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Abstract
TITLE: Examining the Safety Climate of a General Aviation Maintenance, Repair,
and Overhaul (MRO) Organization: A Replication Study and Application
of Bandura’s Reciprocal Causation Model
AUTHOR: Russell Vincent Tokarski
MAJOR ADVISOR: Michael A. Gallo, Ph.D.
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the safety climate of a
general aviation original equipment manufacturer maintenance, repair, and
overhaul (MRO) facility relative to Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017)
respective empirically-derived safety climate path models, and Bandura’s (1977)
theoretical reciprocal causation model. The study used an explanatory correlational
design, and the primary data collection instrument was Uhuegho’s Aviation
Maintenance Safety Climate Survey, which consisted of Fogarty’s 48-item
Maintenance Environment Survey and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) 12-item
General Health Questionnaire. The target population was all aviation maintenance
technicians employed at the targeted MRO’s U.S. facilities, which complete
scheduled/unscheduled light-to-heavy maintenance on general aviation single and
multiengine turbine aircraft as well as GA single and twin reciprocating engine
aircraft. The accessible population was AMTs who were employed at the central
Florida facility, and the sample consisted of N = 90 AMTs who volunteered to
participate.

iii

The results of an SEM analysis validated Fogarty’s (2005) model but not
Uhuegho’s (2017). Consistent with Fogarty, the study confirmed that AMTs’
perceptions of their organization’s concern for safety-related issues, their
supervisors’ level of expertise and the amount of assistance they receive, and the
amount and quality of feedback they receive from their supervisors significantly
influence safety climate. The study also confirmed that AMTs’ psychological
stress/distress levels have a negative effect on maintenance errors and mediate the
relationship between safety climate and errors. Study results also supported
Bandura’s (1977) model with significant reciprocal paths between safety concern
and errors, safety concern and stress, stress and errors, and feedback and errors.
Findings suggest that addressing employees’ perceptions of their organization’s
concern for workplace safety, being sensitive to the feedback supervisors provide,
and reducing workplace stress—for example, by supporting paid mental health
leave or allowing for flexible work hours and/or remote working when feasible—
can have both a direct and indirect effect on mitigating workplace maintenance
errors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background and Purpose
Background
The primary focus of the current study was to examine the safety climate of
a general aviation original equipment manufacturer (OEM) maintenance, repair, and
overhaul (MRO) organization relative to Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017)
respective safety climate path models. Unlike Fogarty, who targeted an Australian
military helicopter unit’s MRO, or Uhuegho, who targeted a U.S. nationwide
civilian-based MRO that specialized in the repair and maintenance of commercial
aircraft, the current study targeted a general aviation OEM MRO in central Florida
that maintains general aviation aircraft. The current study also examined the extent
to which the study’s data were consistent with Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model, which served as the theoretical grounding of the study.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 2014) has recognized via its
strategic plan for human factors the important role that maintenance plays in safety
of the aviation industry and the corresponding problems associated with
maintenance. For example, according to the International Air Transport
Association’s 2018 Safety Report (IATA, 2019), maintenance events in
commercial aviation—which can be caused by an error, a violation, or a
combination of errors and violations (Rankin, 2007)—can have a negative effect on
1

both safety and cost. As a latent condition—which means the condition was present
in the system before the accident and became evident by triggering factors—
maintenance events were cited as a contributing factor in 9% and as a threat in 13%
of the 316 commercial aircraft accidents from 2014 to 2018 (p. 146). Unlike other
latent conditions or threats such as meteorology and wind/wind shear/gusty wind,
IATA reported that humans were primarily responsible for maintenance-caused
events. Accenting this, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA, 2016)
reported that the mechanical/maintenance category, which refers to either a
component failure or a maintenance error, was attributable to 18% of the 1,036
total accidents and 10% of the 159 fatal accidents in fixed-wing non-commercial
general aviation aircraft (p. 19). Mechanical/maintenance related factors also
contributed to 12% of the 25 Part 135 charter operation accidents, and 14.3% of the
Part 135 charter operation seven fatal accidents (p. 22). Mechanical and
maintenance related factors can be combined because it has been found that
component failures in aviation can be tracked back to human error during
manufacture, inspection, and/or maintenance (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). As can
be seen by these statistics, general aviation maintenance error related accident rates
are considerably higher than commercial aviation. Looking at the effect of safety
climate on maintenance error in a general aviation maintenance organization may
enlighten the industry on factors that could be manipulated to attain a much safer

2

work environment and higher quality maintenance product with limited
maintenance error.
Maintenance error has its origins in human error. In aviation maintenance,
the study of human error has its roots with Reason (1997) who defined it as “the
failure of planned actions to achieve their desired ends––without the intervention of
some unforeseeable event” (p. 71). After an extensive search, Skybrary (2019)
defined maintenance error as the “unintended failure to carry out a maintenance
task in accordance with the requirements of that task and/or not working in
accordance with the principles of good maintenance practice” (see Human
Behaviour, Maintenance Error section). Examples of typical aircraft maintenance
errors include: discrepancies in electrical wiring; loose objects left in an aircraft;
the incorrect installation of components or using the wrong parts; inadequate
lubrication; and not securing access panels, fairings, cowlings, fuel or oil caps, and
fuel panels. In the airline industry, maintenance errors can have a significant impact
on a commercial airline’s operating cost. For example, Rankin (2007, p. 16)
reported that maintenance errors in commercial aviation cause: (a) 20% to 30% of
in-flight engine shutdowns with each shutdown costing approximately $500,000;
(b) 50% of flight delays due to engine problems, which equate to approximately
$9,000 per hour; and (c) 50% of flight cancellations due to engine problems, which
can cost approximately $66,000 per cancellation. General aviation operator costs
are difficult to estimate due to the variable conditions and costs associated with
3

differing types of operations, such as personal flights, business operations,
agricultural operations, and charter operations. From my personal experience as a
general aviation MRO maintenance manager, maintenance error cost for a general
aviation maintenance facility will include such expenses as: providing an
alternative aircraft at $25,000 per flight, repair of error averaging $120,000 in labor
and parts, lost labor time because technicians are working the repair in place of
scheduled aircraft, and loss of credibility in the general aviation community. Loss
of credibility is immeasurable due to the loss of possible maintenance input and
future contracts influenced by bad press and derogatory word-of-mouth events.
Fogarty (2005) reported maintenance errors are comprised of personal as
well as organizational variables. At the organizational level––which includes
individual aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs), middle management, support
staff, and upper management––Park et al. (2012) maintained that a strong safety
culture is needed to improve the performance of aircraft maintenance and to
achieve higher organizational performance levels. Once an MRO’s safety culture is
established, those who are responsible for carrying out maintenance tasks should
then embrace it, although Reason (1998, p. 293) pointed out, “Safety cultures
evolve gradually in response to local conditions, past events, the character of
leadership and the mood of the workforce.” Safety culture, because of these factors,
is a difficult phenomenon to quantify. Because a safety culture requires the
workforce to embrace the policies as well as the beliefs of the organization,
4

assessment of its impact on safety as well as its strength is difficult (Fogarty, 2005)
and requires a qualitative approach such as case studies, document/content analysis,
or phenomenology (e.g., Jin & Chen, 2013; Zhang et al., 2002).
This difficulty in measuring an organization’s safety culture has been
reported extensively in the literature. Most relevant to the current study, Reason
and Hobbs (2003) divided safety culture into two parts. The first part consisted of
“the beliefs, attitudes, and values—often unspoken—of an organization’s
membership regarding the pursuit of safety” (p. 145). The second part “is more
concrete and embraces the structures, practices, controls, and policies” (p. 145) the
organization engages in the pursuit of a safe work environment. This latter
component of Reason and Hobbs’ concept of safety culture infers that the beliefs,
attitudes, and values of all employees are critical to understanding an organization’s
safety culture. This infers that instead of trying to acquire a holistic view of an
organization’s safety culture, which would include gaining access to an
organization’s safety records and interviewing upper management—two
challenging endeavors—a more practical and feasible approach would be to focus
on safety climate. This approach is appropriate because, as Guldenmund (2000, p.
221) observed, “culture expresses itself through climate (and) climate (is) the overt
manifestation of culture within an organizational (and hence) climate follows
naturally from culture or, put another way, organizational culture expresses itself
through organizational climate.” Thus, as Fogarty (2004, p. 85) noted: “Surveying
5

Figure 1.1
Baron’s (2008) Culture/Climate Flow Down Pyramid

an organization’s safety climate is tantamount to assessing the organization’s safety
health.” This also is consistent with Baron (2008) who suggested via his
Culture/Climate Flow Down Pyramid, as shown in Figure 1.1, that corporate
culture influences safety culture, which influences safety climate.
In his study of the safety climate of an Australian military helicopter unit’s
MRO, Fogarty (2005) generated an empirical model (Figure 1.2) that demonstrated
a causal relationship among Safety Climate, Psychological Strain, and Maintenance
Errors. Uhuegho (2017) replicated Fogarty’s study by examining the application of
Fogarty’s model relative to a national (U.S.) civilian-based MRO that focused on
the repair and maintenance of commercial aircraft. As illustrated in Figure 1.3,
Uhuegho’s findings did not fully support Fogarty’s model. For example: (a) three
of Fogarty’s safety climate measures—safety concern, feedback, and training—
were not applicable to Uhuegho’s model, (b) Fogarty’s two measures of
6

Figure 1.2
Fogarty’s (2005) Final Safety Climate Model for MROs

Figure 1.3
Uhuegho’s (2017) Final Safety Climate Model MROs

psychological strain—stress and psychological distress—had a direct and
significant effect on maintenance errors in Uhuegho’s model, and (c) Fogarty’s two
measures of safety climate—recognition and supervision—affected maintenance
errors in Uhuegho’s model, but their effect was mediated by psychological strain.
7

Figure 1.4
Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal Causation Model

Note. When applied to Fogarty’s (2005) model (see
Figure 1.2), Safety Climate was assigned to the
Environment dimension, Psychological Strain was
assigned to the Person dimension, and Maintenance
Errors was assigned to the Behavior dimension.

Independent of Fogarty (2005), Uhuegho (2017) also grounded his study in
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model, which posits a bidirectional
relationship among three dimensions: Environment, Person, and Behavior. As
illustrated in Figure 1.4, Uhuegho applied Bandura’s model by aligning (a) the
Environment dimension to Fogarty’s Safety Climate construct, (b) the Person
dimension to Fogarty’s Psychological Strain construct, and (c) the Behavior
dimension to Fogarty’s Maintenance Errors construct. Uhuegho reported a
reciprocal relationship between: (a) the Person and Environment dimensions with
respect to Safety Concern and Stress, (b) the Person and Behavior dimensions with
respect to Maintenance Errors and Stress and between Maintenance Errors and
Psychological Distress, and (c) the Environment and Behavior dimensions with
respect to Maintenance Errors and Safety Concern. As a result, Uhuegho’s data
supported Bandura’s theoretical model.
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As presented in the foregoing paragraphs, the concept of safety is of
paramount importance in the aviation industry and is a critical component related to
maintenance. Furthermore, the single best way to understanding the extent to which
organizations pursue safety initiatives and their effect is by examining the
organization’s safety culture. However, this requires a herculean effort because as
Jin and Chen (2013, p. 60) noted, assessing safety culture requires “both qualitative
(e.g., observations, focus group discussions, case studies) and quantitative methods
(e.g., interviews, surveys, Q-sorts in which participants can assess a statement
using a subjective weighed approach).” This approach also can be very intrusive
because it would require access to an organization’s “safety documents, educational
materials and videos about the company’s safety policies, requirements,
procedures, management techniques and accountability systems…safety behavior
violation reports, (and interviewing) top executives, middle management
personnel…and workers” (Jin & Chen, 2013, pp. 61–62).
Because of the difficulty in assessing the safety culture of an organization,
the current study endeavored to examine the safety climate of the targeted MRO to
get an understanding of its employees’ perceptions about their organization’s safety
management. According to Fogarty (2004, p. 85), examining an organization’s
safety climate is equivalent to assessing the organization’s safety health in that it
provides a window to the organization’s safety culture. To date, only two studies
have been reported in the literature that examined the safety climate of aviation
9

MROs: Fogarty (2005) and Uhuegho (2017). Similar to Uhuegho, the current study
examined the extent to which the study’s data were consistent with Fogarty’s
empirically derived path model and was grounded in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model. The current study also endeavored to see how the sample data fit
Uhuegho’s path model. The primary difference between the current study and those
of Fogarty and Uhuegho, though, was the type of MRO. Whereas Fogarty focused
on an Australian military-based rotary-wing MRO, and Uhuegho focused on a U.S.
nationwide fixed-wing commercial aircraft MRO, the current study examined the
safety climate of a regional U.S. based general aviation aircraft OEM’s MRO.
Purpose
The purpose of the current study was to examine the safety climate of a
general aviation original equipment manufacturer (OEM) maintenance, repair, and
overhaul (MRO) organization. In the context of the current study, an MRO referred
to any organization that is certified to conduct maintenance, preventive
maintenance, alteration, repair, overhaul, ground handling, or servicing of aircraft
under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 145 repair stations or Part 121 Air
Carriers and Commercial Operators (FAA, 2020). Furthermore, safety climate
referred to “the individual’s perceptions of the organization’s policies, procedures,
and rewards relevant to safety in the organization” (Fogarty, 2005, p. 75). The
reader should note that unlike safety culture, which can be informally defined as
“how we do safety around here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 4), safety climate
10

provides a window into an organization’s safety health (Reason, 1997). Among
other things, safety climate focuses on employees’ perceptions of “management’s
commitment to safety, appropriateness of training, and availability of resources,”
all of which have links with safety outcomes (Fogarty, 2004, p. 85). Safety climate
was measured using Fogarty’s (2004) Maintenance Environment Survey (MES).
(Note: A detailed description of the MES is provided in Chapter 3, and the reader is
directed to this chapter for additional information about this instrument.)
The current study was a replication of Uhuegho (2017), which was a
replication and extension of Fogarty (2005). Whereas Fogarty examined the safety
climate of an Australian military helicopter unit’s MRO, Uhuegho examined the
safety climate of a national (U.S.) civilian-based MRO that focused on the repair
and maintenance of commercial aircraft––which is defined as any aircraft
certificated to operate in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 121, such as
for a scheduled air carrier (FAR, 2020). The current study, however, focused on a
general aviation OEM MRO in central Florida that maintains general aviation
aircraft––which is defined as any aircraft certificated to operate in any 14 CFR part
other than 121, such as for personal use under part 91 (FA$, 2020).
Definition of Terms
In the context of the current study, the key terms and phrases were
operationally defined as follows.

11

1.

Aircraft maintenance technician (AMT) was defined as an employee
with the FAA airframe and powerplant certification (A&P), FAA
repairman certificate, or FCC general radio operator license (GROL),
who has contact with aircraft at the targeted general aviation OEM
MRO with the intent of performing inspection, overhaul, repair,
preservation, or preventative maintenance on the airframe, powerplant,
or appliances.

2.

Behavior is a dimension in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model and refers to “an individual’s observable actions and reactions”
(Ormrod, 2012, p. 118). In the context of the current study, Behavior
was aligned to Fogarty’s (2005) Errors construct, and was measured by
one factor, Maintenance Errors, which is defined separately in this
section.

3.

Commercial aviation referred to all aviation organizations operating
and/or maintaining aircraft for compensation or hire under a 14 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 certification (FAR, 2020).

4.

Environment is a dimension in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model and refers to the “general conditions and immediate stimuli
(including reinforcement and punishment) in the outside world”
(Ormrod, 2012, p.118). In the context of the current study,
Environment was aligned to Fogarty’s (2005) Safety Climate construct,
12

and was measured by five factors: Recognition, Safety Concern,
Supervision, Feedback, and Training. The definitions of these factors
are provided separately in this section.
5.

Errors was a latent construct in Fogarty’s (2005) model and was
aligned to Bandura’s (1977) Behavior dimension. This construct was
measured by a single factor, Maintenance Errors, which is defined
separately in this section.

6.

Feedback was defined as participants’ perceptions of the feedback they
received for their work performance, including the amount and quality.
This factor was part of Fogarty’s (2005) Safety Climate construct as
well as a component of Bandura’s (1977) Environment dimension. It
was measured by Fogarty’s MES and corresponded to Items A18–A21
of Uhuegho’s (2017) AMSCS.

7.

General aviation referred to all aviation organizations operating and/or
maintaining aircraft certificated to operate under any 14 CFR other than
Part 121 (FAR, 2020). This includes 14 CFR Parts 91, 129, and 135.

8.

Maintenance referred to the inspection, overhaul, repair, preservation,
and replacement of parts associated with an airframe, engine, or
appliance designed for flight (FAR, 2020). It also included operations
such as towing, repositioning, or handling of aircraft or appliances for
inspection, overhaul, repair, preservation, or replacement of parts.
13

9.

Maintenance errors were defined as errors participants recalled making
on the job that were either self-detected or detected by their
supervisors. This factor was part of Fogarty’s (2005) Errors construct
as well as a component of Bandura’s (1977) Behavior dimension. It
was measured by Fogarty’s MES and corresponded to Items A36–A48
of Uhuegho’s (2017) AMSCS.

10. Maintenance facility (or more briefly, facility) was defined as the entire
building, tooling, equipment, personnel, and organization that were
engaged in the maintenance of aircraft.
11. Maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) referred to any organization
certificated to perform inspection, repair, overhaul, or servicing of
aircraft, their components, or appliances (FAR, 2020). An MRO also is
referred to as a “repair station.”
12. Organization was defined as the employees of any facility and included
management, support staff, AMTs, line service technicians, and
customer service representatives.
13. Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) was defined as the company
that manufactures and maintains its own specific brand of aircraft. An
OEM holds the FAA type certification to manufacture and provide
parts and components for those aircraft as well as maintain the aircraft
to airworthiness standards.
14

14. Person was a dimension in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model and referred to an “individual’s particular physical
characteristics (e.g., age, gender, physical attractiveness), cognitive
processes (e.g., attention, expectations), and socially and culturally
conferred roles and reputations” (Ormrod, 2012, p. 118). In the context
of the current study, Person was aligned to Fogarty’s (2005)
Psychological Strain construct and was measured by two factors: Stress
and Psychological Distress. The definitions of these factors are
provided separately in this section.
15. Psychological distress referred to participants’ general psychological
health and included psychosomatic symptoms, anxiety, insomnia,
social dysfunction, and severe depression (Fogarty, 2005, p. 8). This
factor was associated with Fogarty’s (2005) Psychological Strain
construct as well as a component of Bandura’s (1977) Person
dimension. It was measured by Goldberg and Williams’ (1998) General
Health Questionnaire and corresponded to Items B1–B12 of Uhuegho’s
(2017) AMSCS.
16. Psychological strain referred to “a state of well-being in which every
individual realizes his or her own potential, can cope with the normal
stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to
make a contribution to her or his community” (World Health
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Organization [WHO], 2014, para. 1). In the context of the current
study, Psychological Strain was a latent construct in Fogarty’s (2005)
model and was aligned to Bandura’s (1977) Person dimension. This
construct was defined by two factors: Stress and Psychological
Distress. The definitions of these factors are provided separately in this
section. This construct also was hypothesized to mediate the
relationship between Safety Climate factors and Maintenance Errors
relative to Fogarty’s path model.
17. Recognition was defined as participants’ perceptions of the recognition
they received for doing good work. This factor was part of Fogarty’s
(2005) Safety Climate construct as well as a component of Bandura’s
(1977) Environment dimension. It was measured by Fogarty’s MES
and corresponded to Items A1–A5 of Uhuegho’s (2017) AMSCS.
18. Repair station is another term used for MRO as defined in this section,
and refers to any facility certificated to perform aircraft maintenance
under part 145 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.
19. Safety climate was defined as “the individual’s perceptions of the
organization’s policies, procedures, and rewards relevant to safety in
the organization” (Fogarty, 2005, p. 75). In the context of the current
study, Safety Climate was a latent construct in Fogarty’s (2005) model
and was aligned to Bandura’s (1977) Environment dimension. This
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construct was measured by five factors: Recognition, Safety Concern,
Supervision, Feedback, and Training. The definitions of these factors
are provided separately in this section.
20. Safety concern was defined as participants’ perceptions of the extent to
which they believed their organization had a strong concern for safetyrelated issues (Fogarty, 2005, p. 7). This factor was part of Fogarty’s
(2005) Safety Climate construct as well as a component of Bandura’s
(1977) Environment dimension. It was measured by Fogarty’s MES
and corresponded to Items A6–A10 of Uhuegho’s (2017) AMSCS.
21. Stress referred to participants’ perceptions of workplace stressors and
reflected participants’ “actual feelings and consequences of stress,
rather than the background factors that might be causing the strain”
(Fogarty, 2005, p.7). This factor was associated with Fogarty’s (2005)
Psychological Strain construct as well as a component of Bandura’s
(1977) Person dimension. It was measured by Fogarty’s MES and
corresponded to Items A27–A35 of Uhuegho’s (2017) AMSCS.
22. Supervision referred to participants’ perceptions of their supervisor’s
expertise and the extent to which they were provided assistance from
their supervisor. This factor was part of Fogarty’s (2005) Safety
Climate construct as well as a component of Bandura’s (1977)
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Environment dimension. It was measured by Fogarty’s MES and
corresponded to Items A11–A17 of Uhuegho’s (2017) AMSCS.
23. Training referred to participants’ perceptions of the “different aspects
of training, including adequacy of training for the job, encouragement
to undertake further training, and opportunities for on-the-job training”
(Fogarty, 2005, p. 7). This factor was part of Fogarty’s (2005) Safety
Climate construct as well as a component of Bandura’s (1977)
Environment dimension. It was measured by Fogarty’s MES and
corresponded to Items A22–A26 of Uhuegho’s (2017) AMSCS.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions
Three primary research questions guided the current study:
Research Question 1. To what extent does the safety climate of a general
aviation OEM’s MRO relate to Fogarty’s (2005) model?
Research Question 2. To what extent does the safety climate of a general
aviation OEM’s MRO relate to Uhuegho’s (2017) Model?
Research Question 3. To what extent does the safety climate of a general
aviation OEM’s MRO relate to Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model?
Research Hypotheses
The corresponding research hypotheses were as follows. (Note: These
research hypotheses are re-expressed as null hypotheses in Chapter 4.)
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Hypothesis 1. The current study’s sample data will be consistent with
Fogarty’s (2005) model.
Hypothesis 2. The current study’s sample data will be consistent with
Uhuegho’s (2017) model.
Hypothesis 3. The current study’s sample data will have a reciprocal
relationship with at least two of Bandura’s (1977) three dimensions of
Environment, Person, and Behavior.
Study Design
The current study’s research design was explanatory correlational. This
design was appropriate because the study involved examining relationships among
multiple factors associated with a single group—AMTs. As noted by Ary et al.
(2010), correlational research is used to assess the strength of relationships between
variables of one group of subjects. It measures the extent to which variables covary with one another (WordPress, 2015). The study also assessed the extent to
which the sample data were consistent with three models as depicted in Figures 1.2,
1.3, and 1.4. In this respect, correlational research was appropriate because the
study examined how a set of variables fit into multiple, data-supported or
hypothesized causal models, providing correlation coefficients for each variable.
Significance of the Study
The current study added to the current body of research on the safety
climate of an MRO. Unlike Fogarty (2005), who targeted the MRO of an
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Australian Army helicopter unit, and Uhuegho (2017), who targeted a U.S. civilianbased MRO network that maintained commercial aircraft under contract conditions
across the nation, the current study targeted a single, regional U.S. general aviation
OEM’s MRO facility. Thus, when considered from this perspective, the current
study complement both Fogarty’s and Uhuegho’s respective studies and
contributed to their ecological generalizability.
Targeting a completely different type of aviation MRO cannot be
understated from a research perspective. From my personal experiences as a 25year AMT and maintenance manager, coupled with Cooper (2000), the working
conditions and corporate climate differ from one MRO facility to the next. In the
general aviation OEM’s MRO, the balance of profit versus safety is a continual
struggle due to safety’s strain on profit margin. Safety tends to be a latent construct
in the aviation industry and only becomes important after an accident or incident
occurs, or when profit is negatively affected. The current study provides data on a
different segment of the MRO market, and because it applies to a single facility it
provides a microcosm view of safety climate.
As noted earlier, the current study was applied to an MRO that is owned
and operated by a general aviation OEM. This facility is a central Florida based
aviation MRO certificated as a repair station under U.S. CFR 14 Part 145. At the
time of the study, the facility employed approximately 170 AMTs who had direct
contact with aircraft in maintenance. This provided a different organizational
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profile to test the current models of aviation safety climate, adding to the literature
of safety climate and culture. It also provided a microcosm perspective of the
climate and culture of a single facility in a specific location. As Cooper (2000)
noted, although organizations may adopt similar behaviors, beliefs and attitudes
will differ from department to department, working group to working group, and
individual to individual. Limiting the current study to one location provided a better
depiction of business’ employees’ beliefs and attitudes.
The results of the current study also validated Fogarty’s (2005) path model,
and supported Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. It did not, however,
validate Uhuegho’s (2017) model. The significance of these findings is two-fold.
First, they highlight the importance of focusing similar research on a single MRO
as opposed to an MRO that involves multiple sites, which was the case with
Uhuegho. Second, the findings also demonstrate the utility of theory with respect to
Bandura’s model. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the current study confirmed
the bidirectional influence that each dimension of Person, Environment, and
Behavior has on each other when applied to the safety climate of an MRO.
From a practical perspective, the current study also helps provide managers
of the targeted MRO with insight into their organization’s safety climate. Thus, the
results of the current study could be used to help managers improve the safety
behaviors within their organization and make managers cognizant of their
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employees’ perceptions of the safety issues that were addressed, especially those
where employees’ self-reported perceptions might be contrary to mangers’ beliefs.
Study Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
Limitations of a study are those conditions, events, or circumstances over
which a researcher has no control but can limit the generalizability of the study’s
results. Listed here are the limitations of the current study. Some of these were
identified a priori by evaluation of similar studies and methodologies, while others
were identified during the data gathering process.
1. Sample Demographics. This study was conducted at a single general
aviation OEM’s MRO in central Florida and consisted of a specific demographic
mix of employees. Therefore, subsequent studies involving a different demographic
mix of participants might get different results.
2. Honesty of Participants’ Responses. Participants' responses to the items
on the AMSCS regarding their perceptions and experiences relative to their
organization’s safety climate were self-reported. Although confidentiality and
anonymity of participants’ responses were maintained, it is still possible that their
responses could have been influenced by a sense of connection between their
responses and some type of retaliation from management, and hence their
responses might not have been truthful or honest. Therefore, the veracity of
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participants’ responses could have affected the results of the study, and the results
of similar studies that enact strategies to address this issue might be different.
3. Time Constraints. Because the current study was cross-sectional in
nature, the data represent participants’ attitudes toward and perceptions of safety at
a specific point in time. Therefore, subsequent studies conducted during a different
time period—even with the same respondents—might get different results.
4. Timing of the Study. The current study was conducted during an
unprecedented era. The world was experiencing a viral pandemic that affected
hundreds of millions of people with tens of millions of deaths globally, and the
United States was experiencing an economic downturn. It is unclear what impact
these events had on participants’ perceptions of workplace safety. Therefore,
subsequent studies conducted in the absence of these events or under different
circumstances—even with the same participants—might get different results.
Delimitations
Delimitations are researcher-defined conditions, events, or circumstances
that further define the boundaries of a study. Imposing these additional restrictions
make a study feasible to implement, but they also have the potential to further limit
the generalizability of the findings. Listed here are the delimitations of the current
study. Some of these were identified a priori by evaluation of similar studies and
methodologies, while others were identified during the research period.
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1. Study Approach. The current study was a replication study that sought
to validate the respective empirical path models of Fogarty (2005) and Uhuegho
(2017). As was the case for these two previous studies, the current study used a
structural equation modeling (SEM) approach with exactly the same latent
constructs and corresponding measured variables. As a result, similar studies that
seek to validate different path models or use different latent constructs and/or
corresponding measured variables might get different results.
2. Theoretical Grounding. With respect to Research Question 3, the
current study was grounded in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model in
which Safety Climate was assigned to the Environment dimension, Psychological
Strain was assigned to the Person dimension, and Maintenance Errors was assigned
to the Behavior dimension. As a result, similar studies that use a different
theoretical grounding or use different assignments to these three dimensions might
get different results.
3. MRO Facility. The current study’s targeted maintenance, repair, and
overhaul facility performed scheduled and unscheduled light-to-heavy maintenance
on general aviation single and multiengine turbine aircraft as well as general
aviation single and twin reciprocating engine aircraft manufactured. Therefore,
similar studies involving MROs that perform different types of service might not
get the same results.
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4. Facility Location. The current study was implemented at a general
aviation OEM’s MRO in central Florida. Thus, similar studies conducted outside
this geographic region or at a different facility may get different results.
5. Participant Selection. The participants in the current study were limited
to only AMTs as defined in the definitions section of Chapter 1. Thus, similar
studies that use all employees working at an MRO, including support staff, line
service, customer service representatives, and general management, might get
different results.
6. Data Collection Instrument. The current study used Uhuegho’s (2017)
Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), which included Fogarty’s
(2005) Maintenance Environment Survey (MES) and Goldberg and Williams’
(1988) General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). Therefore, similar studies that use
different data collection instruments might get different results.
7. Data Collection Approach. The data collection instrument was
administered as a digital questionnaire for participants to complete online during a
training event by the management team. As a result, similar studies that do not
administer the questionnaire as part of a training event, or use a different data
collection approach such as a mailed survey that is completed by hand or a
telephone survey might get different results.
8. Data Collection Period. The current study was conducted over a 2-week
period ending February 26, 2021. Therefore, similar studies that are conducted for a
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longer or shorter time period or during a different time of the year might get
different results.
9. Sample Size. The current study was conducted at a single facility with a
limited population, which had an effect on the sample size. Therefore, a study
conducted in a facility with a larger population or across multiple facilities where a
larger sample could be selected might get different results.
10. Type of Data. The current study collected only quantitative data.
Therefore, similar studies that use qualitative methodologies such as case studies,
phenomenology, or grounded theory, all of which result in contextual data, or
studies that use a mixed-methods approach that results in both numerical and
contextual data, might get different results.
11. Data Analysis Strategy. The current study used structural equation
modeling (SEM), multiple regression, and MANOVA to test the study’s
hypotheses and answer the corresponding research questions. Thus, similar studies
that use different statistical procedures might get different results.
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Literature
Introduction
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section contains
information about the theoretical foundation on which the current study was
grounded and includes a discussion of Bandura’s (1977) social cognitive theory and
the corresponding reciprocal causation model. The second section contains a
review of prior research relative to the concepts of safety climate and safety culture.
The third section provides a summary of the related literature and a discussion of
its implications to the current study.
Overview of Underlying Theory
The current study was a replication of Uhuegho (2017), which was a
replication and extension of Fogarty (2005), and endeavored to examine the safety
climate of a general aviation original equipment manufacturer MRO organization.
As presented in Chapter 1, safety climate provides a window into an organization’s
safety health or culture, and can be examined by assessing employees’
perceptions—including their beliefs, attitudes, and values—about their
organization’s commitment to safety. The focus here is on acquiring employees’
mental representations, which are a function of employees’ personal experiences
working for their employer. Unlike “black-box” or “stimulus-response”
psychology, which concentrates on tangible and observable human behavior,
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mental representations are a function of internal mental changes based on cognitive
processes that are neither tangible nor observable. As a result, the current study was
grounded in cognitive psychology, and the primary underlying theory was
Bandura’s (1977) social cognitive theory (SCT), which involves watching and
interacting with other people. Although there are many facets to SCT, the study
focused predominantly on the concept of reciprocal causation (Bandura, 1989,
2006, 2008; Schunk & Pajares, 2004; Zimmerman & Schunk, 2003).
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the concept of reciprocal causation involves three
sets of variables, or dimensions—Person (P), Environment (E), and Behavior (B)—
and posits that each dimension influences the other two. As an example, consider
the Behavior dimension and how both the Environment and Person dimensions can
influence it (see Figure 2.2a). If the managers of an MRO positively recognize
AMTs monthly for maintaining a 100% safety record—for example, they might
receive a gift certificate or be billed as “employee of the month”—then this will
influence how they perform their job. Thus, in this situation, E is influencing B.
Note that it also is possible for AMTs’ perceptions of their environment to affect
their behavior. For example, regardless of an MRO’s safety policies or

Figure 2.1
Reciprocal Causation Model

28

Figure 2.2
Reciprocal Relationships Among Person, Environment, and Behavior

commitments, if AMTs think or believe they will be recognized in some manner
for maintaining an excellent safety record, then they are more likely to exhibit
safety-conscious behavior. Thus, in this latter situation, the Person dimension is
influencing Behavior.
Note that the two situations described in the foregoing paragraph reflect a
unidirectional relationship. The reciprocal causation model, though, posits a
bidirectional relationship. Thus, in the previous example, it also is possible for the
Behavior dimension to influence the Environment and Person dimensions (see
Figure 2.2b). Focusing on the B  E relationship, it is reasonable to assume that
AMTs who attend safety-training sessions (i.e., Behavior) will seek to avoid
situations (i.e., Environments) that have a high safety risk. For example, an AMT
might request not to be paired with a careless colleague or to use tools that are not
up to spec. With respect to the B  P relationship, consider the situation where an
AMT successfully completes several complicated repair jobs. Over time, this
behavior has the potential to influence this person’s self-efficacy or selfconfidence, which is reflective of the Person dimension.
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Now consider the relationship between the Person and Environment
dimensions, and how they can affect each other (see Figure 2.2c). An AMT who
has a great mental attitude about working and helping co-workers (P) is more likely
to be recognized favorably by management or peers (E). It also is plausible for the
reverse to hold. For example, if management or peers have high regard for an AMT
(E), then this could impact the AMT’s self-perception (P) of being well-liked.
As presented in Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1, and replicated here as Figure 2.3 for
the convenience of the reader, when Bandura’s (1977) model is applied to the
context of the current study: (a) the Person dimension was represented by Fogarty’s
(2005) Psychological Strain construct, and was measured by the Stress subscale of
Fogarty’s Maintenance Environment Survey (MES) and Goldberg and Williams’
(1988) General Health Questionnaire (GHQ); (b) the Environment dimension was
represented by Fogarty’s Safety Climate construct, and was measured by five
subscales of the MES: Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and
Training; and (c) the Behavior dimension was represented by Fogarty’s
Maintenance Errors construct and was measured by the Errors subscale of the MES.
Figure 2.3
Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal Causation Model
Relative to Fogarty (2005)

30

Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model has been applied to previous
safety culture studies. For example, Cooper (2000, p. 119) reported, “Bandura's
reciprocal model appears to offer the perfect framework with which to analyze
organizational (safety) ‘culture’…” In Cooper’s application, though, Person
represented “safety climate,” Behavior represented an organization’s safety
checklists, and Environment (“Situation”) represented an organization’s safety
management system audits and inspections. Jin and Chen (2013) applied Cooper’s
representation of Bandura’s model to their study, which examined the safety
culture of a national general contractor. A review of this study is provided later in
this chapter.
Uhuegho (2017) was the first to apply Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model to a safety climate study. Uhuegho examined the safety climate of
a national (U.S.) civilian-based MRO that focused on the repair and maintenance of
commercial aircraft. A discussion of his study, including a graphical depiction of
the corresponding significant reciprocal relationships he found, is presented later in
this chapter. The current study replicated Uhuegho, in part, by applying Bandura’s
model to assess the safety climate of a single general aviation OEM MRO facility
in central Florida.
Review of Past Research
The literature review presented here is structured into four sections. The
first section provides the reader with background information that distinguishes
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between safety climate and safety culture. The second section includes a discussion
of key factors that have been identified in the literature as influencing safety
climate as well as factors that are influenced by safety climate. The third section
contains studies on safety culture and/or climate that were based on the underlying
theory of the current study. The last section contains a summary of safety climate
studies in aviation, including Fogarty (2004, 2005) and Uhuegho (2017), which
examined the safety climate of an MRO.
Safety Climate vs. Safety Culture
The primary purpose of the current study was to assess the safety climate
of a U.S. based general aviation OEM’s MRO. As presented in Chapter 1, this was
done by determining the extent to which data acquired from the study “fit” the
empirical safety climate path models of Fogarty (2005) and Uhuegho (2017). The
focus on safety climate, which involves assessing employees’ perceptions of safety
in the workplace, is important because it is considered to be a predictor of safety
behavior as well as a predictor of an organization’s overall safety culture
(Williamson et al., 1997; Zohar, 1980). Accenting this latter point, Guldenmund
(2000) and Schneider et al. (2017) posited that safety climate helps shape
organizational culture. Because the terms safety climate and safety culture are
commonly misunderstood and/or sometimes treated synonymously in the literature,
a discussion that explains the difference between these terms relative to the current
study is warranted.
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Concept of Safety Culture. From a historical perspective, the concept of a
safety culture was first recognized in one of the final reports written from the
investigation of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident (Taylor, 2010).
In its revised report from 1988, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
(INSAG, 1999, p. 2) wrote:
The objective of achieving safety must permeate each activity performed in
generating electricity at a nuclear power plant. There must be pervasive
safety thinking on the part of those concerned in each phase, from siting and
design to construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance, upgrades or
modifications, training, decommissioning, and all related activities. This
pervasive safety thinking is a key element in the ‘safety culture’ that is
emphasized strongly in this report.
Inherent within this statement is the inference that safety culture is a subset of the
overall culture of an organization. To understand this more fully, it is helpful to
begin with a definition of culture. Unfortunately, though, this is difficult to do
because culture is a complex phenomenon or construct, and hence there is no onesize-fits-all definition. As a result, instead of offering a definition of culture, it is
more informative to consider it from a general perspective. One such perspective
that captures the essence of what culture means relative to the proposed study is
from the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior (GLOBE) project, which
considers culture as “practices and values,” where practices refer to “the way things
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are done in this culture,” and values are judgments about “the way things should be
done” (Tirmizi, 2008, p. 23). In more practical terms, and paraphrasing Uttal (1983,
as cited in Reason, 1998, p. 294), culture may be thought of simply as “how and
why we do things around here.”
When applied to an organization, organizational culture would then refer to
“how and why” things are done within a particular organization. More succinctly,
organizational culture may be defined as
The shared values and basic assumptions that explain why organizations do
what they do and focus on what they focus on; it exists at a fundamental,
perhaps preconscious level of awareness, is grounded in history and
tradition and is a source of collective identity and commitment. (Schneider
et al., 2017, p. 468)
The reader will note that the shared values cited by Schneider et al. (2017) refer to
the organization’s values, which usually (a) are developed by the organization’s
managers, (b) reflected in the organization’s mission statement, and (c) shared with
the organization’s members who then follow them. Thus, Schneider et al.’s
definition implies that culture is inherent in and is the driving force behind every
organization, and that organizational culture reflects the overall dominant
characteristics of an organization. In other words, it is representative of the
organization as a whole.
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Within any organizational culture, however, there also exist several smaller
subcultures. As an example, consider the various non-academic organizations
within a university such as athletics, student affairs, and campus security. The
university as a whole would represent the organizational culture, and these different
organizations would be considered organizational subcultures. Although these
subcultures would have their own distinguishing set of characteristics, they would
still subscribe to the overall culture of the university. Expanding this example even
further, consider an athletics department that houses the university’s basketball and
football teams. These teams also would be considered subcultures and have their
own identity.
Applying this concept to the current study, although the targeted
organization—a U.S. based general aviation OEM’s MRO—has its own
organizational culture, the focus of the study was on one subculture, namely safety.
Thus, safety culture is considered to be an aggregate of the policies, beliefs,
attitudes, and actions toward safety in the targeted organization. A more practical
way in which to express this is, it’s “the way we do safety around here” (Deal &
Kennedy 2000, p. 4), and is influenced by the management team, supervisors, and
the organizational policies that are implemented and enforced (Patankar & Taylor,
2016).
When this concept of culture is applied to the realm of safety, Reason
(1998) reported that a safety culture is a reporting culture. With a robust safety
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culture, an organization can expect employees to report errors and risks in a timely
manner so that lessons are learned and prevention methods are established to
ensure risks are mitigated. These risks, as reported in the literature, fall into two
types: violations and errors. Violations are a disregard of policy and procedure,
while errors are omissions or commissions of steps by mistake (Reason & Hobbs,
2003). The expectation of a reporting culture is each error reported by an employee
is met with positive consequences unless the employee committed a violation (Atak
& Kingma, 2011). With a robust safety culture, an employee in violation can
expect a less severe consequence if the violation is reported promptly (Geller,
1994). In this sense, a culture of safety concomitant with a reporting of safety
violations and errors is considered a just culture (Reason, 1998).
When considered from a research perspective, a critical question is, “How
can culture be measured?” This question is applicable to any type of culture,
including safety culture. Based on the various definitions or perspectives associated
with culture, particularly the more practical ones such as “how and why we do
things around here,” the concept of culture infers that it is functional because it
provides a frame of reference for behavior (Guldenmund, 2000). This implies, then,
that assessing an organization’s culture is best accomplished through a qualitative
research approach similar to the way cultural anthropologists study various
societies. When applied to the context of the current study, this would involve
reviewing the safety and quality records of the organization via a content analysis
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and conducting personal interviews with employees across the spectrum, including
upper and middle managers as well as line workers and their supervisors (Jin &
Chen, 2013). These qualitative methodologies can be extremely invasive for an
organization because it would mean revealing or providing access to records that
are considered proprietary. Such exposure also could have negative consequences
with respect to the organization’s reputation. Thus, trying to assess the safety
culture of an organization would require tremendous cooperation by employees at
all levels of the organization and involve access to not only the organization’s
employees but also to their safety records (Guldenmund, 2000; Jin & Chen, 2013;
Pidgeon, 1998).
Concept of Safety Climate. In the early culture literature, the terms culture
and climate were intermingled, and in some cases, treated synonymously. Within
the past 30 years, though, there has been a decoupling of these terms and the belief
now is that organizational culture expresses itself through organizational climate
(Guldenmund, 2000). For example, Schein (1992) observed that climate may be
considered as culture in the making and is “a reflection and manifestation of
cultural assumptions” (p. 230). Thus, where culture is considered functional,
climate is considered to be psychological and refers to the attitudes, beliefs, and
perceptions of an organization’s employees toward the shared values of the
organization (Guldenmund, 2000). This implies that an organization’s culture is
expressed through its employee’s beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions. This was
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illustrated graphically in Baron’s (2008) Culture/Climate Flow Down pyramid,
which was presented in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1.
As an illustration, consider the previous example about the culture of a
university, the subculture of the athletics department, and the sub-subculture of the
basketball team. The coach of the basketball team would establish a certain culture
(shared values and beliefs) relative to the team’s identity, including how the team
plays, how the players are to treat opposing team members, the players’ expected
level of camaraderie, the extent to which players are to socialize with each other,
and so forth. This culture would be consistent with the culture of the athletics
department, which would be consistent with the university’s overall culture. To get
a peek into the basketball team’s culture (as well as a peek into the overall culture
of the athletics department and university), a researcher would assess the player’s
attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions toward playing basketball for the coach. If the
players’ attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions reflected “winning is paramount,
regardless of how we play,” then one can surmise that this is the culture the coach
has established (even if this were not true), and correspondingly would reflect the
overall culture of the athletic department and university.
When applied to the context of the current study, safety climate refers to
employees’ attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions with respect to how safety is carried
out within the organization and is used as a predictor of employees’ safety-related
behaviors (Bamel et al., 2019). Similar to the basketball team example, safety
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climate provides a window into an organization’s safety culture. Because safety
climate is considered attitudinal with respect to safety within an organization, it can
be assessed using attitude scales or questionnaires. One such questionnaire that was
designed to assess the safety climate of aviation MROs is Fogarty’s (2004)
Maintenance Environment Survey (MES), which is described in Chapter 3. The
MES includes items that assess employees’ perceptions of: (a) the recognition they
receive from their organization/supervisor for doing a good job; (b) their
organization’s concern for safety; (c) their supervisor’s level of expertise and
assistance they provide; (d) the level of feedback they receive from their supervisor
or organization; (e) training-related issues such as whether they have received
adequate training for their current job, the level of encouragement they receive to
pursue additional training, and opportunities their organization provides for on-thejob training; and (f) the amount of stress they feel on the job as well as the
consequences of their stress. When these items are considered as an aggregate, the
collective responses provide a picture of an MRO’s safety culture and can be used
to determine what organizational factors need adjustment to improve the safety
culture (Cooper, 2000).
Summary of Safety Climate vs. Safety Culture. In their review of the
safety climate literature, O’Dea et al. (2010, p. 2) wrote, “The general consensus is
that culture represents the more stable and enduring characteristics of the
organization and has been likened to its traits or ‘personality’.” O’Dea et al. also
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reported that “Safety culture is a more complex and enduring trait, reflecting
fundamental values, norms, assumptions, and expectations, which, to some extent,
reside in societal culture (Mearns & Flin, 1999, as cited in O’Dea et al., 2010, p. 2).
“Climate, on the other hand, is thought to represent a more visible manifestation of
the culture, which can be seen as its ‘mood state,’ at a particular moment in time”
(Cox & Flin, 1998, as cited in O’Dea et al., 2010, p. 2). The safety climate
literature also has confirmed that “the questionnaire survey is the predominant
method used for investigating safety, (and) it is now widely recognized that this
method reflects the climate of the organization at the time of the study” (Denison,
1996, as cited in O’Dea et al., 2010, p. 2). The literature has further confirmed there
is general agreement “that climate can be used as an indication of the underlying
safety culture” (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999). As a result, the
current study focused on safety climate and used Fogarty’s (2004) MES as a means
to get a peek into the targeted MRO’s safety culture.
Factors That Influence Safety Climate
A search of the safety climate literature uncovered multiple safety climate
studies that sought to identify factors that influenced employee perceptions and
attitudes of safety in the workplace. In the search to identify and mitigate safety
risks before they led to an accident or incident, researchers examined workers’
perceptions and attitudes, or more precisely, the safety climate of organizations. To
establish a measure of safety climate, researchers defined the factors that
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contributed to these perceptions and attitudes. A description of the salient studies
relevant to this endeavor follows.
Zohar (1980). In his seminal work, Zohar looked to the industrial safety
literature to develop a safety climate instrument that would measure employee
perceptions and attitudes in multiple industries throughout Israel. Zohar identified
seven factors to include in the initial questionnaire (p. 98): (a) perceived
management attitude toward safety, (b) perceived effects of safe conduct on
promotion, (c) perceived effects of safe conduct on social status, (d) perceived
organizational status of safety officer, (e) perceived importance and effectiveness
of safety training, (f) perceived risk level at workplace, and (g) perceived
effectiveness of enforcement versus guidance in promoting safety. Seven short,
positively worded statements measured on a 5-point response scale represented
each factor. This resulted in an initial questionnaire of 49 items, which were
administered to a sample of 120 workers in four factories during personal
interviews. Zohar ultimately removed nine items because they were found to be
unrelated to any dimension.
Zohar (1980) administered the revised 40-item questionnaire to 20 workers
from 20 different factories, representing four production categories: metal
fabrication, food processing, chemical industry, and the textile industry. Using a
within- and between-factors ANOVA, the hypothesis of a defined safety climate
was supported statistically, F(19, 380) = 52.4, p < .001. The attempt to correlate
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safety climate scores of each factory with standard safety measures, such as
accident rate and severity rate, was discontinued, though, because these statistics
were found to be linked to employees’ compensation and to be unreliable.
Alternatively, the research team brought in experienced safety inspectors to rate
each factory’s safety practices and accident prevention programs. Using Spearman
rank correlation coefficients to test the four judges’ rankings versus the respective
safety climate score in each industry produced high correlations in three of the four
industries: metal fabrication, rs = .90; chemical industry, rs = .80; and food
processing, rs = .50. The textile industry was omitted due to that judge’s
inexperience with the industry and the locations of the factories. The high level of
agreement between safety climate scores and judges’ rankings validated the
questionnaire and supported the hypothesis that safety climate scores will vary
between factories and correlate with the factory’s safety record.
The final part of Zohar’s (1980) study used stepwise discriminate analysis
to determine the smallest number of safety climate dimensions required to
differentiate between separate factories by their safety climate scores. Zohar found
that four of the eight dimensions accounted for most of the separation of factories:
(a) perceived importance of safety training programs, Wilke’s  = .12, F = 141.12;
(b) perceived effect of work pace on safety, Wilke’s  = .02, F = 81.44; (c)
perceived status of safety committee, Wilke’s  = .006, F = 58.92; and (d)
perceived status of safety officer, Wilke’s  = .002, F = 48.81 (Zohar, 1980, p.
42

100). Zohar interpreted these results as indication that two dimensions influenced
safety climate levels. The first was the perceived relevance of safety to job
behavior, indicated by the result that workers regarded safety training as a
prerequisite and that high work pace is a job hazard. The second dimension was the
perceived attitude management has for safety, indicated by the importance of the
perceived status of both the safety committee and the safety officer.
Zohar (1980, p. 101) concluded that the safety climate measure could be
used to determine and compare safety levels among different industries. Because
the judges had a difficult time evaluating and comparing safety levels of the
differing industries and factories through safety prevention programs, he explained
that the safety climate score could be a common measure used to compare safety
across multiple facilities and industries.
Subsequent to Zohar (1980), many safety climate researchers validated or
improved on his results. Glennon (1982, as cited in Coyle et al., 1995) developed a
safety climate model in the Australian workforce that included nine climate
dimensions. Brown and Holme (1986, as cited in Bamel et al., 2019) confirmed the
validity of Zohar’s model of safety climate in a production facility in the United
States, although their research brought into question the generalizability of Zohar.
Coyle et al. (1995). Coyle et al. recognized that many of the safety climate
questionnaires used might not have been as generalizable as researchers and safety
specialists required. As a result, they posited that employee perceptions of safety
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could be influenced by factors specific to a particular workplace or industry and
suggested that Zohar’s (1980) results, as well as those by Glennon (1982, as cited
in Coyle et al., 1995) and by Brown and Holme (1986, as cited in Coyle et al.,
1995), might “reflect nothing more than inherent biases in their questionnaire
designs” (Coyle et al., 1995, p. 249). Based on a factor analysis, Coyle et al.
reported that two very similar organizations did not identify the same perceived
factors that affected safety. Although Coyle et al. concluded that the factors
influencing safety climate differ between organizations, they also recognized that
safety climate could be useful to identify factors that require attention when
looking for improvement to safety culture in a specific workplace.
DeJoy et al. (2004). From an organizational perspective, DeJoy et al.
examined the relationship that safety climate shares with three factors: (a)
environmental conditions, (b) safety-related programs and policies, and (c)
organizational climate. They set out to determine not only the relationship that
these factors have with safety climate, but also the strength and direction of those
relationships within the context of retail operations. These factors were selected
because environmental conditions are considered the traditional antecedents of
safety performance, while organizational climate and policy are considered to
greatly influence employee behaviors and attitudes toward safety (p. 82). Dejoy et
al. employed a self-administered questionnaire scored on a 5-point Likert type
response scale, distributed throughout 21 retail stores, and received 2,208
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responses. The analysis of the responses was completed using hierarchical multiple
regression, designed to reflect the progression from the environmental conditions to
the organizational-level factors (p. 85). Eleven partial correlations were completed.
While controlling for all other variables, safety policy and programs (R2 = .395),
organizational support (R2 = .148), and environmental conditions (R2 = −.127)
produced three of the top four strongest correlations with safety climate. Dejoy et
al. reported that these three factors collectively accounted for 55% of the variance
in safety climate scores (p. 86). These findings are consistent with the safety
climate literature, where organizations that take care to provide a clean and safe
environment, control risk through policy and procedure, and provide organizational
support to their employees, tend to exhibit a more positive safety climate.
Based on the findings presented here, although safety climate models
differed on many of the factors found to influence safety climate, there is
agreement that management commitment, policy and procedures, and
organizational climate exhibit the most consistent effect on safety climate. The
reader will note that these factors are included in Fogarty’s (2004) Maintenance
Environment Survey (MES), which was used in the current study to assess the
safety climate of the targeted MRO.
Factors That Are Influenced by Safety Climate
In addition to factors that influence safety climate, research also has
progressed into identifying factors that are influenced by safety climate. Three
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studies relevant to the current study are Johnson (2007), Wang et al. (2018), and
Huang et al. (2015).
Johnson (2007). Johnson posited three hypotheses. The first one—safety
climate consists of three factors, including Active Practices, Proactive Practices,
and Declarative Practices—was concerned with factors that affect safety climate.
The primary focus of his study, though, was the second and third hypotheses: (a)
safety climate is directly and positively correlated with safe behavior, and (b) safety
climate is negatively correlated with injury frequency/severity rates. Both of these
hypotheses examined safety climate’s ability to predict safety-related outcomes.
Using the Zohar Safety Climate Survey (ZSCQ; Zohar & Luria, 2005), Johnson
trimmed the ZSCQ to an 11-question format, which resulted in a three-dimension
set of effects on safety climate: caring, compliance, and coaching. Based on a
sample of 292 participants from a heavy manufacturing organization, Johnson
confirmed that these factors were closely aligned with Zohar and Luria’s (2005)
factors, which was verification of Johnson’s first hypothesis.
To verify his second hypothesis, Johnson commissioned safety
professionals at the group level in 17 areas of the targeted company to evaluate the
safe behavior of employees over a 5-month period. Johnson then used structural
equation modeling (SEM) and factor analysis to analyze the correlations between
safe behavior and safety climate. With respect to his third hypothesis, Johnson
collected injury frequency and severity rates from Occupational Safety and Health
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(OSHA) administration records for the 17 areas for the 2006 calendar year. These
frequency rates included the total number of recordable injuries per 100 employees
per year (TCIR), the number of lost workday injuries per 100 employees per year
(LWDCR), and the total number of lost workdays per 100 employees per year
(LWDR). Johnson reported significant relationships between safety climate and
safe behavior (r = .738, p < .01) as well as between safety climate and LWDR (r =
−.503, p < .05) (p. 517). The sign of the relationships supported the predictability of
the relationships. Although LWDCR and TCIR failed to produce significant
relationships, a relationship was verified nonetheless. However, these
nonsignificant relationships suggested that perhaps they were depressed as a result
of mediating variables, and the possibility of these spurious paths led Johnson to
evaluate the relationships through SEM.
The result of Johnson’s (2007) SEM analysis yielded a good model fit,
NNFI = 1.060; NFI = 0.961; CFI = 1.000; GFI = 0.915; RMR = 0.078; RMRstd =
0.041; RMSEA = 0.000; 90% CL: 0.000 to 0.214; and χ2(4) = 4.318, p = .742.
Johnson also concluded that the structural relationships were reasonable paths for
predicting emerging injury frequency rates. Relative to these paths, Johnson (p.
518) reported that the relationship between Safety Climate and Safe Behavior was
significant (β1 = 1.00, p < .05), and that the relationship between Safe Behavior and
Injury Frequency was strong, but not significant (β2 = −.462, p > .05). Although
this second relationship was not significant, it was strong and negative, suggesting
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that increases in safe behavior could be a predictor of lower injury frequency rates.
This was also true of the relationships involving TCIR (.770) and LWDCR (.755),
and Injury Frequency. Although they were not significant (p > .05), these
relationships were strong, suggesting their potential as predictive measures for
Injury Frequency.
Johnson’s (2007) research is relevant to the current study because (a) it
confirmed that a safety climate model could predict safety outcomes mediated by
safe behavior, and (b) it used SEM as a primary statistical means to establish the
mediating effect of safety behavior between safety outcomes and safety climate.
Although the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes was not
significant, it was strong, and Johnson confirmed that it was indeed being mediated
through safe behavior. This finding established that safety climate could predict
safety outcomes and influence safe behavior, which in turn affects safety outcomes.
Wang et al. (2018). Wang et al. examined the influence of safety climate in
Chinese construction workers. Safety climate was defined through three
dimensions: manager’s attention to the safety of workers, safety of the project work
environment, and safety supervision in the project. As with Johnson (2007), Wang
et al. were interested in the relationship of safety climate with safety behavior and
safety awareness, but they did not relate it to traditional safety climate outcomes
such as accident and injury rates or missed work days. They used an 18-item
questionnaire comprised of four parts that were adopted from previous research—
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personal information, safety climate, safety awareness, and safety behavior—and
the items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type response scale. The questionnaire
was completed during face-to-face interviews involving 164 participants
representing 15 construction teams. Of these participants, 96 provided complete
and valid data, which represented all levels of the construction teams: managers,
common workers, and temporary workers. The internal consistency of the
instrument was not reported.
Wang et al. (2018) presented four hypotheses to determine the relationships
among safety climate, safety behavior, and safety awareness. With respect to their
first hypothesis, which examined the effect safety awareness has on safety
behavior, Wang et al. reported that the results of hierarchical linear modeling
(HLM) showed that safety awareness had a positive influence on safety behavior,
ϓ = .48, p < .10. A follow-up t test confirmed support for this hypothesis, t = 1.334,
p = .074. This result suggests that if workers have good safety awareness, their
safety behavior will increase.
With respect to their second hypothesis, which examined the effect safety
climate has on safety behavior, Wang et al. reported that HLM results confirmed
that safety climate had a positive influence on safety behavior, ϓ = .67, p < .10. A
follow-up t test confirmed support for this hypothesis, t = 0.576, p = .057. This
finding implies that a positive organizational level safety perception (safety
climate) will have a positive impact on the safety behaviors of the workers.
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With respect to their third research hypothesis, which examined the effect
safety climate has on safety awareness, Wang et al. reported that HLM results
showed safety climate had a positive influence on safety awareness, ϓ = .63, p <
.10. A follow-up t test confirmed support for this hypothesis, t = 2.096, p = .056.
This finding implies that positive organizational level safety perceptions (safety
climate) have a positive effect on how workers identify and perceive safety issues
in the workplace.
With respect to their fourth research hypothesis, which examined the extent
to which safety climate moderates the effect safety awareness has on safety
behavior, Wang et al. reported that HLM results showed the relationship between
safety awareness and safety behavior was stronger when safety climate was
positive, ϓ = .15, p < .10. A follow-up t test confirmed support for this hypothesis,
t = -2.249, p = .027. This finding implies that safety climate has a positive influence
on the relationship between individual safety awareness and safety behaviors. In
other words, when employees’ perceptions of management’s attention to safety,
environmental safety, and safety supervision are positive, then workers’ awareness
will be heightened, and their safety behaviors will be positive.
Huang et al. (2015). Huang et al. were curious of safety climate outcomes
beyond the safety realm and examined the relationship among safety climate,
psychosocial factors, and human resource outcomes. They used the framework of
social exchange theory, which posits that favorable treatment received by one party
50

obligates them to provide favorable treatment in return. More specifically, the more
employees perceive management’s positive support for their safety in the
workplace, the more likely they will feel obligated to perform safely with a better
attitude and more positive safety behaviors. Huang et al. (pp. 249–250) posed five
hypotheses: (a) safety perceptions will have a direct relationship with job
satisfaction, (b) safety climate perceptions will have a direct relationship with work
engagement, (c) safety climate perceptions will have an inverse relationship with
employee turnover rate, (d) job satisfaction will mediate the relationship between
safety climate and employee engagement, and (e) job satisfaction will mediate the
relationship between safety climate and employee turnover rate.
Huang et al. (2015) collected data from two trucking companies, A and B.
The sample size for Company A was N = 2,204, and the sample size for Company
B was N = 4,003. One year after the data were collected, Huang et al. acquired job
turnover and tenure data for 2,117 truck drivers from Company A, and 2,818 truck
drivers from Company B. Huang et al. focused on lone workers—those who have
limited or no contact with co-workers and supervisors—because this limits the
ability of participants to reconcile their perceptions of safety with other workers so
that individual safety climates can be examined. Huang et al. used a safety climate
measurement instrument consisting of 40 items scored on a 5-point Likert-type
scale, divided into two 20-item sections measuring organizational-level factors and
group-level factors. Internal consistency, measured using Cronbach’s alpha, was
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high for the instrument: Company A organizational-level,  = .92, group-level,  =
.94; Company B organizational-level,  = .90, group-level,  = .94. Job satisfaction
data were collected from two self-reported items: “I like working for this company
and expect to be here for another year or more” and “I would recommend this
company as an employer to other drivers I know.” Huang et al. reported the
correlations between the two job satisfaction items were significant for both
Company A, r2 = .86, p < .01, and Company B, r2 = .88, p < .01. Employee
engagement was measured through an 8-item version of the Utrecht Work
Engagement Scale. Huang et al. reported Cronbach’s alpha was  = .87 for
Company A and ⍺ = .86 for Company B.
In Company A, Huang et al. (2015) found the relationship between
employee job satisfaction was significantly correlated with both organizationallevel safety climate (r = .59, p < .01) and group-level safety climate (r = .52, p <
.01). The same significant relationship was found in Company B where employee
job satisfaction was significantly correlated with group-level safety climate (r =
.51, p < .01) and organizational-level safety climate (r = .53, p < .01). Huang et al.
also reported significant relationships between employee engagement and
organizational-level safety climate, Company A: r = .14, p < .01; Company B: r =
.20, p < .01), and between employee engagement and group-level safety climate,
Company A: r = .15, p < .01; Company B: r = .16, p < .01. The relationship
between organizational-level safety climate and employee turnover rate, though,
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was not significant, Company A: r = .06, p >.05; Company B: r = .11, p > .05, as
was the relationship between group-level safety climate and turnover rate,
Company A: r = .07, p > .05; Company B: r = .01, p > .05. These respective
relationships between employee turnover and organizational-level as well as grouplevel safety climate were mediated, however, through employee job satisfaction. In
the final models for each company, Huang et al. removed the direct relationships
between employee turnover and both group-level and organizational-level safety
climate.
Huang et al. (2015) provided evidence of the power of safety climate
outside of safety culture. The strength of employees’ perceptions of safety and their
perceptions of how the organization views safety is strong enough to influence an
employees’ job performance and satisfaction within their workplace. According to
Huang et al., this could drive many employees with poor perceptions at both the
organizational-level and group-level to seek employment elsewhere. Their research
suggests that safety climate not only impacts traditional safety outcomes but also
relates to outcomes more relevant to an organization’s effectiveness and success. If
employees perceive the organization as caring for employees’ safety and wellbeing,
they will reciprocate with engagement and caring for their job performance. Thus,
the organization’s investment in safety will influence attitudes and behaviors far
beyond safety in the workplace.
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Safety Culture/Climate Studies Grounded in Theory
Complementing the previous studies, which identified factors that
influenced and/or were influenced by safety climate, are safety culture/climate
studies grounded in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. Two studies that
helped inform the proposed study are presented here.
Jin and Chen (2013). Jin and Chen applied Cooper’s (2000) model, which
applied Bandura’s (1977) model, to a regional general contractor in the United
States’ building construction industry. The company had recently implemented a
safety program intended to develop a positive safety culture throughout all levels of
the company, and Jin and Chen assessed the effectiveness of this program by
examining the company’s overall safety culture
With respect to Bandura’s (1977) model, Jin and Chen (2013) measured the
Person dimension via three separate safety climate questionnaires distributed
through three levels of the company: top executives, middle management, and
workers. Subcontractors also were included in the worker’s category, and their
questionnaire responses counted separately. Each questionnaire consisted of similar
types of questions about respondent’s awareness, accountability, program
acceptance, safety risk, attitude, and program involvement perceptions. The
questionnaires consisted of multiple-choice items, Likert scaled items, and openended questions. Jin and Chen did not report reliability coefficients but did note
that the contractor’s safety director was deeply involved in the questionnaire
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preparations, reviewing the questionnaires for structure, relevancy, and accuracy,
which reflected attention to face and content validity. Jin and Chen collected 650
completed questionnaires: 71 from top executives, 229 from site management
personnel, and 350 from workers. Jin and Chen reported that 99% of the workers
were aware of the safety program, but the level of awareness of the three basic
elements significantly decreased (p < .05) to 74%, while awareness of the 20 nonnegotiable behaviors significantly decreased (p < .05) to 33%. This suggested that
although the workers were aware a safety management system was instituted, they
were not aware of its pertinent elements and additional training should be
implemented. The positive perceptions of acceptance items were much more
consistent among executives (81%–100%) and site managers (72%–96%) than
workers (51%–96%). The accountability element was positive, indicating 94% of
executives claimed they held their manager accountable for safety enforcement,
56% of site mangers felt increased safety accountability, and 99% of workers
perceived they would be held accountable for their safety. The study also revealed
59% of workers could describe the consequences of a first-time violation, and 30%
could describe the consequences of a second violation. These findings suggest
another opportunity for training. As a positive aspect, Jin and Chen reported that
93% of the workers felt responsible for the safety of their co-workers, and 79% of
the workers were likely to address a safety situation with a co-worker.
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Jin and Chen (2013) assessed the Behavior dimension by examining
reported violations over the study’s 44-month period. They reported examining
1,113 violations, with 81% of these violations related to fall hazards. A positive
management commitment to the safety program also was noted with 61% of the
violations reported by site managers, and another 35% witnessed by safety
coordinators. Jin and Chen’s safety violation rate, which was calculated based on
annual working hours for 100 workers, decreased during the study period from 2.69
to 0.90.
Jin and Chen (2013) assessed the Environment dimension by auditing the
contractor’s safety management system (SMS). They reviewed the contractor’s
safety documents, educational materials designed to promote the organization’s
safety policies, and management’s safety strategies and accountability measures.
Jin and Chen reported that the contractor’s SMS was consistent with the key
aspects of a SMS as reported in the literature, and it strengthened the organization’s
overall safety system through enhanced safety rules, safety meetings, and other
means of communicating safety.
Jin and Chen’s (2013) study was beneficial to the current study in several
ways. First, it demonstrated that measuring an organization’s safety culture requires
a holistic approach that involves both quantitative and qualitative research
strategies. Second, a safety culture model can be aligned to Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model, which integrates three dimensions—Person,
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Environment, and Behavior—where the Person dimension reflects safety climate,
the Environment dimension reflects a SMS, and the Behavior dimension reflects
reported safety violations. Third, the Person dimension, which measures
employees’ shared perceptions and attitudes of safety, can be used to reflect
workplace safety culture. Fourth, the concept of a safety culture model based on
Bandura’s reciprocal causation model can be extended to reflect a safety climate
model of an MRO where the Person dimension corresponds to employees’ mental
health, the Environment dimension corresponds to employees’ attitudes and
perceptions about workplace safety issues, and the Behavior dimension
corresponds to maintenance errors. All of these aspects were incorporated into the
current study from the perspective of examining safety climate instead of safety
culture.
Cui et al. (2013). Cui et al. applied Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model and Geller’s (2001) total safety culture triad (Figure 2.4) to safety
management in the Chinese mining industry. Cui et al.’s premise was that safety
behavior is influenced by the safety climate of the organization. When applied to
Geller’s triad model, safety climate was hypothesized to mediate the relationship
between Environment and Behavior. Cui et al.’s conceptualization of safety climate
included human interactions such as safety committee status, management
commitment to safety, leadership role ambiguity, organizational environment, and
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Figure 2.4
Geller’s (2001) Total Safety Culture (TSC) Model

safety training. Cui et al. included these in the Environment dimension, which
reflected the physical aspects of workplace safety.
Cui et al. (2013) distributed 300 questionnaires to front-line employees of
the mining operation. Participants were asked to assess their “perception of their
work environment and management attributes, their attitudes toward occupational
safety, and their safety related behaviors” (p. 40). Cui et al. indicated that
approximately two thirds (n = 209) of the 300 questionnaires were complete and
served as the basis of data analysis. Based on the results of SEM analysis, Cui et al.
reported that their data was a good fit to the hypothesized model, χ2(96) = 112.18,
df = 96, p = .1240, CFI = 984, TLI = .980, and RMSEA = .028. Their findings
confirmed a significant positive relationship between hazardous environment and
management commitment to safety (p = .000), and a significant positive
relationship between management commitment to safety and employee’s beliefs
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toward safety (p = .000). Furthermore, they reported a positive relationship
between hazardous environment and employee’s beliefs toward safety, but this
relationship was not significant (p = .228). Cui et al. also noted that the results
suggested management’s commitment to safety fully mediated the effect of
hazardous environment on employees’ beliefs toward safety, and employees’
beliefs toward safety fully mediated the effect of management’s commitment to
safety on employees’ safety-specific behavior and safety involvement.
Cui et al.’s (2013) findings supported Bandura’s (1977) and Geller’s (2001)
respective models. An implication of Cui et al.’s findings, which they presented as
a recommendation for future research, was that employees’ cognitive processes
drive safety behavior, and organizational management needs to have an
understanding of the role cognition plays in a safety culture. As Cui et al. noted,
“Formal safety procedures and facilities will have little effect on employees’
behaviors if employees do not perceive management to be committed” (p. 44). This
was further accented by Uhuegho (2017) who wrote, “… employees’ perceptions
of a hazardous environment significantly influenced employees’ safety behaviors,
which were mediated by employees’ perception of management’s commitment to
safety and individual beliefs about safety” (p. 49).
Cui et al.’s study helped inform the current study in two ways: (a) It
confirmed that employees’ perceptions of how their organization views safety are
important, and (b) an organization’s safety climate is shaped by its policies,
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practices, and procedures. The study also confirmed the use of applying Bandura’s
(1977) reciprocal causation model relative to generating a safety climate model.
Safety Climate in Aviation
In the late 1990s, safety climate research was applied to the aviation
industry (O’Connor et al., 2011). Climate scales and questionnaires were developed
for differing job functions of the aviation industry, including pilots, flight
attendants, ground crews, air traffic controllers, and maintainers. These climate
scales focused on the commercial airline and military segments of the aviation
industry. Of the various studies conducted within this domain, four were relevant to
the current study.
McDonald et al. (2000). McDonald et al. conducted safety culture
evaluations of the maintenance departments of four commercial aviation companies
in Europe with the goal of developing a conceptual model of a generic, integrated
safety management system, with a focus on the human factor aspect of safety.
Using safety culture and climate research from other industries, McDonald et al.
developed an initial model consisting of five fundamental elements: strategy and
policy, implementation of policy and setting standards, operational norms,
monitoring, and feedback (p. 154). Because of the diversity inherent in the safety
management system of a commercial aviation organization, multiple research
methods were implemented and included: management interviews and a review of
company safety documentation, review of safety procedures and policies, review of
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organization and planning of work, monitoring the safety program, review of
feedback and change management, survey of human factor bottlenecks, safety
climate surveys, safety attitude surveys, incident surveys, and a task procedure
survey. Using a one-way ANOVA, the results of the safety climate survey showed
a significant difference among the organizations, F(3, 662) = 30.55, p < .0001, as
well as significant variance among job types, F(97, 612) = 7.28, p < .001. The most
glaring difference was commercial aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs) who
had significantly lower safety climate scores than other job types (p < .05).
McDonald et al. also indicated that commercial AMTs seemed to have a
“professional sub-culture,” which mediated the effects of organizational safety on
normal operational practices (pp. 173–174). McDonald et al. also reported that the
perceived role of commercial AMTs differed between technicians and managers.
Commercial AMTs believed their responsibility was to ensure the safety of the
aircraft using their knowledge, skills, and professional values, whereas
management believed commercial AMTs’ role was to follow the task and
organizational procedures explicitly (p. 173). These same perceptions were thought
to mediate between the organization’s safety management system and safety
outcomes (O’Conner et al., 2010). Given this defined role separation, Fogarty
(2004) examined the relationship between safety climate and maintenance error. A
description of his study follows.
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Fogarty (2004, 2005). Fogarty endeavored to identify factors that
contributed to maintenance errors in military aviation maintenance and place those
factors in a path diagram that captured the major sources of variance in
maintenance errors. Fogarty’s first step produced a relevant questionnaire that
encompassed each factor, and the research was completed in three phases. The first
phase searched for relevant factors using instruments devised to measure aspects of
various segments of the aviation maintenance industry related to errors. The
instruments Fogarty considered included: (a) Taylor and Thomas’ (2003)
Maintenance Resource Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire
(MRM/TOQ), which measures professionalism and trust in commercial aircraft
maintenance; (b) Patankar’s (2003) Organizational Safety Culture Questionnaire,
which identified four factors relevant to commercial aviation maintenance:
compliance with standard operating procedures, collective safety commitment,
individual safety responsibility, and employee-management trust; and (c)
Wiegmann et al.’s (2003) Commercial Aviation Safety Survey, which was
designed for pilots. The second phase included a review of aviation maintenance
accident report databases for underlying causes related to safety climate. The third
phase was conducted through interviews with military AMTs and their supervisors,
and these data were included in a content analysis, which identified organizational
factors associated with safety climate. These activities led to Fogarty’s
Maintenance Environment Survey (MES), which consisted of five dimensions, or
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subscales: (a) safety climate, (b) morale, (c) psychological health, (d) outcome
variables, and (e) affectivity. The latent construct Safety Climate was thought to
have five indicator variables measured through technicians’ perceptions of each
variable: (1) recognition for doing good work, (2) organization safety focus, (3)
supervision standards, (4) feedback on work performance, and (5) training
standards and appropriateness. Safety climate also was thought to influence another
latent construct, morale, which was measured by technician commitment to the
organization, personal job satisfaction, and personal responsibility. Safety climate
was also thought to influence health, which included measures of stress, fatigue,
and general health as defined by Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ). Climate, health, and morale were expected to influence the
variance of self-reported maintenance errors. Affectivity was measured through the
Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS) developed by Watson et al.
(1988). Measuring affectivity gave insight into the military AMTs’ mood and
emotional states, which were linked to health, climate, morale, and errors (Fogarty,
2004). It also was a way to statistically remove the effects of positive and negative
affectivity from the results, effectively partialling out the bias associated with selfreported items.
Fogarty (2004) distributed this 112-item Likert-scaled questionnaire to 240
military AMTs at two Australian Army helicopter maintenance bases with a 90%
response rate. Fogarty then conducted a factor analysis after removing 32 items
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from the validated scales (e.g., GHQ and PANAS) and the 12 demographic items.
The remaining 68 items were too large of a block to conduct a simultaneous factor
analysis, so the items were divided into groups for each construct being measured.
Fogarty found six items, including the responsibility scale did not meet internal
consistency standards and discarded them. He also found the error scale had a low
reliability estimate ( = .60), but decided it was sufficient for research purposes.
All other scales had reliability estimates of  ≥ .70 (p. 80). The variation in
response patterns, determined by a review of the standard deviations, was
determined sufficient to move forward with an analysis of the correlations present,
eventually leading to the structural model.
Fogarty (2004) reported that the dependent variable, maintenance error, was
correlated significantly (p < .01) with five variables: recognition (r2 = .16),
training (r2 = .19), stress (r2 = .48), GHQ, (r2 = .31), and negative affectivity (r2 =
.25). He then used SEM to test the relationships among the variables. Fogarty
reported that fatigue, which originally was part of the health construct, shared
variance with errors not captured by health. Therefore, he flagged it as a separate
variable that directly influenced errors. The final results of data analysis confirmed
safety climate could be modeled hierarchically with safety climate accounting for
44% of the variance in health, 67% of the variance in morale, and 4% of the
variance in fatigue. With morale, safety climate, accounted for 27% of the variance
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in job turnover intentions, and all variables collectively accounted for 45% of the
variance in self-reported maintenance error (p. 85).
Fogarty (2005) conducted a cross-validation study with a simplified model
based on his 2004 study. The simplified model was concerned with psychological
strain and its direct effect on errors and how it mediated the effects of safety
climate. Because the focus was on psychological strain and safety climate, Fogarty
removed the constructs of morale, turnover intentions, and fatigue as mediating
variables. A graphical illustration of this revised hypothesized model was provided
in Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1. Fogarty then modified his questionnaire by including
one additional item on the supervision standards scale, deleting three items on the
training standards scale, and adding an additional nine items on the error scale,
which was treated as a single latent outcome variable.
The results of Fogarty (2005) were consistent with the findings of Fogarty
(2004), namely, safety climate acts primarily on the psychological health of
military AMTs, and psychological strain is the primary determinate of maintenance
error. All scales, except for training, also showed satisfactory reliability (⍺ > .70).
Fogarty wrote that the relatively low reliability of the training scale (⍺ = .62) was
not of concern because it was one of five predictor variables feeding the safety
climate construct. This new model predicted 39% of the variance in psychological
strain and 15% of the variance in maintenance error (p. 11).
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Fogarty’s (2005) results suggest that perceptions of organizational
conditions are not sufficient in themselves to influence errors. These perceptions
place strain or stress on the individual military AMT. When these individuals
succumb to the pressures of strain and stress, errors begin to emerge. Fogarty
indicated that organizations must be aware of these pressures, and therefore should
monitor individual health and morale to ensure these pressures do not get to the
point of influencing maintenance error.
Fogarty (2004, 2005) identified various limitations to his research. First, he
indicated that self-reported errors might not correlate to actual errors in the work
environment. He argued this by pointing out various studies that have correlated
safety climate indicators to objective indicators of safety performance (Donald &
Canter, 1994; Hofman & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 1980, 2000). He also mentioned that
the links between attitudes, intentions, and behavior have been documented in
theoretical accounts such as Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior, and these
theoretical accounts strongly support the use of self-reported measures in safety
research (Fogarty, 2004).
Another limitation Fogarty (2004, 2005) identified was his sample, which
involved AMTs from multiple Australian Army aviation units. This limits the
generalizability of his results to military AMTs who are subject to stresses and
challenges not faced by civilian commercial and general aviation AMTs. He also
noted that the opposite could be true, where civilian AMTs experience stressors and
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conditions not found in military aircraft maintenance. Fogarty (2004) further noted
there was an increased demand placed on both military and civilian AMTs, and it is
only growing as aviation organizations push for efficiencies to counteract a
shrinking workforce and a higher demand for airworthy aircraft.
Fogarty (2004, 2005) helped inform the current study in two key ways.
First, he developed a valid and reliable instrument for assessing the safety climate
of an MRO, and second, his research yielded an empirically derived safety climate
path model that reflects the relationship among the salient factors that influence
maintenance error. As noted earlier in this dissertation, the current study was
intended to replicate Fogarty (2005) by testing his path model using data acquired
from civilian AMTs who work for a regional U.S. general aviation OEM MRO.
Hodges and Gardner (2014). Hodges and Gardner focused on the
perceptions of error climate among N = 189 Royal New Zealand Air Force
maintenance personnel; three fourths were Aircraft and Avionics Technicians, and
one fourth were small trades technicians. They defined error climate as
“employees’ shared perceptions of organizational practices regarding errors” (p. 2).
Hodges and Gardner also conceptualized error management climate (EMC) using
Van Dyck et al.’s (2005) definition as one in which “employees perceive that there
are organizational practices related to communicating about errors, to sharing error
knowledge, to helping in error situations and to quickly detecting and handling
errors” (p. 1229).
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Of the various hypotheses they posed, four were relevant to the current
study (pp. 2–3): (a) self-reported errors will be negatively related to perceptions of
EMC, (b) perceptions of supervision will be positively related to perceptions of
EMC, (c) perceptions of EMC will be related to lower levels of stress and
psychological ill-health, (d) error will be positively related to stress and
psychological ill-health, and (e) the relationship between perceptions of EMC and
self-reported errors will be mediated by stress and psychological ill-health.
Perceptions of EMC were measured using a 5-point Likert response scale and a16item attitude scale. Perceived supervision was measured using the Supervision
subscale of Fogarty’s (2004) MES. Stress was measured using the Stress subscale
from Fogarty and Buikstra’s (2008) instrument. Psychological ill health was
measured using Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) 12-item GHQ.
The results of a factor analysis found: (a) a significant negative relationship
between perceptions of EMC and self-reported errors, β = −.26, p < .001; (b) a
significant positive relationship between perceptions of supervision and EMC, β =
.34, p < .001; (c) a significant negative relationship between perceptions of EMC
and stress, F(4, 179) = 4.21, p < .01, but no relationship between perceptions of
ENC and psychological ill-health; (d) a significant positive relationship between
self-reported errors and stress, F(4, 179) = 3.16, p < .01, but no relationship
between self-reported errors and psychological ill-health; and (e) neither stress nor
psychological ill health mediated the relationship between perceptions of EMC and
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self-reported errors. Based on these findings, Hodges and Gardner (2014) reported
that a positive perception of an EMC, which implies that management fosters a
non-punitive safety climate, could lead to error prevention: “… perceptions of an
EMC, which acknowledges errors and develops processes to deal with them, does
not invite additional error but serves a valuable function in reducing error” (p. 9).
They also indicated that if employees have a positive perception of supervision,
then this in turn could lead to stronger perceptions of EMC. Lastly, Hodges and
Gardner reminded readers about the influence psychological health (stress) can
have on errors.
Hodges and Gardner (2014) helped inform the current study in several
ways. First, it provided further confirmation for using Goldberg and Williams’
(1988) GHQ to measure psychological health. Second, it confirmed the role
supervision has with respect to maintenance errors. Third, it demonstrated the
impact of the relationship between safety climate and errors.
Uhuegho (2017). Uhuegho replicated Fogarty (2005) by testing Fogarty’s
safety climate model using data acquired from AMTs who worked for a U.S. based
commercial aviation MRO, which consisted of 200 facilities that performed heavy
airframe, engine, component, and line maintenance on private business, narrow
body, and regional commercial jets. As was the case with Fogarty, Uhuegho’s
primary data collection instrument was Fogarty’s 48-item MES and Goldberg and
Williams’ (1988) 12-item GHQ. Uhuegho also appended a set of demographic and
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maintenance experience items and referred to his instrument as the Aviation
Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS). Uhuegho administered the AMSCS
by making it electronically accessible via a web-based survey-hosting platform.
The final sample size was N = 134.
Uhuegho (2017) used SEM to test Fogarty’s (2005) model, and the result of
this analysis was significant, 2(19) = 84.27, p = .000, which means that Uhuegho’s
data did not fit the model. After several revisions to the model, which included
eliminating the Training, Feedback, and Safety Concern subscales, a good model fit
was achieved, 2(5) = 7.86, p = .164, GFI = .977, CFI = .970, RMSEA = .068, and
DELTA2 = .971. This final model, which is graphically illustrated in Figure 1.3 in
Chapter 1, predicted 1% of the variance in psychological strain and confirmed a
negative relationship between psychological strain and safety climate: as climate
improved, psychological strain decreased (p. 131).
Although Uhuegho’s (2017) final model was consistent with his sample
data and yielded acceptable fit indices, it did not completely support Fogarty’s
(2005) model: (a) Safety Climate in Uhuegho’s model was defined by only two of
Fogarty’s five subscales, Recognition and Supervision, and (b) none of the paths in
Uhuegho’s model was significant. The only consistency between the two models
was that Uhuegho’s model confirmed that Psychological Strain mediated the effect
of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors, but as noted above, Safety Climate did
not include the Training, Feedback, and Safety Concern subscales. One plausible
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explanation for the differences in the two models is the setting: an Australian
military MRO involving rotary wing aircraft (Fogarty) vs. a U.S. based civilian
MRO involving fixed-wing commercial aircraft (Uhuegho). The current study
endeavored to provide further insight into the differences between Fogarty’s and
Uhuegho’s respective models by testing the efficacy of both models relative to a
general aviation OEM MRO in central Florida that maintains general aviation
aircraft.
In addition to testing Fogarty’s (2005) model, Uhuegho (2017) also tested
his model relative to Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. This model,
which is based on three dimensions, Environment, Person, and Behavior,
hypothesizes a bidirectional relationship among these dimensions (see Figure 1.4 in
Chapter 1). Guided by Cui et al. (2013) and Jin and Chen (2013), Uhuegho aligned
Fogarty’s Safety Climate, Psychological Strain, and Maintenance Errors constructs
to Bandura’s Environment, Person, and Behavior dimensions, respectively.
Following a series of omnibus MANOVA analyses, Uhuegho (2017)
reported: (a) the Person dimension (Stress and Psychological Distress) had a
significant influence on the dimensions of Environment (Safety Climate) and
Behavior (Maintenance Errors), Wilks’  = .67, p < .0001; (b) the Environment
dimension had a significant influence on the Person and Behavior dimensions,
Wilks’  = .75, p < .0001; and (c) the Behavior dimension had a significant
influence on the Person and Environment dimensions, F(5, 128) = 10.39, p < .0001,
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Figure 2.5
Results of Uhuegho (2017) Applied to Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal Causation Model

Eigenvalue = .41. As presented in Figure 2.5, follow-up univariate F tests yielded
the following significant reciprocal relationships:
• Person and Environment: Safety Concern influenced Stress, B = -0.76,
t(130) = -4.91, p < .0001, and Stress influenced Safety Concern, B = 0.20, t(131) = -3.98, p = .0001.
• Person and Behavior: (a) Maintenance Errors influenced Stress, B = 0.32,
t(132) = 5.21, p < .0001, and Stress influenced Maintenance Errors, B =
0.39, t(131) = 3.55, p = .0005. (b) Maintenance Errors influenced
Psychological Distress, B = 0.26, t(132) = 4.82, p < .0001, and
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Psychological Distress influenced Maintenance Errors, B = 0.38, t(131) =
3.01, p = .0031.
• Environment and Behavior: (a) Maintenance Errors influenced Safety
Concern, B = -0.11, t(132) = -3.05, p = .0027, and Safety Concern
influenced Maintenance Errors, B = -0.80, t(130) = -3.91, p = .0001.
In addition to these significant reciprocal relationships, Uhuegho (2017)
also reported two significant one-way relationships: (a) Safety Concern influenced
Psychological Distress, B = -0.37, t(130) = -2.59, p = .0107, and (b) Recognition
influenced Maintenance Error, B = 0.43, t(130) = 2.23, p = .0276.
When speaking of the influence of the Person dimension on the
Environment dimension, Uhuegho (2017) explained that as commercial AMTs’
stress or perceptions of their stress increase, their perception of the MRO’s concern
for safety may decrease. This is plausible, Uhuegho explained, “because as
workers’ stress levels increase, it is conceivable that their judgment becomes
impaired” (p. 137). This could give commercial AMTs the false impression that the
environment they work in is not suitable for safe operations, which in turn could
lead to inaccurate perceptions of their organization’s concern for safety. The
influence of the Person dimension on the Behavior dimension led Uhuegho to think
that as commercial AMTs’ perceptions of stress and psychological distress
increase, so does their reflection on the extent to which they committed

73

maintenance errors. Again, stress and distress have been shown to impair judgment,
leading to errors.
The Environment dimension’s effect on the Person dimension was negative.
This means as commercial AMTs’ perceptions of their organization’s concern for
safety increases, their stress and psychological distress decrease. This is plausible
because as perceived conditions in the workplace improve, stress and anxiety levels
are lowered. The Environment dimension’s influence on the Behavior dimension
was counterintuitive, however. As commercial AMTs received recognition, their
reflection on maintenance errors on the job increased. Uhuegho (2017) offered the
following plausible explanation: recognition could lead to overconfidence and
complacency, which in turn could lead to more errors. At the same time,
commercial AMTs felt their organization had a strong concern for safety reflected
on fewer maintenance errors, which is plausible because, as with the Person
dimension, stress levels most probably are decreased as perceived concern is
increased, which would lead to fewer errors.
The influence of the Behavior dimension on the Person dimension was
positive. This leads researchers to believe that as maintenance errors increase, so
too does the commercial AMTs’ levels of stress and distress. This is plausible
because the more errors made on the job, the more commercial AMTs will perceive
negative consequences, which would lead to higher levels of stress and distress.
The negative influence noted between the Behavior and Environment dimensions is
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most probably, as Uhuegho (2017) noted, a function of commercial AMTs’
perceived locus of control: As a technician commits errors, there will be a tendency
to place blame onto an outside source, such as the organization’s concern for safety
and not accept personal responsibility for negative actions.
Uhuegho’s (2017) overall findings supported Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model. Uhuegho’s research showed significant reciprocal relationships
between (a) Stress and Safety Concern, (b) Stress and Psychological Distress and
Maintenance Errors, (c) Safety Concern and Maintenance Errors. Uhuegho
successfully implemented Bandura’s reciprocal causation model in a commercial
aviation MRO environment evaluating safety climate. Following Uhuegho’s
recommendations, the current study implemented similar methods to evaluate the
safety climate of a general aviation OEM MRO, where privately owned general
aviation corporate turbine-powered aircraft are maintained.
Summary and Study Implications
Prior research has demonstrated that safety, in a most general sense, is a
cognitively driven concept. People in organizations must think and act on their
thoughts and perceptions to create a safe environment. Safety is not only driven by
the organizational environment, but also by each member’s perceptions of the
organization as a whole. To feel safe, members must recognize that what they do
matters, and believe that their organization will take action when safety is
compromised. Prior research also has confirmed that measuring an organization’s
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safety climate is similar to taking the pulse of the organization’s safety culture: it
provides insight into the perceptions of the organization’s members. From that it
can be anticipated what the member’s action will be. With this insight, an
organization can treat those symptoms and possibly find the cure to keep safety a
priority from the top down.
To date, there has been a dearth of research in general aviation OEM MRO
safety culture and climate (Uhuegho, 2017). Most past research in the aviation
safety field has centered on the development of instruments to evaluate safety
culture. The current study was grounded in social cognitive theory based on
Bandura’s (1977) model as well as Geller’s (2001) model of total safety culture.
The current study tested both Fogarty’s and Uhuegho’s safety climate models, and
the application to Bandura’s reciprocal causation model relative to a U.S. based
general aviation OEM MRO. As Uhuegho suggested of his study, this theoretical
grounding, “will help advance a unified explanation of employee attitudes toward
safety” (p. 56). A safety climate model empirically derived from a general aviation
OEM MRO also has been added to the safety climate literature.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Population and Sample
Population
The target population of the current study was all aircraft maintenance
technicians (AMTs) employed at a United States based general aviation original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) owned maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO)
facility that performs scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on general aviation
piston and turbine-powered aircraft, engines, and components. The aviation MRO
industry employs approximately 183,000 AMTs in the United States (DataUSA,
2020). According to Data USA, on average U.S. AMTs are 40 years of age, 95%
are male, and 66.3% are White (non-Hispanic). The network of OEM MROs that
the current study focused on grossed over $153 million in 2018, and employed
approximately 1,000 AMTs domestically (Textron, 2019).
The accessible population consisted of all available AMTs employed at the
general aviation OEM MRO facility in central Florida. This facility is one in a
network of nine owned and operated by this OEM in the United States. The central
Florida facility performs inspections, overhaul, repair, preservation, and
replacement of parts associated with an airframe, engine, or appliance on general
aviation piston and turbine-powered aircraft, engines, avionics, and components
manufactured by the OEM. The MRO has a man-hour capacity of $60,000,000 per
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year and employed 156 AMTs during the month of February 2021 (R. Evenson,
personal communication, February 26, 2021). The pool of AMTs employed by the
network is mobile, which implies that technicians are encouraged to travel among
the network to provide their skills and unique talents to facilities where and when
they are needed most. The AMTs who worked in the targeted OEM MRO have
varying experience backgrounds in aviation maintenance. The period AMTs have
worked for the OEM MRO range from less than 1 year to 43 years (R. Evenson,
personal communication, February 26, 2021). Some AMTs began working at the
OEM MRO after completing technical school whereas others completed on-the-job
training at the OEM MRO to receive their airframe and powerplant certifications.
Still others have worked in various sectors of the aviation maintenance industry,
including military or commercial MROs, before beginning work at the OEM MRO.
Working in different sectors of the industry brings ideas and experience to the
general aviation OEM MRO, but safety climate and culture are a constant in all
sectors of the aviation MRO industry.
Of the 156 AMTs employed at the OEM MRO in the month of February
2021: 78.8% had A&P ratings; 21% were unrated; 3.8% were certified painters;
1.9% were customer service/line-service technicians; 7.7% were certified avionics
technicians; and 7.7% were repairmen. The group included 149 males and 8
females ranging in age from 20 to 63 years old, and 62% were Caucasian, 31%
Hispanic, 5.8% African-American, and 1.3% Asian American. The reader will note
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that the targeted OEM MRO does not track additional demographics such as
education levels, marital status, and total years as an AMT (R. Evenson, personal
communication, February 26, 2021). Therefore these data cannot be reported.
Sample
A convenience sampling strategy was used to select the sample from the
accessible population. A direct link to the data collection instrument (see the
Instrumentation section of this chapter) was sent to the work email of all AMTs
employed at the OEM MRO facility during the week of February 15, 2021. The
AMTs were given time to voluntarily complete the questionnaire during monthly
team meetings held that week. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, meetings were
limited to small groups and the immediate supervisor facilitated each session to
ensure that all AMTs who opted to participate were allotted the same amount of
time to complete the questionnaire. In addition, the pandemic made it necessary to
extend the availability of the questionnaire an additional 2 weeks because one
entire shift of technicians was on home quarantine due to exposure to the COVID19 virus.
Although sample demographics should reflect the accessible population, the
use of a convenience sampling strategy makes this problematic. There was a 57.7%
response rate to the questionnaire, making the sample size N = 90. As reported in
Table 3.1, of the 90 respondents, 77 were male, 7 were female, and 6 chose not to
report their gender. Additionally, males had a mean age of M = 45.4 years old,
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Table 3.1
Summary of Participants’ Age and Marital Status by Gender
Age

Marital Status a

Group

N

M

Range

M

NM

Male

77

45.4

23–63

59

18

Female

7

34.0

20–49

Not Reported

6

45.1

44–48

–

–

90

44.4

20–63

63

21

Overall

4

3

Note. N = 90.
a
Marital Status represent total number of participants corresponding
to each marital category. M = Married; NM = Not married: Single
(n = 11), Divorced (n = 9), Widowed (n = 1), Separated (n = 0), and
“Other” (n = 0). A dash entry indicates the data were not reported.

females had a mean age of M = 34 years old, and the overall ages ranged from 20 to
63 years old. With respect to marital status, 63 participants were married and 21
were not married.
As reported in Table 3.2, participants ranged from less than one year of
experience to 48 years of experience as an AMT with an overall mean of M = 19.6
years (SD = 12.1). Of the five educational categories, those with a 2-year degree
had the highest frequency (n = 30) and Graduate degree had the least number of
participants (n = 8). Eight participants did not report their education level, and 20
did not report their number of years of experience as an AMT.
As reported in Table 3.3, of the 90 participants: 65 were licensed airframe
and powerplant (A&P) technicians, 5 were avionics technicians, and 6 were
unlicensed technicians, which included apprentice (n = 1), customer service
technicians (line service, n = 3), and painters (n = 2). These data are then
disaggregated by race/ethnicity and reported in Table 3.4. The reader will note that
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Table 3.2
Summary of Participants’ Education Level and Years’ Experience
Total Years of Experience as an AMT a

Highest Level
Education

Nb

Nc

M

SD

Range

High school

22

16

23.3

14.2

4–48

2-yr college

30

27

18.2

11.2

3–40

4-yr college

11

11

16.3

11.6

0–31

8

8

15.3

10.4

1–28

11

8

25.6

11.5

11–40

82

70

19.6

12.1

0–48

Graduate
Technical school
Overall

d

Note. N = 90.
a
0 = less than 1 year experience. b Eight participants did not report their highest
level of education. c 20 participants did not report their total years’ experience as
an AMT. d Technical school represents a specialized 2-year post high school
program in aircraft maintenance.

Table 3.3
Summary of Participants’ Aircraft Mechanic Ratings
Rating

N
2
49
10
1
2
1
0
0
5
6

Airframe
with Powerplant
with Powerplant and Inspection Authorization
with Powerplant and Inspection Authorization and Pilot
with Powerplant and Avionics
with Powerplant and Pilot
Powerplant
Inspection Authorization
Avionics
Unlicensed a
Note. N = 90; 14 participants did not report their ratings. Multiple
ratings were included.
a
Unlicensed included: apprentice (n = 1), customer service (n = 3), and
painter (n = 2).

most participants were Caucasian (n = 61), followed by Hispanic (n = 15) and
African-American (n = 3).
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Table 3.4
Summary of Participants’ Ratings by Race/Ethnicity
Airframe a
Race/Ethnicity

N

PP

Caucasian

61

36

PP/IA/P

PP/A

PP/P

Avionics

Unlicensed

9

1

2

1

4

1

3

2

1

0

0

0

0

0

15

9

0

0

0

0

1

1

Other b

3

1

0

0

0

0

0

2

Overall

82

48 c

10

1

2

1

5

4c

African-Am
Hispanic

PP/IA

Note. N = 90. Eight participants did not report their race/ethnicity.
a
PP = Powerplant, IA = Inspection Authorization, P = Pilot, A = Avionics. Two participants had
an airframe rating only: Caucasia (n = 1) and Hispanic (n = 1). b Other included American Indian
(n = 1): Mixed (n = 1), and West Indian (n = 1). c One participant with an airframe and powerplant
rating and two unlicensed participants did not report race/ethnicity. See also Table 3.3.

Power Analysis
Testing Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017) Path Models. Prior to
conducting the current study, an a priori power analysis was conducted for testing
Fogarty’s and Uhuegho’s respective path models. According to Kline (2016, p. 15)
SEM studies require large sample sizes to get appropriate power, but there is no
consensus on how large a sample is needed. For example, several researchers have
suggested minimum sample sizes ranging from 100 to 200 participants, with 150
participants being a good median (Wang & Wang, 2012). A more precise sample
size can be estimated through the use of the ratio (N:q), which is the number of
cases/observations (N) to the number of free parameters (q). Wang and Wang
suggest a minimum ratio of 5:1, with 10:1 being better with kurtotic data, but with
most data a ratio of 20:1 is advisable. However, both Kline and Wang and Wang
cautioned there is no one-size-fits-all heuristic when it comes to determining a
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correct sample size for SEM. For the current study, testing Fogarty’s (2005)
involved seven parameters, and testing Uhuegho’s (2017) model involved four
parameters. As a result, I applied Kline’s recommended ratio of 20:1 using the
more complex model with q = 7 parameters. This yielded a minimum
recommended sample size of 20 × 7 = 140.
Kline (2016) also provided two points of view when performing a priori
sample size estimates. The first is determined by the ability to apply adequate
statistical precision to the results, the second is based on having reasonable power
of the significance tests for each effect. Kline, however, refuted the latter because
the idea behind SEM is to examine the model holistically and estimate effect sizes
and their precision rather than be concerned with the significance of each individual
effect in the model. Because the current study was concerned with the overall fit of
the collected data to Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017) models, the focus was
on a method inclined toward statistical precision. As a result, Kim’s (2005)
approach using fit indices and power to estimate an appropriate sample size was
used. Referencing Preacher and Coffman (2006), R code was generated for the root
mean square error approximation (RMSEA), which is an index of a model’s fit and
can range from 0 to 1 with values closer to 0 representing a good fit. Applying the
parameters of ⍺ = .05, df = 7, desired power of .80, null RMSEA of .000 and
alternate RMSEA = .05, R generated an estimated minimum sample size of N = 821.
In addition to Wang and Wang (2012) and Kline, I also consulted Kock and
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Hadaya (2016) and McCallum et al. (1996). Kock and Hadaya’s approach yielded a
minimum sample size of N = 68, and McCallum et al.’s tables yielded a minimum
sample size of N = 435.
Concomitant with the discrepancies in sample sizes is discrepancies in
corresponding power. For example, a sample size of N = 140 yielded a power of
.16, which does not meet Cohen’s (1988) minimal power of .80 for an a priori
power analysis. This also reinforced the reality that SEM is a large sample
technique. Of the various sample sizes (N = 68, 140, 435, and 821), only the latter
two would yield a minimum power of .80, but the size associated with McCallum
et al. (N = 435) assumes df = 19, which was consistent with Fogarty’s (2004)
model. For comparisons purposes, Fogarty’s sample size was N = 150, and
Uhuegho’s (2017) sample size was N = 134. The target a priori sample size of the
current study was N = 140, but due to circumstances out of my control (see the
limitations and delimitations section of Chapter 1), the accessible population from
which the sample was selected was severely restricted, resulting in a final sample
size of N = 90 for the SEM analysis. As a result, the corresponding post hoc power
for this aspect of the current study was less than .80.
Testing Bandura’s (1977) Model. To test Bandura’s model, both multiple
regression and MANOVA (when appropriate) were used to determine the effect
one dimension had on the other two dimensions. As an example, reference Figure
3.1 and the Person dimension, which consists of the factors Stress and Distress. To
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Figure 3.1
Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal Causation Model Applied to the Current Study

examine the effect of Person on the other two dimensions, the independent
variables were Stress and Psychological Distress, and the corresponding dependent
measures were the variables comprising the other two dimensions. For the
dimensions that consisted of more than one dependent variable, a multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed as an omnibus test to protect
against inflated Type I and Type II errors.
A post hoc power analysis was completed using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al.,
2009). As summarized in Table 3.5, the current study exceeded Cohen’s (1977)
established metric-free effect size conventions where “small” = .02, “medium” =
.15, and “large” = .35, and each predictor exceeded the established minimum power
of .80. As a result, with respect to testing Bandura’s (1977) model, there was at
least an 80% chance in all cases that the effect found in the sample also exists in the
population relative to an alpha level of  = .05.
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Table 3.5
Summary of Power Analyses for Testing Bandura’s (1977) Model
ka

Outcome Variable

R2

ES b

Power

Person Dimension
Influence of Person on Environment
• Y = Safety Concern

1

-.17 c

.205

.98

• Y = Supervision

1

.08

• Y = Feedback

.087

.88

1

.09

c

.099

.91

1

.22 c

.282

> .99

3

.17 c

.205

.93

3

.12 c

.136

.82

Influence of Person on Behavior
• Y = Maintenance Errors

Environment Dimension
Influence of Environment on Person
• Y = Stress
Influence of Environment on Behavior
• Y = Maintenance Errors

Behavior Dimension
Influence of Behavior on Person
1

.39 c

• Y = Safety Concern

1

-.79 c

3.76

> .99

• Y = Supervision

1

.19

.235

> .99

• Y = Stress

.639

> .99

Influence of Behavior on Environment

• Y = Feedback

1

.60

c

1.50

> .99

Note. N = 134,  = .05.
a
k = number of independent variables in the model being tested. b ES = effect
size. c Indicates that the overall R2 was significant for the preset alpha level of
 = .05.

Instrumentation
The current study used Uhuegho’s (2017) Aviation Maintenance Safety
Climate Survey (AMSCS), which consisted of three sections: Section A contained
Fogarty’s 48-item Maintenance Environment Survey (MES), Section B contained
Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) 12-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), and
Section C contained Background Information designed to collect participants’
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personal and professional demographic data. A copy of the AMSCS is included in
Appendix A, and a brief discussion of each section follows.
Section A: Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
Fogarty’s (2004) MES consists of 48 items measured on a traditional 5point Likert response scale of 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither
Disagree nor Agree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree. Thus, overall scores could
range from 48 to 240, with higher scores reflecting a positive perception of an
organization’s safety climate. The MES also was partitioned into seven subscales
with higher subscale scores reflecting a tendency toward that dimension (Fogarty,
2004, p. 80). A brief discussion of the subscales follows (Fogarty, 2005, p. 7).
Recognition for Doing Good Work. The Recognition subscale consists of
five questions designed to measure participants’ perceptions of the amount of
recognition their organization/supervisor provides them for doing good work. A
sample item is: “In this job, people are rewarded according to performance.” Scores
could range from 5 to 25 with higher scores reflecting a more positive perception of
the recognition participants believe they receive from their organization and/or
supervisor for doing good work.
Safety Focus of the Organization. The Safety Concern subscale consists
of five questions designed to measure participants’ perceptions that their
organization has a strong concern for safety issues. A sample item is: “This
workplace regards safety as a major factor in achieving its goals.” Scores could
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range from 5 to 25 with higher scores reflecting a more positive perception of
participants’ view of the concern their organization has for safety-related issues.
Supervision Standards. The Supervision subscale consists of seven
questions designed to measure participants’ perceptions of their supervisors’ level
of expertise and the amount of assistance their supervisor provides them. A sample
item is: “My immediate supervisor really understands the maintenance task.”
Scores could range from 7 to 35 with higher scores reflecting a more positive
perception of their supervisor’s level of expertise and willingness to assist them.
Feedback on Work Performance. The Feedback subscale consists of four
questions designed to measure participants’ perceptions of how much feedback
they receive from their organization/supervisor as well as the quality of this
feedback. A sample item is: “My work group receives detailed feedback regarding
overall performance.” Scores could range from 4 to 20 with higher scores reflecting
a more positive perception of the feedback participants receive.
Training Standards and Appropriateness. The Training subscale consists
of five questions designed to measure participants’ perceptions regarding various
training-related issues. These include: (a) the extent to which participants believe
they received adequate training for their current job, (b) the level of encouragement
they receive from their organization/supervisor to undertake further training, and
(c) the opportunities their organization provides for on-the-job training. A sample
item is: “I have found many opportunities to use my training in my current job.”
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Scores could range from 5 to 25 with higher scores reflecting a more positive
perception toward the targeted training-related issues.
Exposure to Workplace Stressors. The Stress subscale consists of nine
questions designed to measure participants’ perceptions of the amount of stress
they feel on the job as well as the consequences of their stress. It is important to
note that this item is not designed to determine any background factors such as
participants’ home environment or personal issues that might cause stress. A
sample item is: “I get anxious when I work to strict deadlines.” Scores could range
from 9 to 45 with higher scores reflecting higher levels of perceived workplace
stress.
Maintenance Errors. The Error subscale consists of 13 questions that
comprised the outcome variable. The questions do not focus directly on the number
of maintenance errors participants made, per se, but instead ask participants to
recall maintenance errors they made on the job, including self-detected errors and
those detected by a supervisor. A sample item is: “I make errors in my job from
time to time.” Another sample item is: “Under pressure, it’s easy to forget steps in a
task sequence.” Scores could range from 13 to 65 with higher scores reflecting a
higher number of maintenance errors participants recalled making on the job.
Fogarty (2004, 2005) provided detailed information about the development
of the MES and the attention he gave to validating the instrument. He did not,
however, report the overall reliability of the MES, only reliability coefficients for
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Table 3.6
Reliability Coefficients for the Data Collection Instrument
Cronbach’s α a
Instrument

M

SD

Current
Study

146.43

18.00

.84

–

.84

13.24

3.75

.71

.78

.68

.68

.36

.69

.90

.89

.89
.71

Fogarty

Uhuegho

Maintenance Environment Survey b
Overall
Recognition (n = 5)
Safety concern (n = 5)
Supervision (n = 7)

18.27
23.87

3.76
6.37

Feedback (n = 4)

11.94

3.49

.75

.51

Training (n = 5)

17.40

3.83

.76

.60

.60

Stress (n = 9)

26.26

6.60

.84

.85

.85

Maintenance errors (n = 13)

35.46
11.5

7.75
5.4

.83
.71

.84

.84
.78

GHQ

c

.88

Note. N = 90.
a
Reliability coefficients reflect a comparison between those reported from the current study vs. those
reported in Fogarty (2005) and Uhuegho (2017). b Fogarty’s (2005) MES consisted of 48 items
measured on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). Thus, aggregate scores
could range from 48 to 240 with higher scores reflecting a positive perception of an organization’s
safety climate. The MES also was partitioned into seven subscales (with number of items in
parentheses). Higher subscale scores reflect a tendency toward each targeted dimension. c Goldberg
and Williams’ (1988) General Health Questionnaire consisted of 12 items measured on a Likert-type
scale with 0 = Not At All, 1 = No More Than Usual, 2 = Rather More Than Usual, and 3 = Much
More Than Usual. Thus, aggregate scores could range from 0 to 36 with lower scores reflecting a
better general psychological health with respect to depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and
psychosomatic symptoms.

each subscale. Uhuegho (2017), however, reported an overall Cronbach coefficient
of ⍺ = .84. The current study’s overall reliability coefficient also was α = .84. Table
3.6 contains comparisons of the corresponding reliability coefficients among the
three studies. The reader will note that the current study’s reliability coefficients
were similar to or higher than those reported by Fogarty. This was especially the
case for Safety Concern (α = .68 vs. α = .36), Feedback (α = .75 vs. α = .51), and
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Training (α = .76 vs. α = .60). The current study’s reliability coefficients also were
approximately the same as those reported by Uhuegho except for Training, where
the current study’s was considerably higher (α = .76 vs. α = .60).
Section B: General Health Questionnaire (GHQ)
Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) GHQ consists of 12 questions designed to
measure a person’s general psychological health. It is used extensively to assess
elements of psychological distress such as depression, anxiety, social dysfunction,
and psychosomatic symptoms. Each question is prefaced by the phrase, “Have you
recently…” Two examples of GHQ items are: (a) “Have you recently been able to
concentrate on whatever you are doing?” and (b) “Have you recently lost much
sleep over worry?” Each item is scored on a Likert-type response scale of 0 = Not
at All, 1 = No More Than Usual, and 3 = Much More Than Usual. Aggregate
scores could range from 0 to 36, with lower scores reflecting lower levels of
psychological distress. Goldberg and Williams reported the GHQ had a
corresponding Cronbach alpha of ⍺ = .88. Uhuegho (2017) reported a GHQ
reliability coefficient of ⍺ = .78, and the current study’s corresponding reliability
coefficient was ⍺ = .71 (see Table 3.6).
Section C: Background Information
Uhuegho (2017) developed the background information section to gather
demographic and maintenance experience data from his participants. The section
consisted of 10 questions. The first seven questions asked participants to self-report
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their age, gender, marital status, race/ethnicity, ratings, total years of experience as
an aviation maintenance person, education level. The last three items asked
participants to identify maintenance related error reporting. The data gathered in
this section are summarized in Tables 3.1–3.4, which were presented earlier.
Procedures
Research Methodology
The research methodology applied to the current study was correlational
with an explanatory design. As noted by Ruana (2016), an explanatory study seeks
to determine the extent to which two or more variables are related. Knowledge of
such relationships can then be used to clarify an understanding of the targeted
phenomenon. This methodology/design was appropriate for the current study
because the study sought to examine the relationships among multiple variables
relative to a single group, namely, general aviation OEM MRO AMTs working in
central Florida. More specifically, the current study endeavored to examine the
safety climate in a general aviation OEM MRO in relation to (a) Fogarty’s (2005)
path model, which was relative to an Australian military helicopter MRO; (b)
Uhuegho’s path model, which was relative to a U.S. based commercial aircraft
MRO; and (c) Bandura’s (1977) theoretical reciprocal causation model. As Fogarty
observed, assessing the safety climate of an organization provides a window into
that organization’s safety culture.
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Human Subject Research
The nature of the current study was to collect data from individuals working
in a general aviation OEM MRO and therefore was considered human subject
research. Because of this, I prepared and submitted an application to Florida
Institute of Technology’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). As part of this
application, I explained that I intended to give attention to issues such as harm,
anonymity, confidentiality, and informed consent. Because I used an anonymous
cognitive assessment questionnaire without identifying codes, the study fell under
the exempt category and was approved.
Study Implementation
The primary data collection instrument was Uhuegho’s (2017) aviation
maintenance safety climate survey (AMSCS). The AMSCS was administered in
digital format on the LimeSurvey (www.limesurvey.com) hosting site. A link to the
questionnaire was sent to the email of all AMTs working in the facility. The email,
as well as a preamble to the questionnaire, was included as an introduction inviting
AMTs to participate and outlined the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) guidelines for human subject research.
The AMTs were provided time at the end of their regularly scheduled
February 2021 monthly team meetings to complete the questionnaire. These team
meetings were held in the company conference/classroom over a 2-day period
(Monday February 22 and Tuesday February 23) to ensure all shifts had the
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opportunity to attend. The nightshift meetings were held first on Monday evening
to minimize the interaction with their dayshift counterparts after being exposed to
the questionnaire. At the end of each team meeting the shift supervisor conducting
the meeting introduced the questionnaire, provided a brief introduction to the
research, and presented the preamble. Time was then allowed for AMTs to
complete the questionnaire on a voluntary basis. If they chose not to complete the
questionnaire, they were permitted to leave the meeting room and return to work.
At this time the supervisor left the meeting room until all AMTs completed the
questionnaire and returned to work.
AMTs had access to their email and the online questionnaire through their
company provided laptop computers, which were with them during the team
meetings. The LimeSurvey site did not allow participants to revisit their responses
once a question was answered, the questionnaire was complete, or they chose to
exit the questionnaire. The responses were collected in a database on the
LimeSurvey website and were only available to me. Responses to each
questionnaire were assigned random identification numbers and downloaded into
Microsoft Excel and JMP for data cleaning and analysis.
Threats to Internal Validity
Internal validity refers to the extent to which changes observed in the
dependent variable are attributed directly and solely to the independent variable and
not to any extraneous factors (Ary et al., 2010). To have internal validity and
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correct inference about the changes in the DV or relationship between the DV and
IV, researchers must control for possible, relevant extraneous factors. Ary et al.
identified 12 extraneous factors—or threats—that, if not controlled for, could
influence the relationship between the DV and IV. A brief discussion of these
threats follows and includes their respective definitions, if and how they impacted
the current study, and if applicable, how I controlled for or mitigated their effect.
History. A history threat refers to any extraneous or unrelated events that
occur at the same time as the study and could have an impact on the dependent
variable (Ary et al., 2010). For example, if the general aviation OEM MRO had
begun a safety climate awareness campaign prior to participants completing the
questionnaire, then workers’ responses to the questionnaire could have been
influenced as well as their sensitivity to safety in the workplace. During the current
study, the facility faced a culture change that included shifts of manpower and new
objectives being set in the face of a precarious economic climate and a COVID-19
pandemic. These extraneous factors may have impacted employees’ perceptions of
safety and quality in the workplace. Because I had no control over these events or
the existing environment, I have documented and reported any instances where I
believe a history threat was present.
Maturation. A maturation threat refers to the changes in physiological,
psychological, and biological systems that participants might experience over the
time of the study. In other words, it reflects any mental or physical changes that
95

might occur within the participants that could account for the results. For example,
while completing the questionnaire, workers could have experienced a mood
change from good to bad, or vice versa. It is also possible that they could have
suddenly become tired, bored, hungry, or inattentive. Although the current study
was considered cross-sectional in that it is was a one-time event with participants
completing the questionnaire in a relatively short period, a maturation effect could
have been possible. Because the participants completed the questionnaire during an
allotted period as part of a team meeting, they were limited on the amount of time
spent participating and completed the questionnaire during a single sitting. As an
extra measure, the questionnaire limited the access to one sitting and limited the
participants’ ability to move forward or backward in the questionnaire. This may
have affected the number of incomplete questionnaires received.
Testing. A testing threat refers to the effect on test scores when a preassessment is administered prior to treatment, and the same pre-assessment is then
used as a post-assessment after treatment. In such situations it is unclear if the
results of the post-assessment are truly because of the treatment or if they are due to
pre-exposure to the test items. Although the current study did not include a preassessment, it may have been possible for participants to scroll forward in the
questionnaire, allowing them to be exposed to each item more than one time. To
control for this threat, I limited the participants’ ability to scroll forward or
backward in the online questionnaire.
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Instrumentation. An instrumentation threat refers to a change in the
instrument used during a study. A change could include, for example, the type of
instrument used, the scorers, the difficulty level, the way the instrument is
administered, and different observers for pre- and post-assessments (Ary et al.,
2010). As a result, an instrumentation threat could be relative to three issues: (a)
instrument decay, which refers to different interpretations of results such as grading
an essay test or grader fatigue; (b) data collector characteristics, which refers to
specific characteristics of the grader such as gender, age, and ethnicity (e.g., having
a young, female president of the company administering the instrument to female
employees); and (c) data collector bias, which refers to inconsistent administration
of the instrument by the data collector (e.g., giving one group more time than what
is permitted, asking leading questions, and personal prejudices). The current study
did not include a data collector, the same instrument was administered to all AMTs,
and all responses were not “graded” because they simply reflected participants’
perceptions measured on a traditional Likert response scale. As a result, an
instrumentation threat was not applicable to the current study.
Statistical Regression. A statistical regression threat refers to the tendency
of participants who score extremely low or extremely high on a pre-assessment to
regress toward or score closer to the mean on the post-assessment. For example,
participants in the current study could score low on an assessment of their safety
climate knowledge prior to an information session. On the post-assessment, though,
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they would show a much greater gain in their understanding of safety climate than
those who scored high on the pre-assessment. Statistical regression did not have an
impact on the current study because a pre- and post-assessment was not
administered, and participants were not grouped by their understanding of safety
climate.
Selection Bias. A selection bias threat refers to differences between
participants in treatment and control groups prior to the beginning of an
experiment. As an example consider an intervention study designed to assess the
effectiveness of an in-service safety training program where one group is presented
the new program and the other group is exposed to traditional safety lectures. If the
treatment group has participants with higher intelligence, higher education level, or
more positive attitudes toward maintaining a safe environment than participants in
the control group, then the treatment group might perform better on the dependent
variable even if this group does not receive the treatment. Thus, this leads to nonequivalent groups at the onset of the study. Although the current study did not
include a group membership variable, the concept of the selection bias threat still
might have been present because I did not randomly select participants from the
accessible population. To address this threat, I provided a summary of the
accessible population’s demographics and the corresponding sample’s
demographics for the reader’s benefit to assess sample representativeness.
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Mortality. A mortality threat refers to the attrition of participants during a
study. For example, if participants with certain characteristics such as poorer safety
attitudes or high-stress levels drop out of a study, then this differential loss could
result in a higher (or lower) mean performance on the dependent variable because
of this group’s absence. In the current study, of the 156 prospective respondents,
119 accessed the questionnaire but 29 were dropped because of incomplete data,
which resulted in a final sample of N = 90. As a result, there was the possibility of a
mortality threat because the 29 dropped participants could have been “different”
with respect to their perceptions, personal demographics, or work experiences than
the 90 participants who remained. Because these 29 cases had incomplete data, it is
not possible to make this determination, though.
Selection-Maturation. A selection-maturation threat refers to the
interaction between selection and maturation. This can occur when group
membership is not random, and the members of one group are maturing at a
different rate than the other group. As a result, their effects are mistaken for the
effects of the treatment variable in the study. Given that a selection or maturation
threat did not exist in the current study, the interaction of these two threats was not
applicable to the current study.
Experimenter Effect. An experimenter effect threat (also known as an
implementation threat) refers to any effect the experimenter unintentionally
imposes on the study, including personal characteristics such as gender, age, race,
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position, or attitude toward the study. These characteristics could influence
participants’ reactions or interactions during the study, resulting in an observable
effect that could be attributed to the treatment. In the current study, as the
experimenter, I was also part of the management team in the general aviation OEM
MRO. Because I was their manager, participants might not have responded to the
questionnaire truthfully, might not have been willing to admit maintenance errors,
or might have skewed their answers to appease me. As a result, the experimenter
effect is recognized as a limitation of the study, specifically with respect to the
veracity of participants’ responses. To limit this effect, the questionnaire was
administered through an anonymous online questionnaire and the shift supervisor
presented the introduction of the questionnaire to all participants.
Subject Effects. A subject effects threat (also known as subject attitudes)
refers to the way in which participants perceive a study relative to their
participation. One example is the Hawthorne effect, which refers to an effect that is
due simply to participants knowing they are participating in a study. The
participants’ response to increased attention or feeling special as participants could
cause them to respond more positively than if they were not aware of their
participation. Another example is the John Henry effect (also known as
compensatory rivalry), which refers to a control group’s zeal to overachieve or outperform the treatment group. These participants may feel compelled or motivated to
exceed what may be expected of them, which could reduce the differences in
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treatment effect between treatment and control groups. A third example is resentful
demoralization. This refers to a situation where the control group discovers it is
receiving something less than the treatment group and, as a result, might experience
feelings of resentment and demoralization. This could lead to an abnormally low
level in the group’s performance, which would inflate the magnitude of the
differences between the performance of the control and treatment groups. The
common thread among all these subject effects threats is group membership.
Because the current study only involved a single group, none of these threats were
considered applicable.
Diffusion. A diffusion threat refers to the situation where individuals in the
treatment group share information with individuals in the control group and
“compare notes” about the study. It includes the possibility of experimenters
sharing ideas on their procedures, and those ideas bleeding into the control
procedures. This threat, although initially considered to be irrelevant, was
addressed by administering the questionnaire to the nightshift AMTs before
administering it to the dayshift AMTs, thereby eliminating any contact between the
groups. This effectively controlled the first group’s ability to share its perceptions
of the questionnaire with the second group.
Location. A location threat refers to the physical site the participants will
be administered the treatment or study protocols. For example, if the participants
complete the questionnaire in an environment that is noisy, hot, and humid, it could
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affect their responses differently than if they completed the questionnaire in a quiet,
climate-controlled environment. In the current study, the AMSCS was administered
as an online questionnaire, available to the participants during a specific time in
their monthly team meeting. This ensured all participants completed the
questionnaire in the same environmentally controlled class/meeting room.
Treatment Verification and Fidelity
Treatment verification and fidelity refer to the confirmation that the
manipulation of the independent variable occurred as planned and that fair,
powerful, and valid treatment comparisons can be replicated (Moncher & Prinz,
1991). Attention to treatment verification promotes the generalizability of a study
because confirmation will enhance the integrity of the independent variable
(Shaver, 1983). Because the current study did not implement a treatment, treatment
verification and fidelity were not a concern. More of a concern was external
validity, which could be affected by three issues identified by Shaver (1983): (a) a
complete description of the variables, (b) the data collection procedures, and (c) the
data analysis methods. To address these issues, within this dissertation I: (a)
provided a detailed description of each variable (see Table 3.7), (b) thoroughly
documented in the Study Implementation section of this chapter the procedures I
used, (c) reported the validity and reliability of the data collection instruments, and
(d) described the appropriate statistical methods used to answer the research
questions.
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Table 3.7
Description of Demographic Variables
Variables

Description

Age

A continuous variable measured in years.

Gender

A categorical variable representing gender; dummy coded with
Males as the reference group.

Marital status

A categorical variable representing five marital categories: Single,
Married, Divorced, Separated, and Widowed. Due to disparate
sample sizes, this was reduced to two groups, Married vs. Not
Married, with the latter group encompassing all non-married
categories; dummy coded with Married as the reference group.

Race/Ethnicity

A categorical variable representing five race/ethnic categories:
Caucasian, African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and
Other; dummy coded with Caucasian as the reference group.

Highest level of education

A categorical variable representing five levels of formal
education: high school, technical school, 2-year college, 4-year
college, and graduate degree; dummy coded with 2-year college as
the reference group.

Total years’ experience

A continuous variable measured in years.

Totals years at current MRO

A continuous variable measured in years.

English as primary language

A categorical variable representing a yes or no response; dummy
coded with No as the reference group.

Data Analysis
Data analysis was completed using both descriptive and inferential
statistics. With respect to descriptive statistics: (a) a summary of the descriptive
statistics relative to Sections A and B of the questionnaire is provided in Tables
4.1–4.3 in Chapter 4, (b) a summary of the descriptive statistics relative to Section
C of the questionnaire is provided in Tables 3.1–3.4 in this chapter, and (c)
descriptions of the demographic variables are provided in Table 3.7. The reader
will note that these demographic variables were not included in any of the primary
analyses. With respect to inferential statistics, a description of the factors associated
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Table 3.8
Description of Latent Factors and Their Corresponding Measured Variables Relative to Fogarty’s
(2005) and Bandura’s (1977) Respective Models
Variable

Description
Safety Climate (Fogarty) / Environment Dimension (Bandura)

Recognition

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 5-item Recognition subscale.

Safety Concern

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 5-item Safety Concern subscale.

Supervision

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 7-item Supervision subscale.

Feedback

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 4-item Feedback subscale.

Training

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 5-item Training subscale.
Psychological Strain (Fogarty) / Person Dimension (Bandura)

Stress

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 9-item Stress subscale.

Psychological
Distress

A continuous variable measured via Goldberg and Williams’ 12-item General
Health Questionnaire (GHQ).
Errors (Fogarty) / Behavior Dimension (Bandura)

Maintenance
Errors

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 13-item Errors subscale.

Note. All Fogarty’s (2005) subscale items were measured on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to
5 = Strongly Agree) with higher scores reflecting a tendency toward each targeted dimension. See
also Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1.

with the primary analyses relative to testing Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s
(2017) respective path models, and Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model, is
provided in Table 3.8 as well as in Table 4.4 in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Tables
4.5–4.10 contain summaries of the results of inferential statistics.
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
This chapter consists of three main sections: descriptive statistics,
inferential statistics, and the results of hypothesis testing. The first section contains
a summary of the descriptive statistics related to the non-demographic sections of
the Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS). The second section
contains a summary of the results of (a) the structural equation modeling (SEM)
analysis, which was used to test Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017) respective
models, and (b) several multiple regression and/or MANOVA analyses, which
were used to test Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. The last section
contains a summary of the results of hypothesis testing that correspond to each of
the research questions outlined in Chapter 1.
Descriptive Statistics
The primary data collection instrument for the current study was Uhuegho’s
(2017) Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), which was
presented to participants in three sections: Section A = Fogarty’s (2005) MES,
Section B = Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) GHQ, and Section C = Background
Information. The AMSCS was accessible via LimeSurvey for a 2-week period from
February 7, 2021 to February 20, 2021, during which all AMTs at the targeted
MRO were afforded time during team meetings to participate. Of the 156 AMTs
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working in the facility during this time frame, 116 attempted the questionnaire,
with 90 completing it (57% response rate). A summary of the responses to Sections
A and B of the questionnaire follows. The reader is reminded that participants’
demographic information is summarized in Tables 3.1–3.4 in Chapter 3.
Section A: Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
This section of the AMSCS was composed of Fogarty’s (2005) MES,
which measured safety climate in an aircraft maintenance environment. The items
of the MES were designed to measure participants’ overall perceptions of their
organization’s general safety climate, and were scored on a traditional 5-point
Likert response scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree.
Thus, overall scores could range from 48 to 240, with higher aggregate scores
reflecting more positive perceptions of the organization’s safety climate. Relative
to the current study’s data, the overall mean was M = 146.4 (SD = 18.0), which
was slightly higher than the midrange of 144. This suggests that participants
essentially had a neutral perception of safety climate at the targeted MRO.
Examining the mean score for each of the 48 items, and then calculating
the mean of these 48 means, confirmed this neutral perception. For example, the
mean of the means was M = 3.02 (SD = 0.59), which—relative to the 5-point
Likert scale—indicates a neutral response with very little variability. There were,
however, a few exceptions to this neutral perception. For example: A7 = “This
workplace regards safety as a major factor in achieving its goals” (M = 4.08, SD =
106

0.93), A47 = “I am pretty hard on myself when I make an error” (M = 4.30, SD =
0.93), and A22 = “My training and experience have prepared me well for duties in
my current job” (M = 3.99, SD = 0.94). At the other end of the spectrum,
participants disagreed with item A41 = “Occasionally, I forget to remove a tool at
the completion of a task” (M = 1.74, SD = 0.89). The scores on these items
indicated that the participants held a deep concern for safety, instilled through the
targeted MRO’s training, and that they accepted responsibility for their actions
when it concerned maintenance errors. A summary of the descriptive statistics for
the MES is provided in Table 4.1.
In addition to examining participants’ overall perceptions of their
organization’s safety climate, Fogarty’s (2005) MES was partitioned into seven
subscales or dimensions (Fogarty, 2005, p. 7). A summary of the results in relation
to these subscales is presented in Table 4.2, and a discussion of each subscale
follows.
Recognition. This 5-item subscale, items A1–A5, assessed participants’
perceptions of the extent to which they felt that they were rewarded or recognized
for doing good work at the targeted MRO. Scores could range from 5 to 25, with
higher scores reflecting a positive perception of the targeted dimension.
As reported in Table 4.2, the mean for this dimension was M = 13.2 (SD =
3.75), which was 1.8 points below the midrange of 15.0. These results suggest that
participants had a negative perception of being recognized for good work. This is
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Table 4.1
Summary of Descriptive Statistics for the 48-Item Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
Item a
A1. In this job the rewards and encouragement usually outweigh the threats and
the criticism.
A2. In this job people are rewarded according to performance.
A3. There is not enough reward and recognition for doing good work.
A4. In our promotion system, the best people generally rise to the top.
A5. I am satisfied with the recognition I get for doing good work.
A6. Personnel are well trained in the consequences of unsafe acts.
A7 This workplace regards safety as a major factor in achieving its goals.
A8. Lack of proper equipment sometimes forces us to cut corners in our work.
A9. There is not always time to follow safe procedures.
A10. In high workload conditions, I am prepared to take a few shortcuts to get
jobs done on time.
A11. My immediate supervisor has had many years’ experience in aviation
maintenance.
A12. My supervisor really understands the maintenance task.
A13. I trust my supervisor.
A14. My supervisor sets clear goals and objectives for the team.
A15. My supervisor actively encourages team members to lift their level of
performance.
A16. When I make an error, my supervisor will support me.
A17. My immediate supervisor checks my work very carefully.
A18. The quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequently.
A19. It is difficult for me to find out how well I am doing my job.
A20. My supervisor keeps me regularly informed of my progress.
A21. My work group receives detailed feedback regarding overall performance.
A22. My training and experience have prepared me well for duties in my current
job.
A23. I have been encouraged to improve myself through continued training.
A24. I have found many opportunities to use my training in my current job.

M

SD

2.79
2.71
2.48
2.34
2.92
3.49
4.08
3.08
3.70

1.14
1.08
1.10
1.04
1.11
1.13
0.93
1.28
1.17

3.92

1.14

3.51
3.51
3.57
3.49

1.33
1.21
1.09
1.03

3.43
3.49
2.87
3.28
2.80
2.87
3.00

1.22
1.11
1.09
1.26
1.11
1.10
1.13

3.99
3.64
3.82

0.94
1.08
0.99

Note. N = 90. The MES is from Fogarty (2005). All items were measured on a traditional 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The MES also was
partitioned into seven subscales, or dimensions: A1–A5 represented Recognition, A6–A10
represented Safety Concern, A11–A17 represented Supervision, A18–A21 represented Feedback,
A22–A26 represented Training, A27–A35 represented Stress, and A36–A48 represented
Maintenance Errors. See Table 4.2 for additional information about these scales, including the
meaning of each subscale.
a
A3, A8, A9, A10, and A19 (denoted in bold type) are oppositely worded items and were reversescored. The means and standard deviations for these items reflect the reverse scorin g.
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Summary of Descriptive Statistics for the 48-Item Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
Item
A25.
A26.
A27.
A28.
A29.
A30.
A31.
A32.
A33.
A34.
A35.
A36.
A37.
A38.
A39.
A40.
A41.
A42.
A43.
A44.
A45.
A46.
A47.
A48.

I am not expected to perform tasks for which I have not been trained.
Maintenance personnel receive a lot of "hands-on" training.
I need to spend more time with my family and friends.
The demands of my work interfere with my home and family life.
I find it difficult to leave work concerns at work.
I have sometimes felt unwell because of work pressures.
My job here does not allow me enough time to relax.
I often feel irritated by things that happen at work.
Other workgroups don't appreciate the problems they cause by amending
their work schedules.
A heavy workload makes me feel tense.
I get anxious when I work to strict deadlines.
When performing a maintenance task, I sometimes miss a step in a test
sequence.
In a maintenance task, I sometimes do things I don't intend to do.
Occasionally I plan an action that subsequently proves to be incorrect.
There are times I have deliberately acted contrary to written procedures.
When I return to a task sequence after an interruption, I sometimes don't
start at the right place.
Occasionally, I forget to remove a tool at the completion of a task.
I have been known to make a slip-up when I haven't been concentrating.
Under pressure, it's easy to forget steps in a task sequence.
I only depart from approved procedures with my supervisor's approval.
I make errors in my job from time to time.
There have been times when tiredness has affected my attention to detail.
I am pretty hard on myself when I make an error.
I have made errors that have been detected by my supervisor.

M
2.62
3.32
3.46
2.90
2.66
2.62
2.46
3.43

SD
1.21
1.13
1.02
1.19
1.20
1.20
0.98
1.15

3.59
2.66
2.49

0.93
1.15
1.14

2.26
2.28
2.51
2.06

0.91
0.91
1.01
1.07

2.07
1.74
2.86
2.96
2.58
3.38
3.11
4.30
3.37

0.95
0.89
1.11
1.20
1.26
0.92
1.17
0.93
1.13

Note. N = 90. The MES is from Fogarty (2005). All items were measured on a traditional 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The MES also was
partitioned into seven subscales, or dimensions: A1–A5 represented Recognition, A6–A10
represented Safety Concern, A11–A17 represented Supervision, A18–A21 represented Feedback,
A22–A26 represented Training, A27–A35 represented Stress, and A36–A48 represented
Maintenance Errors. See Table 4.2 for additional information about these scales, including the
meaning of each subscale.

further supported by looking at Table 4.1, which shows that participants generally
“disagreed” (scores of less than 3.0) with items A2 = “In this job people are
rewarded according to performance,” A4 = “In our promotion system, the best
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Table 4.2
Summary of Descriptive Statistics for the Subscales of the 48-Item Maintenance Environment
Survey (MES)
Possible
Range

Midrange b

Recognition (A1–A5)

5–25

Safety Concern (A6–A10)

Subscale a (Item Numbers)

Cronbach 

M

SD

15.0

13.2

3.75

.71

5–25

15.0

18.3

3.76

.68

Supervision (A11–A17)

7–35

21.0

23.9

6.37

.90

Feedback (A18–A21)

4–20

12.0

11.9

3.49

.75

Training (A22–A26)

5–25

15.0

17.4

3.83

.76

Stress (A27–A35)

9–45

25.0

26.3

6.60

.84

Maintenance Errors (A36–A48)

13–65

35.0

35.5

7.75

.83

Overall (A1–A48)

48–240

144.0

146.43

18.00

.84

Note. N = 90. The MES is from Fogarty (2005). All items were measured on a traditional 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. (see also Table 4.1).
a
Recognition assessed the extent to which participants felt they are rewarded or recognized for
doing good work. Item A3 was oppositely worded and reverse-scored. Safety Concern assessed
participants’ perceptions that their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues. Items A8–A10 were
oppositely worded and reverse-scored. Supervision assessed participants’ perceptions of their
supervisor’s expertise and the extent to which their supervisor assisted them. Feedback assessed
participants’ perceptions of the amount and quality of feedback they received. Item A19 was
oppositely worded and reverse-scored. Training assessed participants’ perceptions related to their
training, including if it was adequate for their job, if they were encouraged to enhance their training,
and whether there were opportunities for on-the-job training. Stress assessed participants’ feelings
and consequences about their stress and what contributes to it. Maintenance errors asked
participants to reflect on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both selfdetected and those identified by their supervisors). b The midrange was calculated by adding the low
and high values of the possible range and dividing the sum by 2.

people generally rise to the top,” and A5 = “I am satisfied with the recognition I get
for doing good work.” Furthermore, with respect to Item A3 = “There is not
enough reward and recognition for doing good work,” which was reversed scored,
the mean of M = 2.48 suggests participants’ agreed with the statement. When these
results are combined with the “disagree” finding of item A1 = “In this job the
rewards and encouragements usually outweigh the threats and the criticism” (M =
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2.79, SD = 1.14), it appears that participants might have a mild fear for their job
when they make an error.
Safety Focus of the Organization (“Safety Concern”). This 5-item
subscale (items A6–A10) assessed participants’ perceptions of the targeted MRO’s
concern for safety issues. Scores could range from 5 to 25, with higher scores
reflecting a positive perception of the targeted dimension.
Referring to Table 4.2, the mean for this dimension was M = 18.3 (SD =
3.76), which was 3.3 points above the midrange. This is an indication that
participants generally agreed that the targeted MRO had a high concern for safety.
This is supported in Table 4.1 by the “agreed” response to item A7 = “This
workplace regards safety as a major factor in achieving its goals” (M = 4.08). It
also is partially supported by the “nearly agreed” response to item A6 = “Personnel
are well trained in the consequences of unsafe acts” (M = 3.49). The three final
items, A8 = “Lack of proper equipment sometimes forces us to cut corners in our
work,” A9 = “There is not always time to follow safe procedures,” and A10 = “In
high workload conditions, I am prepared to take a few shortcuts to get the jobs
done in time” were reverse-scored items. Their means, prior to reverse scoring,
approached 2.0, which indicates that participants “disagreed” with these statements.
Supervision Standards. This 7-item subscale, items A11–A17, assessed
participants’ perceptions of their supervisor’s expertise and the extent to which their
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supervisor assisted them. Scores could range from 7 to 35, with higher scores
reflecting a positive perception of the targeted dimension.
As reported in Table 4.2, the mean for this dimension was M = 23.9 (SD =
6.37), which was 2.9 points higher than the midrange of 21.0. Although this mean
score suggests that participants’ perceptions of their supervisor were generally
positive, the reader will note that the high degree of variability (SD = 6.37) suggests
that this generally positive perception was not consistent among the participants.
Referencing Table 4.1, each corresponding item’s mean hovered around 3.5 and had
fairly consistent standard deviations with the exception of item A17 = “My
immediate supervisor checks my work very carefully” (M = 2.87). It is possible that
this last item could be the source of the overall large variability associated with this
dimension. It also is highly plausible that the mean of this item was a function of the
quality system implemented at the targeted MRO, namely, supervisors do not
inspect work. That is the task of the quality control inspector.
Feedback on Work Performance. This 4-item subscale, items A18–A21,
assessed participants’ perceptions of the amount of feedback they received. Scores
could range from 4 to 20, with higher scores reflecting a positive perception of the
targeted dimension.
As reported in Table 4.2, the mean for this dimension was M = 11.9 (SD =
3.49), which was approximately equal to the midrange of 12.0. This suggests
participants had a generally neutral perception of the amount and quality of
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feedback they are given by their supervisors. The mean scores of the corresponding
items related to this dimension confirm this finding. As reported in Table 4.1, all
hover around M = 3.0. This also is the case for item A19 = “It is difficult for me to
find out how well I am doing my job,” which was reverse-scored. Prior to reverse
scoring this item’s mean was M = 3.2.
Training Standards and Appropriateness. This 5-item subscale, items
A22–A26, assessed participants’ perceptions of the different aspects of their
training, including adequacy of training for the job, encouragement to undertake
further training, and opportunities for on-the-job training. Scores could range from
5 to 25, with higher scores reflecting a positive perception of the targeted
dimension.
As reported in Table 4.2, the mean for this dimension was M = 17.4 (SD =
3.83), which was 2.4 points above the midrange of 15.0. Although his suggests
participants had a generally favorable perception of their training, when the
corresponding items related to this dimension are examined separately, there
appears to be some inconsistency. For example, as reported in Table 4.2, items
A22 = “My training and experience have prepared me well for duties in my current
job,” A23 = “I have been encouraged to improve myself through continued
training,” and A24 = “I have found many opportunities to use my training in my
current job” had means between 3.64 and 3.99 with a consistent standard deviation
of approximately 1.0. The reader will note that these items reflect the issue of job
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training adequacy and encouragement to undertake further training, and the
respective means tend to an “agree” direction. However, the remaining two items,
which referred to job expectations and on-the-job-training, tend to a “disagree”
direction: item A25 = “I am not expected to perform tasks for which I have not
been trained” (M = 2.62, SD = 1.21), and item A26 = “Maintenance personnel
receive a lot of “hands-on” training” (M = 3.32, SD = 1.13). Thus, when the results
are considered from an aggregate perspective, participants’ perceptions of their
training was positive, but when the results are disaggregated relative to the
dimension’s respective items, participants’ perceptions were not as positive when it
came to opportunities for on-the-job training or for being asked to perform
activities for which they were not trained.
Exposure to Workplace Stressors (“Stress”). This 9-item subscale, items
A27–A35, assessed participants’ feelings and consequences of their stress and what
factors contribute to it. Scores could range from 9 to 45, with higher scores
reflecting a positive perception of the targeted dimension.
As reported in Table 4.2, the mean for this dimension was M = 26.3 (SD =
6.60), which was 1.3 points higher than the midrange of 25.0. Although this mean
score suggests that participants’ perceptions of the stress they experience in the
workplace is slightly higher than average, the reader will note that the high degree
of variability (SD = 6.60) suggests that was not consistent among the participants.
For example, referencing Table 4.1, items A28–A31 and A34–A35, which
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collectively reflect the pressures of work, the mean scores are in the disagree-toneutral range. This indicates that participants essentially disagreed that workrelated pressures contributed to workplace stress. Furthermore, with respect to
items A27 and A33, which reflect a “time” issue, the mean scores are in the
neutral-to-agree range. This indicates that participants believed that their job has an
impact on their time, which in turn could induce stress. However, now consider
item A32 = “I often feel irritated by things that happen at work, which had a mean
of M = 3.43 (SD = 1.15). This item is similar to items A28–A31 and A34–A35 in
that it too is related to workplace pressure, yet participants’ responses tended
toward neutral-to-agree, which is contrary to the previous trend. It is likely that this
inconsistency resulted in the high variability in the overall results for this
dimension.
Maintenance Errors. This 13-item subscale, items A36–A48, asked
participants to review their history of committing maintenance errors on the job,
including those they self-detected as well as those flagged by their supervisors.
Scores could range from 13 to 65, with higher scores reflecting a higher history of
committing maintenance errors.
As reported in Table 4.2, the mean for this dimension was M = 35.5 (SD =
7.75), which was approximately equal to the midrange of 35.0. This indicates that
participants’ reflections of making maintenance errors on the job—self-detected or
identified by their supervisor—were relatively neutral. As shown in Table 4.1, the
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trend of “disagree-to-neutral” is apparent in all but two items. Item A41 =
“Occasionally, I forget to remove a tool at the completion of a task” (M = 1.74,
SD = 0.89) indicates that participants strongly disagreed with the statement. Item
A47 = “I am pretty hard on myself when I make an error” (M = 4.30, SD = 0.93)
indicates that participants tended to agree with the statement. This suggests that
although participants were careful to not commit errors during maintenance, they
accepted responsibility when it did happen.
Section B: The General Health Questionnaire (GHQ)
This section of the AMSCS was composed of Goldberg and Williams’
(1988) 12-item GHQ, which is a self-reported instrument used to identify
psychological distress such as depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and
psychosomatic symptoms. The GHQ is measured on a 4-point Likert-type response
scale with 0 = Not at all, 1 = No more than usual, 2 = Rather more than usual, and
3 = Much more than usual. Thus, overall scores could range from 0 to 36, with
higher scores indicating higher levels of psychological distress.
As reported in Table 4.3, the overall mean was M = 11.5 (SD = 5.4), which
was 6.5 points below the midrange. This indicates a low level of self-reported
psychological distress among the participants. When examined individually, mean
scores ranged from M = 0.26 (SD = 0.66) to M = 1.37 (SD = 1.01), which supports
the absence or at the very worst no more than usual psychological distress among
the participants.
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Table 4.3
Summary of Descriptive Statistics for the 12-Item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) a
Item b

M

SD

B1. Have you recently been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing?

1.35

0.92

B2. Have you recently felt capable of making decisions about things?

1.07

0.92

B3. Have you recently been able to face up to your problems?

1.12

0.88

B4. Have you recently lost much sleep over worry?

0.91

1.00

B5. Have you recently felt constantly under strain?

0.87

0.87

B6. Have you recently felt you could not overcome your difficulties?

0.81

0.95

B7. Have you recently been feeling unhappy and depressed?

0.69

0.97

B8. Have you recently been losing confidence in yourself?

0.45

0.84

B9. Have you recently been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?

0.26

0.66

B10. Have you recently felt that you are playing a useful part in things?

1.37

1.01

B11. Have you recently been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities?

1.36

0.98

B12. Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?

1.24

0.98

Note. N = 90. The GHQ is from Goldberg and Williams (1988). All items were measured on a 4point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 = Not at all, 1 = Not more than usual, 2 = Rather more than
usual, and 3 = Much more than usual. Scores overall could range from 0 to 36 with higher scores
reflecting higher levels of psychological distress. The overall mean was M = 11.5 (SD = 5.4).
a
The overall Cronbach alpha for the 12-item GHQ was  = .71. b B1, B2, B3, B10, B11, and B12
(denoted in bold type) are oppositely worded items and were reverse-scored. The means and
standard deviations for these items reflect the reverse scoring.

Inferential Statistics
Overview
The purpose of the current study was three-fold: (a) to replicate Fogarty
(2005) to determine if the targeted MRO’s data were consistent with Fogarty’s
model; (b) to replicate Uhuegho (2017) to determine if the targeted MRO’s data
were consistent with Uhuegho’s model; and (c) to examine the extent to which the
targeted MRO’s data supported Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model.
Fogarty’s, Uhuegho’s, and Bandura’s respective models are presented in Chapter 1,
and the interested reader is directed to this chapter to review these models.
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The data analysis strategy used for the first two parts of the current study
was structural equation modeling (SEM). This strategy was appropriate because in
both cases the goal was to confirm the relationship among a set of variables relative
to the respective causal models reported in the literature. The data analysis strategy
used for the third part of the study was a combination of either multiple regression
or MANOVA, depending on the number of dependent variables involved. These
strategies were appropriate because the objective was to explore the relationship
among a set of variables relative to a theoretical model.
Preliminary Analyses
Prior to performing any primary analysis, the data were screened using
multiple analyses to ensure the dataset was “clean.” These preliminary analyses
included modifying the initial dataset to prepare it for analysis, conducting outlier
and missing data analyses, checking for multicollinearity, and confirming that the
dataset was compliant with the assumptions of the targeted data analysis strategies.
A summary of these preliminary analyses follows.
Dataset Modifications. I made several modifications to the dataset after
receiving it from Lime Survey, the website that hosted the AMSCS. The first
modification was to change the column headings to match the AMSCS categories
and subscales. The next modification was to delete cases with no data. Of the initial
sample, 26 of the 116 cases (22%) had no data. As a result of deleting these cases,
the sample size was reduced to N = 90. The next modification was to reverse score
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five items of Fogarty’s (2005) MES and six items of Goldberg and Williams’
(1988) GHQ.
The remaining data set modifications consisted of coding the categorical
demographic variables of gender, marital status, race/ethnicity, education level, and
ratings. Gender was dummy coded with Male as the reference group. Due to
disparate sample sizes, marital status was reduced to a dichotomy that compared
Married vs. Unmarried, where Unmarried included those who identified as single,
divorced, widowed, separated, and other. This was then dummy coded with
Married as the reference group. Race/Ethnicity was also reduced to a dichotomy
due to disparate sample sizes, and Caucasian vs. non-Caucasian where NonCaucasian included those who identified as Hispanic, African-American, Asian
American, and Other. This was then dummy coded with Caucasian as the reference
group. Education level, which consisted of high school, technical school, 2-year
degree, 4-year degree, and graduate degree, was dummy coded using 2-year degree
as the reference group. Ratings consisted of Airframe, Powerplant, Avionics, IA,
Apprentice, Painter, Pilot, and Customer Service. Because of the number of
missing responses to the ratings category, these data were neither coded nor used in
the analysis. As a note to the reader, the demographical variables were not included
in the primary analysis used to test the study’s hypotheses.
Missing Data Analysis. Missing data occurs because participants forget to
respond to an item, are reluctant to respond, or consciously opt out of responding.
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Of the 90 cases that comprised the sample: no data were missing on the MES, four
cases had missing data on the GHQ, six participants did not report their gender, six
did not report their marital status, 10 did not report their age, and 11 did not report
their race/ethnicity. Six of the participants who did not report their age and
race/ethnicity were the same ones who did not report their gender and marital
status. Instead of deleting these cases, I followed Cohen et al.’s (2003) guidelines
and treated them as information, and all missing data were found to be missing
randomly and not systematically. As a result, missing GHQ data were imputed with
mean scores, missing age data were imputed with the overall mean age (M = 44.5
years old), and the missing data for race/ethnicity, marital status, and gender were
assigned respective means.
Outlier Analysis. Outliers are either extremely high or low scores relative
to the given data set. These can consist of contaminated data, which could be the
result of a data entry error, or rare cases, which are valid but exceedingly rare
observations in the sample. An example of this latter case pertinent to the current
study would be a participant who has less than 1 year working at the targeted MRO
because it is this person’s 1st year of employment.
To determine if outliers were present, an outlier analysis was performed
using Jackknife distances, which flagged five outliers. Each case appeared to be
reflective of real-world situations. Two separate simultaneous regression analyses
were performed—one with outliers present, the other with outliers absent—with
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Maintenance Errors as the dependent variable. In each analysis the results showed
that both models were nearly the same with respect to overall R2, root mean square
error, and F and p values. Because these outliers represented real-world situations
and they did not appear to inflate or mask significance, they were retained in the
final model.
Multicollinearity. The assumption in any multivariate analysis is that each
predictor has the potential to contribute to the explanation of the variability in the
outcome variable. This assumption will not be met if one predictor is highly
correlated (e.g., r > .8) with another predictor. This concept of two highly
correlated predictor variables is referred to as multicollinearity. The presence of
multicollinearity can result in incorrect regression coefficients and large standard
errors (among other things).
To check for multicollinearity in the current study’s dataset, I examined
each predictor’s variable inflation factor (VIF), which “provides an index of the
amount that the variance of each regression coefficient is increased relative to a
situation in which all the IVs are uncorrelated” (Cohen et. al., 2003, pp. 421–422).
In addition, the square root of the VIF indicates the amount of increase in standard
error of a regression coefficient compared against what would be expected if all the
predictors were not correlated. As an example, consider an independent variable
that has a VIF = 4. This would indicate that the corresponding standard error would
be twice as high as it would be if the predictor were not correlated with any other
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predictors in the model. In the current study, Age and Total years as an AMT were
fairly highly correlated (r = .76, VIFs ≈ 4.0). So I decided that removing Total
years as an AMT was prudent due to the high quantity of missing data. After
removing Total years as an AMT, all VIFs were below 1.5, which eliminated any
multicollinearity.
SEM and MANOVA/Multiple Regression Assumptions. As noted
earlier, the statistical procedures used to test the current study’s hypotheses were
SEM and MANOVA/multiple regression. Kline (2016, pp. 33–34) reported that the
data related assumptions of SEM were: (a) no missing data, (b) independence of the
residual, (c) multivariate normality, and (d) exogenous variables are measured with
perfect reliability. In addition to these, Kline also specified multivariate linearity
and homoscedasticity of the residuals as additional assumptions. MANOVA and
multiple regression share these assumptions and adds an additional one, namely,
correct specification of the independent variables. Following is a discussion of
these assumptions and how the methods were applied to the current dataset to
confirm compliance.
Multivariate Linearity. MANOVA/multiple regression and SEM examine
linear relationships between variables. This makes it necessary to determine if the
form of these relationships is linear. The linearity assumption must be met from a
multivariate point of view. A violation of this assumption would be a nonlinear
relationship among measured variables and could result in biased estimates of the
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regression coefficient and standard errors. A residual analysis was conducted to
verify multivariate linearity. This analysis plotted residuals against predicted
values. No discernable pattern was noted, and the Kernel smoother line, which
closely followed the trend of the zero-line associated with the linear fit of the
model, confirmed this observation. This verified that the dataset was compliant
with the multivariate assumption.
Homoscedasticity of the Residuals. The assumption of homoscedasticity is
met when the variance of the residuals around the calculated regression line
remains constant, regardless of any value of the independent variable. When this
assumption is violated, the significance tests and confidence intervals will be
incorrect. Violation of this assumption can be detected, as with the multivariate
linearity, by examining the residuals versus predicted plot. As reported in the
previous assumption, there was no discernable pattern, which was confirmed by the
Kernel smoother line. This confirmed the dataset was compliant with the
homoscedasticity of residuals assumption.
Independence of the Residuals. This assumption confirms the residuals of
the observations are independent of one another. In other words, it ensures there is
no relationship among the residuals for any subset of cases. This assumption is
violated when multiple observations are made of participants over time and there is
a systemic change in those observations. To evaluate this assumption, the residuals
were plotted against the corresponding case numbers. No discernable pattern was
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noted, which was confirmed by the Kernel smoother line. This verified the dataset
was compliant with the independence of the residuals assumption.
Normality of the Residuals. The normality of the residuals assumption
indicates that any error represented by the residuals should be normally distributed
for each set of values of the independent variables. It helps to evaluate the
statistical significance of the relationship between dependent and independent
variables as reflected by the regression line. To verify compliance with this
assumption, a normal q-q plot was constructed with a 95% confidence band. The
residuals closely followed the corresponding line of fit, and all the data were
enclosed within the confidence band as well. This observation was confirmed by
the Shapiro-Wilk W goodness-of-fit test, W = .99, p = .6975. Thus, the dataset was
compliant with the normality assumption.
Perfect Reliability. This assumption assumes the instruments used to
measure the independent variables are reliable or measure the independent variable
without error. When this assumption is violated, measurement error could result in
biased regression coefficients and standard errors, and incorrect confidence
intervals. Cohen et al. (2003) established that reliability coefficients of at least  =
.70 are acceptable in practice. The two primary data collection instruments in the
current study, Fogarty’s (2005) MES and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) GHQ,
had overall reliability coefficients of α = .84 and α = .71, respectively, as reported
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. For the subscales of the MES, it should be noted that Safety
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Concern had an α = .68, which falls short of Cohen et al.’s recommendation, but
was close enough that it was decided to keep it in the final dataset.
Correct Specification of the IVs. This last assumption refers to the notion
that the independent variables included in the model belong in the model because
of their relationship with the dependent measure. If this assumption is incorrect it
will lead to incorrect estimates of the regression coefficients, significance tests, and
confidence intervals. Because the current study was a replication of Fogarty (2005)
and Uhuegho (2017), the variables were therefore based on Fogarty for the primary
variables, and the demographic variables were based on Uhuegho. Because the
relationship between these variables is dependent on the sample data, it is possible
that some of these variables may not be correctly specified.
To test this assumption, I examined variable leverage plots. These plots
focused on the relationship between the residuals of the dependent variable and the
residuals of the targeted independent variables after both variables were freed of
any relationship with other variables. These leverage plots indicated that the
following factors did not have a relationship with the DV = Maintenance Errors: (a)
the Recognition subscale of the MES, (b) the Training subscale of the MES, (c)
Psychological Distress (GHQ), (d) Age, (e) Marital Status, (f) Total Years as an
AMT, (g) Education Level, and (h) Race/Ethnicity. Because this assumption was
not relevant to SEM, all subscales of the MES and the GHQ were included to test
Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017)) models. These same subscales, however,
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were excluded when testing Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. In
addition, the demographic variables were not applicable to the primary analysis
because they were not included as factors in any of the models.
Summary of Preliminary Analyses. After completing the preliminary data
screening, the final sample was N = 90, which included five outliers. Although the
reliability of the Safety Concern subscale (α = .68) did not meet Cohen et al.’s
(2003) specified minimum threshold of α = .70, it was kept in the dataset to test
Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017) models because it was close to .70. The
MES subscales of Recognition, Training, and Psychological distress failed to meet
the correct IV assumption, but because this assumption was not relevant to SEM,
these subscales were included when testing Fogarty’s and Uhuegho’s models.
These factors, however, were removed when testing Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model. A summary of these analyses is provided in Table 4.4.
Primary Analysis 1: Testing Fogarty’s (2005) Model
Structural equation modeling was performed using AMOS version 27 to
determine if the sample data fit Fogarty’s (2005) model as presented in Figure 4.1.
First, the intercorrelations among the targeted factors were determined. The results
of this analysis is provided in Table 4.5, where Maintenance Errors is listed along
the bottom row to more easily examine its correlations with the other factors. The
reader will note that Maintenance Errors was significantly correlated with Safety
Concern and Feedback, which were factors in the Safety Climate construct, and
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Table 4.4
Summary of Variable Status as a Result of Preliminary Data Screening
Dataset Used for Primary Analyses
Decision a

Reason/Rationale a

Recognition b

Kept for SEM

Assumption is not relevant to SEM

Safety concern

–



Supervision

–

–

Initial Set of Factors

Feedback

–

–

Training b

Kept for SEM

Assumption is not relevant to SEM

–

–

Kept for SEM

Assumption is not relevant to SEM

–

–

Stress
Psychological distress

b

Maintenance errors

Complete Dataset with Demographic Factors
X1 = Recognition

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

X2 = Safety concern

–

–

X3 = Supervision

–

–

X4 = Feedback

–

–

X5 = Training

Deleted from final model

X6 = Stress

–

Not correctly specified; failed assumption
–

X7 = Psych. distress

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

X8 = Age

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

X9 = Gender

–

–

X10 = Marital status

Deleted from final model

Highly correlated with X3 = Supervision

X11 = Total years AMT

Deleted from final model

Highly correlated with X8 = Age

X12 = Education level

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

X13 = Race/Ethnicity

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

Note. N = 90.
a
Dashed items (–) denote no action taken because the factor was compliant with the assumptions.
b
Although the Recognition, Training, and Psychological distress subscales were not compliant with
the correct specification of the IV assumption, they were included in the dataset used to test
Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017) models because this assumption was not relevant to SEM.
However, Recognition, Training, and Psychological distress subscales were excluded from the
dataset used to test Bandura’s (1977) model.

Stress, which was a factor in the Psychological Strain construct. As with Fogarty
(2005) and Uhuegho (2017), the Psychological Strain variables had non-zero
correlations with all five of the Safety Climate variables. This is keeping with
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Figure 4.1
Fogarty’s (2005) Final Safety Climate Model for MROs

Table 4.5
Summary of Intercorrelations among the Subscales of Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance Environment
Survey and Goldberg and Williams’ (1998) General Health Questionnaire
Scale a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. X1 = Recognition

—

2. X2 = Safety Concern

.21*

3. X3 = Supervision

.42*** .29**

—

4. X4 = Feedback

.56*** .31**

.48*** —

5. X5 = Training

.43*** .40*** .31**

.40*** —

6. X6 = Stress

-.22*

-.30** -.21*

-.05

-.17

—

7. X7 = Psych. Distress b

-.05

-.02

.07

.03

.26*

8. Y = Maintenance Errors

.11

-.35** .10

.21*

-.04

.40*** .19

8

—

.15

—
—

Note. N = 90. Correlations greater than |. 20 | are significant for  = .05.
a Scales 1–5 defined Safety Climate; Scales 6–7 defined Psychological Strain. b Psychological Distress was
measured by the General Heath Questionnaire.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Fogarty’s proposition that, “safety climate acts primarily on the psychological
health of the individual workers and that psychological strain is a primary
determinate of maintenance errors” (p. 58).
As depicted in Figure 4.2, when testing Fogarty’s (2005) model with the
current study’s sample data, the first iteration yielded a significant model. In SEM,
a significant model means the data did not fit the model. This is because the null
hypothesis presumes there is no significant difference between the sample data and
the model. Because the first iteration yielded a significant Chi-square (p = .039),
the model was rejected and subsequent revisions were examined. In hindsight,
though, it was observed that I included the four missing data cases—which were
imputed with means—for Psychological Distress. As a result, I removed these four
cases, which reduced the sample size from N = 90 to N = 86, and reran the analysis.
Prior to doing so, though, I also set the Recognition, Training, and Psychological
Distress factor paths to a fixed estimate of 1.00 as a parameter of the model. These
factors were chosen because of their failure to meet the correct specification of the
IV assumption.
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, these changes yielded a non-significant Chisquare, χ2 (20, N = 86) = 26.82, p = .14, and as reported in Table 4.6, the analysis
also resulted in acceptable fit indices. Although two of these indices—CFI = .804
and DELTA2 = .841—were slightly smaller than their recommended minimum
thresholds of .90 (Jaccard & Wan, 1996), it was reasoned that this was probably
129

Figure 4.2
Results of SEM Analysis of Initial Hypothesized Model

Note. Unstandardized estimates. Chi-square = 32.457, df = 20, p = .039.

Figure 4.3
Results of SEM Analysis of Modified Hypothesized Model

Note. This model reflects the absence of four missing data cases from Psychological Distress.
Unstandardized estimates. Chi-square = 26.817, df = 20, p = .140.
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Table 4.6
Indices of Model Fit
Index a

Recommended Thresholds b

2(20) = 26.817, p = .140

Nonsignificant, p > .05

GFI = .921

Greater than .90

CFI = .804

Greater than .90

RMSEA = .063

Less than .08

DELTA2 = .841

Greater than .90

Note. See also Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
a GFI = goodness-of-fit index, CFI = comparative fit index, RMSEA =
root mean square error of approximation, and DELTA2 is the
incremental fit index (IFI). b See Jaccard and Wan, 1996, p. 86.

due to a combination of sample size, model complexity, and number of variables in
the model. For example, in the current study, the sample size was relatively small,
N = 86, there were a relatively large number of variables, v = 19, and the model
was of moderate complexity, df = 20. According to Kenny (2020), small sample
sizes and larger numbers of variables tend to produce larger indices, whereas more
complex models (smaller dfs) tend to produce smaller fit indices.
As displayed in Figure 4.4, this final model yielded significant paths for
three of the Safety Climate factors: Safety Concern, Supervision, and Feedback for
α = .05. The model also predicted 8% of the variance in Psychological Strain,
defined by Stress and Psychological Distress, and predicted 9% of the variance in
Maintenance Errors. Additional noteworthy observations include:
• There was an indirect (negative) relationship between Psychological
Strain and Safety Climate: As Safety Climate increased, Psychological
Strain decreased. This implies that when participants’ perceptions of the
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Figure 4.4
Results of SEM Analysis of Final Model

Note. Unstandardized estimates. Chi-square = 26.817, df = 20, p = .140.

targeted MRO’s safety climate were positive, their perceived level of
stress and psychological distress declined.
• The mediated effect (standardized indirect) of Safety Climate on
Maintenance Errors, through Psychological Strain was .081. This
indicates that as Safety Climate increased by 1 standard deviation,
Maintenance Errors decreased by 0.081 standard deviations. This
relationship was not significant.
• There were nine error terms in the model. Of those, two were not
significant, e9 (p = .528) and e6 (p = .840). The remaining error terms,
however, were significant (p < .001). This indicates there is a certain
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amount of unexplained variance related to the factors Recognition, Safety
Concern, Supervision, Feedback, Training, Psychological Distress, and
Maintenance Errors. Because Psychological Strain was a latent variable,
this error implies that measurements of Psychological Strain are not
restricted to just Stress and Psychological Distress. Because each of the
Safety Climate factors was significantly affected by this unexplained
variance, this result also implies there may be influences on the construct
of Safety Climate, other than those identified by Fogarty (2005). This is
discussed further in Chapter 5.
Based on these results, the sample data effectively validated Fogarty’s model: (a)
all the measured factors of the three latent variables remained in the final model,
and (b) the path model confirmed that Psychological Strain mediates the
relationship between Safety Climate and Maintenance Errors. The only difference
is that all five Safety Climate paths in Fogarty were significant whereas three of
these five paths in the current study’s model were significant.
Primary Analysis 2: Testing Uhuegho’s (2017) Model
The reader might recall from Chapter 2 that Uhuegho (2017) attempted to
validate Fogarty’s (2005) model by applying it to a U.S. based commercial aviation
MRO. Furthermore, unlike Fogarty, who examined the safety climate of an
Australian military helicopter unit’s MRO, Uhuegho’s MRO consisted of 200
facilities across the U.S. that performed heavy airframe, engine, component, and
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line maintenance on private business, narrow body, and regional commercial jets.
As reported in Chapter 2, Uhuegho’s final path model did not fit Fogarty’s model.
For example, of the five factors associated with Safety Climate, only two—
Recognition and Supervision—remained in Uhuegho’s final model, and although
Uhuegho’s model yielded acceptable fit indices, none of the paths were significant.
The only similar finding was that Uhuegho’s model confirmed that Psychological
Strain mediated the effect of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors.
Because the current study’s path model effectively validated Fogarty’s
(2005) model, this means it was not consistent with Uhuegho’s (2017) model. As a
result, the outlier appears to be with Uhuegho, and a plausible explanation would
be MRO site. Although all three studies targeted a single MRO, the respective
MROs of the current study and Fogarty’s involved a single site, but Uhuegho’s
MRO had 200 locations across the nation and data were collected from these
multiple sites. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.
Primary Analysis 3: Testing Bandura’s (1977) Model
A third objective of the current study was to examine the relationship
among Fogarty’s (2005) three latent constructs of Safety Climate, Psychological
Strain, and Maintenance Errors relative to the three dimensions of Bandura’s
(1977) reciprocal causation model: Environment, Person, and Behavior. As
discussed in Chapter 1, Bandura posited that each dimension influenced the other:
(a) Person and Behavior influence Environment, (b) Environment and Behavior
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Figure 4.5
Application of Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal Causation Model to the Current Study

Note. Safety Climate was aligned to Bandura’s Environment dimension, Psychological
Strain was aligned to Bandura’s Person dimension, and Maintenance Errors was aligned
to Banudra’s Behavior dimension. The respective factors for each dimension are given
as bullet items within brackets.

influence Person, and (c) Environment and Person influence Behavior. When
applied to the context of the current study, and as illustrated in Figure 4.5 using
bidirectional arrows between each of the dimensions: (a) Safety Climate
corresponded to the Environment dimension and consisted of three factors: Safety
Concern, Supervision, and Feedback; (b) Psychological Strain corresponded to the
Person dimension and consisted of the single factor Stress; and (c) Maintenance
Errors corresponded to the Behavior dimension and consisted of the single factor
Maintenance Errors.
Following is a summary of each analysis. The reader is reminded that the
factors of Recognition and Training, which were part of Safety Climate, and
Psychological Distress, which was part of Psychological Strain, were not compliant
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with regression assumptions as part of preliminary data screening, and hence were
not included in these analyses. The reader also is directed to Figure 2.2 in Chapter
2, which guided the structure of these analyses.
Person and Environment Influence Behavior: P  B and E  B
(reference Figure 2.2a in Chapter 2). To examine the influence Person and
Environment had on Behavior, I conducted a simultaneous multiple regression
analysis in which Maintenance Errors (the dependent variable) was regressed on
Stress, Safety Concern, Supervision, and Feedback. As reported in Table 4.7, this
analysis was significant, R2 = .34, F(4, 85) = 10.96, p < .0001. Thus, these four
factors collectively explained 34% of the variance in Maintenance Errors. Because
the overall model was significant, the individual factors were examined per the Fisher
protected t test concept, which protects against inflated alpha levels. Following is a
brief summary of these respective findings.
The Influence of Person on Behavior (P  B). As reported in Table 4.7,
Stress (Person dimension) had a significant relationship with Maintenance Errors
(Behavior dimension), B6 = 0.39, p = .0007. Thus, when holding all the other
variables in the model constant, for every unit increase in Stress scores,
Maintenance Errors increased on average by 0.39 units. More concretely, every 10point increase in Stress scores resulted in an average increase of approximately four
errors.
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Table 4 .7
MRC Results for the Influence of Person and Environment on Behavior (P  B and
E  B)
Y = Maintenance Errors (Behavior)
95% CI
Effect

B

Intercept

SE

LL

UL

p

28.02

5.62

16.83

39.20

< .0001

0.39

0.11

0.17

0.61

.0007

-0.79

0.20

-1.19

-0.39

.0002

0.19

0.13

-0.06

0.44

.1443

0.60

0.23

0.15

1.06

.0100

Person
X6 = Stress a
Environment
X2 = Safety Concern b
X3 = Supervision
X4 = Feedback

b

Note. N = 90. R2 = .34, F(4, 85) = 10.96, p < .0001. See also Figure 2.2(a). See also
Figure 2.2(a) in Chapter 2 and Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4.

The Influence of Environment on Behavior (E  B). As reported in Table
4.7, Safety Concern and Feedback (Environment dimension) had a significant
relationship with Maintenance Errors (Behavior dimension), B2 = 0.79, p = .0002,
and B4 = 0.60, p = .01. Thus, when holding all the other variables in the model
constant, for every unit increase in Safety Concern scores, Maintenance Errors
decreased on average by 0.79 units, and for every unit increase in Feedback scores,
Maintenance Errors increased on average by 0.60 units. More concretely: (a) every
10-point increase in Safety Concern scores, which reflected participants’
perceptions that management has a high level of concern for safety issues, resulted
in an average decrease of approximately eight errors; and (b) every 10-point
increase in Feedback scores, which reflected participants’ perceptions of the
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amount and quality of feedback they received from supervisors with respect to their
job performance, resulted in an average increase of approximately six errors.
Behavior Influences Person and Environment: B  P and B  E
(reference Figure 2.2b in Chapter 2). To examine the influence Behavior had on
Person and Environment, I conducted a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) as an omnibus procedure to protect against inflated Type I and Type
II errors. This procedure involved the single independent variable, Maintenance
Errors (Behavior dimension) and four dependent variables: the three Safety Climate
factors—Safety Concern, Supervision, and Feedback (Environment Dimension)—
and the single Psychological Strain factor, Stress (Person dimension). As reported
in Table 4.8, this analysis resulted in a significant MANOVA model, F(4, 85) =
10.96, p < .0001. (Note. There was no corresponding Wilks’ λ because there was
only one independent variable, namely, Maintenance Errors.) As a result, four
separate univariate analyses were performed, one for each dependent variable.
Following is a brief summary of these analyses.
The Influence of Behavior on Person (B  P). As reported in Table 4.8,
Maintenance Errors (Behavior dimension) had a significant relationship with Stress
(Person dimension), R2 = .16, F(1, 88) = 16.76, p < .0001. Thus, Maintenance
Errors explained 16% of the variance in Stress scores. Furthermore, B6 = 0.34,
which indicates that for every unit increase in Maintenance Errors, Stress scores
increased on average by 0.34 units. More concretely, every 10-unit increase in
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Table 4 .8
Univariate Follow-ups of MANOVA Results for the Influence of Behavior on Person and
Environment (B  P and B  E)
Maintenance Errors (IV)
(B  P)
95% CI
Person Factor (DV)
Intercept
X6 = Stress

a

B

SE

LL

UL

p

14.18

3.02

8.18

20.18

< .0001

0.34

0.08

0.18

0.51

< .0001

Maintenance Errors (IV)
(B  E)
95% CI
Environment Factor (DV)
Intercept
X2 = Safety Concern

b, e

B

SE

LL

UL

p

24.34

1.76

20.86

27.84

< .0001

-0.17

0.05

-0.27

-0.08

.0006

Maintenance Errors (IV)
(B  E)
95% CI
Environment Factor (DV)
Intercept
X3 = Supervision

c

B

SE

LL

UL

p

20.87

3.16

14.59

27.15

< .0001

0.08

0.09

-0.09

0.26

.3349

Maintenance Errors (IV)
(B  E)
95% CI
Environment Factor (DV)
Intercept
X4 = Feedback

d, e

B

SE

LL

UL

p

8.59

1.70

5.20

11.97

< .0001

0.09

0.05

0.00

0.19

.0467

Note. N = 90. The overall MANOVA model was significant, F(4, 85) = 10.96, p < .0001.
There was no corresponding Wilk’s Lambda for the MANOVA because there was only one
IV. In this table, which reflects the respective follow-up univariate analyses, Maintenance
Errors was treated as the independent variable, and X6 = Stress, X2 = Safety Concern, X3 =
Supervision, and X4 = Feedback were treated as dependent variables. See also Figure 2.2(b)
in Chapter 2, and Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4.
a 2
R = .16, F(1, 88) = 16.76, p < .0001.When combined with the results from Table 4.7,
there is a significant reciprocal relationship between the Person dimension (X6 = Stress)
and the Behavior dimension (Maintenance Errors). b R2 = .12 F(1, 88) = 12.55, p = .0006.
c 2
R = .01, F(1, 88) = 0.94, p = .3349. d R2 = .04, F(1, 88) = 4.07, p = .0467. e When
combined with the results from Table 4.7, there is a significant reciprocal relationship
between the Environment dimension (X2 = Safety Concern and X4 = Feedback) and the
Behavior dimension (Maintenance Errors).
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Maintenance Errors resulted in Stress scores increasing on average by a little more
than 3 points.
The Influence of Behavior on Environment (B  E). As reported in Table
4.8, Maintenance Errors (Behavior dimension) had a significant relationship with
Safety Concern (Environment dimension), R2 = .12, F(1, 88) = 12.55, p < .0006.
Thus, Maintenance Errors explained 12% of the variance in Safety Concern scores.
Furthermore, B2 = 0.17, which indicates that for every unit increase in
Maintenance Errors, Safety Concern scores decreased on average by 0.17 units.
More concretely, every 10-unit increase in Maintenance Errors resulted in, on
average, a nearly 2-point decrease in Safety Concern scores.
Maintenance Errors (Behavior dimension) also had a significant
relationship with Feedback (Environment dimension), R2 = .04, F(1, 88) = 4.07, p =
.0467. Thus, Maintenance Errors explained 4% of the variance in Feedback scores.
Furthermore, B4 = 0.09, which indicates that for every unit increase in Maintenance
Errors, Feedback scores increased on average by 0.1 point. More concretely, every
10-unit increase in Maintenance Errors resulted in, on average, a 1-point increase in
Feedback scores.
Person and Environment Influence Each Other: P  E and E  P
(reference Figure 2.c in Chapter 2). To examine the influence Person had on
Environment (P  E), I conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
as an omnibus procedure to protect against inflated Type I and Type II errors. This
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Table 4 .9
Univariate Follow-ups of MANOVA Results for the Influence of Person on
Environment (P  E)
Stress (IV)
(P  E)
95% CI
Environment Factor (DV)
Intercept
X2 = Safety Concern

a

B

SE

LL

UL

p

22.77

1.57

19.65

25.88

< .0001

-0.17

0.06

-0.29

-0.06

.0040

Stress (IV)
(P  E)
95% CI
Environment Factor (DV)
Intercept
X3 = Supervision

b

B

SE

LL

UL

p

29.22

2.72

23.81

34.62

< .0001

-0.20

0.10

-0.40

-0.004

.0456

Stress (IV)
(P  E)
95% CI
Environment Factor (DV)
Intercept
X4 = Feedback

c

B

SE

LL

UL

p

12.62

1.52

9.59

15.65

< .0001

-0.03

0.06

-0.14

0.09

.6489

Note. N = 90. The overall MANOVA model was significant, F(3, 86) = 3.92, p = .0113.
There was no corresponding Wilk’s Lambda for the MANOVA because there was only one
IV. In this table, in the respective follow-up univariate analyses, Stress was treated as the
independent variable, and X2 = Safety Concern, X3 = Supervision, and X4 = Feedback were
treated as dependent variables. See also Figure 2.2(c) in Chapter 2.
a 2
R = .09, F(1, 88) = 8.74, p = .0040. b R2 = .09, F(1, 88) = 8.74, p = .0456. c R2 = .002,
F(1, 88) = 0.21, p = .6489.

procedure involved the single independent variable Stress (Person dimension) and
the three dependent variables of Safety Concern, Supervision, and Feedback
(Environment dimension). As reported in Table 4.9, this analysis resulted in a
significant MANOVA model, F(3, 86) = 3.92, p < .0113. (Note. There was no
corresponding Wilks’ λ because there was only one independent variable, namely,
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Stress.) As a result, three separate univariate analyses were performed, one for each
dependent variable. Following is a brief summary of these analyses.
As reported in Table 4.9, Stress (Person dimension), had a significant
relationship with Safety Concern (Environment dimension), R2 = .09, F(1, 88) =
8.74, p < .0040. Thus, Stress explained 9% of the variance in Safety Concern
scores. Furthermore, B2 = 0.17, which indicates that for every unit increase in
Stress scores, Safety Concern scores decreased on average by 0.17 units. More
concretely, for every 10-unit increase in Stress scores, Safety Concern scores
decreased on average by 1.7 points. This implies that as stress increases,
participants’ perceptions that their organization has a strong concern for safety
issues decreases.
As reported in Table 4.9, Stress (Person dimension), had a significant
relationship with Supervision (Environment dimension), R2 = .04, F(1, 88) = 4.11,
p = .0456. Thus, Stress explained 4% of the variance in Supervision scores.
Furthermore, B3 = 0.20, which indicates that for every unit increase in Stress
scores, Supervision scores decreased on average by 0.20 units. More concretely, for
every 10-unit increase in Stress scores, Supervision scores decreased on average by
2 points. This implies that as stress increases, participants’ perceptions of their
supervisors’ level of expertise and the amount of assistance their supervisor
provides them decreases. As reported in Table 4.9, Stress (Person dimension), did
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not have a significant relationship with Feedback (Environment dimension), R2 =
.002, F(1, 88) = 0.21, p = .6489.
To examine the influence Environment had on Person (E  P), I conducted
a simultaneous multiple regression analysis in which Stress (the dependent
variable) was regressed on Safety Concern, Supervision, and Feedback. As reported
in Table 4.10, this analysis revealed an overall significant relationship, R2 = .34,
F(4, 85) = 10.96, p < .0001. Thus, these three factors collectively explained 34% of
the variance in Stress scores. Because the overall model was significant, the
individual factors were examined per the Fisher protected t test concept, which
protects against inflated alphas. Of these three factors, though, only Safety Concern
had a significant relationship with Stress, B2 = 0.50, p = .0095. Thus, holding all
other variables in the model constant, for every unit increase in Safety Concern
scores, Stress scores decreased on average by one-half a point. More concretely, for

Table 4 .10
MRC Results for the Influence of Environment on Person (E  P)
95% CI
Environment Factors
Intercept
X2 = Safety Concern
X3 = Supervision
X4 = Feedback

a

B

SE

LL

UL

37.20

3.76

29.72

44.67

< .0001

-0.50

0.19

-0.88

-0.13

.0095

-0.20

0.12

-0.44

0.04

.1035

0.25

0.22

-0.19

0.69

.2633

2

p

Note. N = 90. R = .34, F(4, 85) = 10.96, p < .0001. In this context, the Person dimension
is represented by X6 = Stress, which is the dependent variable. See also Figure 2.2(c) in
Chapter 2 and Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4.
a
When combined with the results from Table 4.9, there is a significant reciprocal
relationship between Person (via X6 = Stress) and Environment (via X2 = Safety Concern).
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every 10-unit increase in Safety Concern scores, Stress scores decreased by 5
points. In other words, as participants’ perceptions of their supervisor’s concern for
safety issues got stronger, their perceptions of the amount of stress they
experienced in the workplace decreased.
Summary of Primary Analysis 3. As reported in Tables 4.7 through 4.10,
the results of data analysis with respect to testing Bandura’s (1977) model
supported the reciprocal relationships between Person, Behavior, and Environment
relative to the safety climate of the targeted MRO. As illustrated in Figure 4.6, the
reciprocal relationships were as follows:
Person and Behavior (P  B). Stress had a significant reciprocal
relationship with Maintenance Errors. As participants’ perceptions of the amount of
stress they felt on the job increased, the number of maintenance errors they recalled
making on the job, including self-detected errors as well as those detected by a
supervisor, also increased (Table 4.7). Similarly, as maintenance errors increased,
so, too, did participants’ stress scores (Table 4.8).
Person and Environment (P  E). Stress had a significant reciprocal
relationship with Safety Concern. As participants’ perceptions of the amount of
workplace stress they felt increased, their perceptions of their supervisor’s concern
for workplace safety decreased (Table 4.9). Similarly, as participants’ perceptions
of their supervisor’s concern for workplace safety issues increased (i.e., became
stronger or more positive), their perceived stress levels decreased (Table 4.10).
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Figure 4.6
Summary of Findings from Testing the Current Study’s Data against Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal
Causation Model

Note. All paths shown were significant for  = .05. In addition to these significant reciprocal
relationships, there also was a one-way significant relationship from Stress to Supervision.

The reader also will note from Figure 4.6 that there was a significant
relationship between Stress and Supervision: As participants’ perceptions of the
amount of stress they felt on the job increased, their perceptions of their
supervisors’ level of expertise and the amount of assistance their supervisor
provides them decreased (Table 4.9). This relationship, however, was one-way and
not reciprocal.
Behavior and Environment (B  E). Maintenance Errors had significant
reciprocal relationships respectively with Safety Concern and Feedback. With
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respect to Safety Concern, as the number of maintenance errors participants
recalled making on the job increased, their perceptions of their supervisor’s concern
for workplace safety issues decreased (Table 4.8). Similarly, as participants’ Safety
Concern scores increased, the number of maintenance errors they recalled making
on the job decreased (Table 4.7). With respect to Feedback, as participants’
perceptions of the amount and quality of feedback they receive from their
supervisor increased (i.e., became more positive), the number of maintenance errors
they recalled making on the job also increased (Table 4.7). Similarly, as the number
of maintenance errors participants recalled making on the job increased, their
perceptions of feedback also increased (Table 4.8).
Results of Hypothesis Testing
Chapter 1 presented the research questions and corresponding research
hypotheses of the current study. For testing purposes, the research hypotheses are
restated here in null form. A discussion of testing these null hypotheses follows.
Null Hypothesis 1: There Is No Significant Difference between the Current
Study’s Sample Data and Fogarty’s (2005) Model
The current study’s sample data yielded a path model that fit Fogarty’s
(2005) path model. As a result, the findings validated Fogarty’s model and this null
hypothesis was not rejected because there were no significant differences between
the two models: The safety climate model of the current study’s targeted MRO was
consistent with the safety climate model of Fogarty’s targeted MRO.
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Null Hypothesis 2. There Is No Significant Difference between the Current
Study’s Sample Data and Uhuegho’s (2017) Model
The current study’s sample data yielded a path model that did not fit
Uhuegho’s (2017) path model. As a result, the findings failed to validate
Uhuegho’s model and this null hypothesis was therefore rejected: The safety
climate model of the current study’s targeted MRO was not consistent with the
safety climate model of Uhuegho’s targeted MRO.
Null Hypothesis 3. There Is No Significant Relationship between at Least Two of
the Three Dimensions Relative to Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal Causation
Model: Environment, Person, and Behavior
As illustrated in Figure 4.6, significant reciprocal relationships existed
among all three of Bandura’s (1977) dimensions. As a result, this null hypothesis
was rejected: The targeted MRO’s safety climate was consistent with Bandura’s
reciprocal causation model: (a) there was a reciprocal relationship between Person
and Behavior with respect to Stress and Maintenance Errors, (b) there was a
reciprocal relationship between Person and Environment with respect to Stress and
Safety Concern, and (c) there was a reciprocal relationship between Environment
and Behavior with respect to Safety Concern, Feedback, and Maintenance Errors.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
Summary of Study
The primary purpose of the current study was to examine the safety climate
of a general aviation original equipment manufacturer (OEM) maintenance, repair,
and overhaul (MRO) organization. This was accomplished by replicating Fogarty
(2005) and Uhuegho (2017), who respectively examined the safety climate in
military and commercial aviation MRO organizations. The objective was to
determine if the current study’s data fit either of these empirical models, which
were reported in the literature. The current study also was grounded in social
cognitive theory, specifically Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model, which
posits bidirectional relationships between the dimensions of Environment, Person,
and Behavior. Relative to this theoretical grounding, a second purpose of the
current study was to determine the extent to which the study data were consistent
with Bandura’s theoretical model.
The primary data collection instrument was Uhuegho’s Aviation
Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), which consisted of Fogarty’s
(2004) 48-item Maintenance Environment Survey (MES), Goldberg and Williams’
(1988) 12-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), and a background section
that consisted of a set of demographics and maintenance experience questions. As
summarized in Table 3.6 (Chapter 3), the overall Cronbach’s alpha for the MES
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and GHQ were α = .84 and α = .71, respectively, and the various subscales of the
MES had alphas that ranged from α = .68 to α = .90.
Data from the first two sections of the AMSCS were partitioned into and
examined relative to three separate constructs, which were aligned to Bandura’s
(1977) model. The first construct, Safety Climate, corresponded to Bandura’s
Environment dimension and was measured by five subscales of the MES:
Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training. The second
construct, Psychological Strain, corresponded to Bandura’s Person dimension and
was measured by the Stress subscale of the MES and the GHQ, which assessed
elements of psychological distress such as depression, anxiety, social dysfunction,
and psychosomatic symptoms. The third construct, Behavior, was measured by the
Maintenance Errors subscale of the MES. The items on this subscale did not focus
directly on the actual number of maintenance errors participants made, but instead
asked participants to recall the number of maintenance errors they made on the job,
including those that were self-detected as well as those detected by a supervisor.
The current study used an explanatory correlational design to examine the
safety climate of the targeted general aviation OEM MRO. This design was
appropriate because the purpose was to examine the relationships among multiple
factors of a single group of aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs) at the OEM
MRO. This design not only examines the direction of relationships but also the
strength of these relationships and how the variables co-vary with one another.
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The target population was all AMTs employed at the United States based
general aviation OEM MRO network facilities. This network consists of nine
facilities across the U.S. and employs approximately 1,000 AMTs. These facilities
complete scheduled and unscheduled light-to-heavy maintenance on general
aviation single and multiengine turbine aircraft as well as general aviation single
and twin reciprocating engine aircraft manufactured by this OEM. The accessible
population was the AMTs at one OEM MRO facility located in central Florida.
This facility employed 156 AMTs during the data collection period. The AMSCS
was administered as a web-based questionnaire hosted by LimeSurveys online. The
link was distributed to all 156 AMTs at the facility through their company email
and could be accessed on their company-issued computers during team meetings
conducted over a 2-week period ending February 26, 2021. All AMTs employed at
the targeted facility were allotted time during monthly team meetings to access and
complete the questionnaire on a voluntary basis. At the end of the data collection
period, 119 AMTs accessed the questionnaire but 29 were incomplete, resulting in
a final convenience sample of N = 90.
Summary of Findings
Three statistical strategies were employed to test the study’s hypotheses.
First, structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the data’s fit with the
safety climate models of Fogarty (2005) and Uhuegho (2017). Multiple regression
and/or MANOVA were then used to analyze the data relative to Bandura’s (1977)
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Table 5.1
Summary of the Results of Hypothesis Testing
Null Hypothesis

Decision

H1

There is no significant difference between the current study’s sample
data and Fogarty’s (2005) model.

Fail to Reject

H2

There is no significant difference between the current study’s sample
data and Uhuegho’s (2017) model.

Reject

H3

There is no significant relationship between at least two of the three
dimensions relative to Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model:
Environment, Person, and Behavior.

Reject

reciprocal causation model. Prior to conducting the primary analyses, the data set
underwent preliminary screening. This involved performing outlier and missing
data analyses, and ensuring the data were compliant with the assumptions of SEM,
multiple regression, and MANOVA. A summary of the hypotheses and their
corresponding findings are provided in Table 5.1, and a brief discussion follows.
Primary Analysis 1: Testing Fogarty’s (2005) Model
The first primary analysis was conducted using SEM to determine if the
current study’s data fit Fogarty’s (2005) model. The first iteration yielded a model
with a significant Chi-square (p = .039) and therefore was rejected. After reviewing
the results, it was discovered that the four cases with missing data in the
Psychological Distress factor as measured by the GHQ were inadvertently included
in this first pass. As a result, they were excluded from the data set, which reduced
the sample size from N = 90 to N = 86. The factor paths for the Recognition,
Training, and Psychological Distress factors also were set as fixed parameters of
1.00 because they failed to meet one of the assumptions of SEM during preliminary
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data screening. After these changes were implemented, the analysis was run a
second time. This resulted in a model with a non-significant Chi-square (χ2 = 26.82,
p = .14) that was consistent with Fogarty’s model. (The reader will recall that a
non-significant Chi-square renders a “fail to reject” the null hypothesis decision,
which means the model derived from the current study’s data is not significantly
different from the hypothesized model, and thus the data fit the model.)
Consistent with Fogarty (2005), this final model generated significant paths
for three of the five factors associated with the Safety Climate construct, and
predicted 8% of the variance in the Psychological Strain construct and 9% of the
variance in the Maintenance Errors construct. There also was a negative
relationship between Psychological Strain and Safety Climate, indicating that as
participants’ perceptions of safety climate in the workplace decreased, their
perceived levels of stress and psychological distress increased. The significant
mediated effect of Safety Climate on Maintenance Error through Psychological
Strain indicated that as Safety Climate increased by 1 standard deviation,
Maintenance Errors decreased by 0.081 standard deviations.
There also were nine error terms in the final model, with seven of those
terms being significant. This indicates there was a certain amount of unexplained
variance related with the factors Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision,
Feedback, and Training. It also indicates there are factors that influence Safety
Climate other than those Fogarty (2005) identified. The two non-significant error
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terms associated with Psychological Strain and Stress along with the significant
error term associated with Psychological Distress indicate the presence of factors
outside of the model with influence over the latent variable Psychological Strain.
Because the error term associated with Maintenance Errors was also significant,
there is an indication that Maintenance Errors are influenced by factors other than
those Fogarty identified. This will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Primary Analysis 2: Testing Uhuegho’s (2017) Model
The second primary analysis examined the fit of the data to Uhuegho’s
(2017) safety climate model. As may be recalled from Chapter 2, Uhuegho
attempted to replicate the results of Fogarty’s (2005) empirical model, but his data
did not fit Fogarty’s model. Because the current study validated Fogarty’s model, it
can be assumed that it also was not consistent with Uhuegho’s model.
Consequently, it appears that Uhuegho’s model is the outlier among the three
empirical models. One plausible explanation for this is the differences in the
targeted MRO sites. Whereas Uhuegho targeted a single MRO with multiple
locations across the United States, Fogarty and the current study targeted MROs at
a single location. This will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
Primary Analysis 3: Testing Bandura’s (1977) Theoretical Model
The third primary analysis tested the current study’s data against Bandura’s
(1977) reciprocal causation model by examining the influence each dimension—
Environment, Person, and Behavior—exerted on each of the other two dimensions.
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This was accomplished via multiple regression and/or MANOVA, depending on
the number of dependent variables involved (see Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4). The
reader is reminded that Recognition and Training, which were part of Safety
Climate (Environment dimension), and Psychological Distress, which was part of
Psychological Strain (Person dimension), were not included in these analyses
because they were not compliant with the regression assumptions. The following
significant results were obtained, which supported Bandura’s model:
• There was a positive reciprocal relationship between the Person and
Behavior dimensions via Stress and Maintenance Errors.
• There were two reciprocal relationships between the Environment and
Behavior dimensions. The first was a positive bidirectional relationship
between Feedback and Maintenance Errors, and the second was a
negative bidirectional relationship between Safety Concern and
Maintenance Errors.
• There was a negative reciprocal relationship between the Environment
and Person dimensions via Safety Concern and Stress. There also was a
one-way relationship from Stress to Supervision.
Conclusions and Inferences
This section includes a review of the current study’s findings with respect to
the research questions presented in Chapter 1. It is arranged in separate discussions
for each research question, with corresponding findings and inferences provided.
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Research Question 1: To What Extent Does the Safety Climate of a General
Aviation OEM’s MRO Relate to Fogarty’s (2005) Model?
As presented in Chapter 4 and noted earlier, an SEM analysis confirmed
that the current study’s data fit Fogarty’s (2005) empirical model. Consistent with
Fogarty, the measured factors of the three latent variables remained in the final
model, and Psychological Strain mediated the relationship between Safety Climate
and Maintenance Errors. There also was a negative relationship between Safety
Climate and Psychological Strain, indicating that as perceptions of Safety Climate
increased (i.e., became more positive), AMTs’ Psychological Strain decreased.
Although not statistically significant, the mediated effect of Safety Climate on
Maintenance Errors through Psychological Strain also was negative, meaning that
when perceptions of Safety Climate increased, maintenance errors decreased.
There were additional contingencies with the current study’s model that
were not identified by Fogarty (2005). For example, the current study’s model
contained nine error terms with seven being significant. This infers there are
additional factors other than those Fogarty identified influencing Safety Climate,
Psychological Strain, and Maintenance Errors. Other plausible explanations for
these error terms as cited by Kline (2016) include random measurement error or
low-reliability scores. According to Kline, SEM is unique in its ability to represent
measurement error and provide a realistic quality to the analysis. This means that
SEM can identify when factors, other than those identified in the model, are having
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an effect. In the current study, these error terms could represent factors such as the
COVID-19 pandemic’s effect on participants’ perceptions of the management’s
concern for safety in the workplace. They also could be related to one of the
limitations of the study, namely, that the study’s administrator was a manager in the
facility. It also is plausible that these error terms were the result of the relatively
small sample size of the current study, which was N = 86. By comparison, in
Fogarty (2004), which established the initial empirical safety climate model, the
sample size was N = 240, and in Fogarty (2005), which validated his initial model
and served as the basis for the current study, the sample size was N = 150.
The other factor Kline (2016) identified as affecting error terms was
reliability of the scores. In the current study and as discussed in Chapter 4, except
for Safety Concern (α = .68), the reliability scores were above α = .70. These
reliability scores were higher than those reported by Fogarty (2005) or Uhuegho
(2017). Fogarty identified three factors with low reliability and included them in
the final model, but Uhuegho excluded them. Again, the low-reliability score of
Safety Concern in the current study may be a result of the participants’ perceptions
of how the management handled aspects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
Research Question 2: To What Extent Does the Safety Climate of a General
Aviation OEM’s MRO Relate to Uhuegho’s (2017) Model?
As presented in Chapter 4 and noted in the foregoing discussion, Uhuegho’s
(2017) empirical safety climate model was not consistent with Fogarty’s (2005)
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model. Because the current study’s path model effectively fit Fogarty’s model, it
can be inferred that it is not consistent with Uhuegho’s model. The most plausible
explanation for the incompatibility between the current study’s and Uhuegho’s
models would be the size of the MRO site. Uhuegho attempted to apply Fogarty’s
model over an entire network of MRO facilities across the United States, while
Fogarty and the current study targeted a single MRO site. As explained in Chapter
2, safety climate will differ inside an organization between facilities and
workgroups, between management and workers, and between teams of workers.
These results would indicate that examining safety climate on a large scale is not
reliable or predictable. As has been reported in other climate and culture research
(e.g., Cooper, 2000), it may be best to examine these constructs in smaller groups.
Research Question 3: To What Extent Does the Safety Climate of a General
Aviation OEM’s MRO Relate to Bandura’s (1977) Reciprocal Causation Model?
As presented in Chapter 4 and noted in the foregoing discussion, a series of
multiple regression analyses and/or MANOVAs (depending on the number of
dependent variables) were used to examine Bandura’s (1977) hypothesized
bidirectional relationships among Person, Environment, and Behavior. A discussion
of each of these relationships follows. The reader is reminded (and cautioned) that
the observed relationships discussed here do not infer cause-and-effect. The reader
also is reminded that the Maintenance Errors factor did not directly focus on the
number of maintenance errors AMTs made, but instead reflected the number of
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errors AMTs recalled making on the job—either self-detected or those detected by
a supervisor.
Influence of Person and Environment on Behavior. The Person
dimension’s influence on Behavior was between Stress and Maintenance Errors.
Holding all other variables constant, there was a positive relationship between
Stress and Maintenance Errors: As AMTs’ perceived level of stress increased, so
too did the number of maintenance errors they recalled making on the job. A
plausible explanation for this finding is that when AMTs’ stress level is elevated,
there is more of a risk for distraction and carelessness, which could lead to an
increase in maintenance errors. The medical literature is replete with studies that
have demonstrated that stress is related to trouble sleeping, fatigue, headaches,
muscle tension or pain, depression, and anxiety, any one of which could lead to
errors in the workplace. Furthermore, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) declared stress a hazard of the workplace (National
Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, NIOSH, 1999).
The Environment dimension’s influence on Behavior was between Safety
Concern and Maintenance Errors, and between Feedback and Maintenance Errors.
With respect to the former, there was a negative relationship: Holding all other
variables constant, as AMTs’ perceived level of Safety Concern increased, the
number of errors they recalled making decreased. A plausible explanation for this
finding is related to how safe employees feel in the workplace. For example, if
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employees perceive that management has a sincere desire to provide a safe work
environment and has demonstrated a strong concern for safety issues, it is logical
that this could lead to a reduction in workplace stress, which in turn would result in
a decrease in errors made on the job. When considered relative to the context of the
current study, if AMTs perceive that management is concerned for their safety and
the safety of the aircraft, it is reasonable to conclude that they will take more care
when performing tasks and exude pride in their workmanship, which could lead to
a reduction in errors.
With respect to the latter, there was a positive relationship: Holding all
other variables constant, as AMTs’ perception of the amount of feedback they
received from management as well as the quality of this feedback increased, the
number of maintenance errors they recalled making on the job also increased. On
the surface, this relationship appears to be contrary to what one would expect.
However, a plausible explanation for this finding would be rooted in AMTs’
general workplace attitudes, which were not examined. For example, if AMTs were
to continually receive timely and targeted feedback from management and/or their
supervisor that was positive, it is possible that this feedback could trigger a more
forthcoming response relative to the number of errors they recalled making on the
job. It could also work the other way, though. For example, it is conceivable that
such feedback could lead AMTs to becoming overconfident, relaxed, and possibly
complacent, which could then lead to an increase in errors being made on the job. It
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also is conceivable that if a supervisor’s feedback is negative, then AMTs might
become disgruntled and lose enthusiasm for good workmanship, which could
induce errors because they would not be concerned about the task at hand.
Influence of Behavior on Person and Environment. The Behavior
dimension’s influence on Person was between Maintenance Errors and Stress.
Holding all other variables constant, there was a positive relationship between
Maintenance Errors and Stress: As the number of maintenance errors participants
recalled making increased, so too did their perceived level of stress. A plausible
explanation for this finding is similar to what was presented earlier, but only in
reverse. For example, it is reasonable to conclude that AMTs who consistently are
being flagged as the source of various workplace errors could experience an
increase in their stress levels. This is because AMTs might now feel they have a
target on their back and that their work is being scrutinized more so than their
colleagues’ work. Another plausible explanation has to do with AMTs’ overall
concern for safety. For example, it is conceivable that AMTs will experience higher
stress levels because they are concerned not only about their job but also for the
safety of the aircraft passengers and crew. This concern is regarded in the industry
as a positive trait of AMTs, because they are always aware of the consequences of
their actions or inactions. The reader also should note that when the current
relationship is combined with the previously presented opposite relationship (i.e.,
Stress  Maintenance Errors), the reciprocal relationship could lead to a vicious
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cycle: As maintenance errors increase, stress levels increase, which in turn
increases maintenance errors, and the cycle continues.
The Behavior dimension’s influence on Environment was between
Maintenance Errors and Safety Concern, and between Maintenance Errors and
Feedback. With respect to the former, there was a negative relationship: Holding all
other variables constant, as the number of maintenance errors AMTs recalled
making increased, their perceived level of Safety Concern decreased. A plausible
explanation for this finding is grounded in the concept of locus of control.
Although the current study did not assess AMTs’ locus of control, it is conceivable
that AMTs with higher number of recalled maintenance errors might also have an
external locus of control. This external locus would then be manifested in an
attitude such as “The errors I am making are not my fault but instead are because
this organization has no regard for workplace safety and I am a victim of their
cavalier approach.” Thus, AMTs’ external locus of control relative to ownership of
the reported maintenance errors would result in a poorer perception of
management’s concern for workplace safety, which in turn would lead to lower
Safety Concern scores.
With respect to the latter, there was a positive relationship: Holding all
other variables constant, as the number of maintenance errors AMTs recalled
making increased, their perceived level of feedback also increased. In other words,
higher number of recalled maintenance errors was related to more positive
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perceptions of the amount and quality of feedback AMTs received from their
organization or supervisor. A plausible explanation for this finding is grounded in
the concept of behavior monitoring where someone (a person) or something (a
system) collects data on the frequency of errors or risk incidents and then uses
these data to help improve a given situation. When applied to the context of the
current study, it is conceivable that supervisors are monitoring the behavior of
AMTs with respect to the number of maintenance errors they are committing, and
subsequently providing these AMTs with targeted and rich feedback to help reduce
the number of reported errors. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that this is
why participants’ perceptions of the frequency and quality of the feedback they
received from their supervisor increased relative to the number of recalled errors.
Influence of Person and Environment on Each Other. The Person
dimension’s influence on Environment was between Stress and Safety Concern,
and between Stress and Supervision. With respect to the former, holding all other
variables constant, there was a negative relationship between these two factors: As
AMTs’ perceived level of stress increased, their perceptions relative to their
organization’ concern for safety issues decreased. A plausible explanation for this
finding is grounded in deadlines. For example, it is conceivable that one possible
source of AMTs’ workplace stress is related to pressure placed on them by
management to complete a task or meet a deadline. Edicts such as “get the task
done no matter the cost” as a deadline approaches, or “bend the safety rules in order
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to make more money” in an effort to beat flat rates, could lead AMTs to perceive
that management has a disregard for workplace safety issues.
With respect to the latter, there also was a negative relationship: Holding all
other variables constant, as AMTs’ perceived level of stress increased, their
perceptions relative to their supervisor’s expertise and assistance decreased. A
plausible explanation for this finding is grounded in the traditional role of a
supervisor. For example, in most workplace environments, supervisors are
responsible for communicating the needs of the organization to the employees,
overseeing employees’ performance, and providing guidance and support to their
employees. In situations such as those described above—pressure to meet a
deadline or pressure to increase profit margins—supervisors clearly are focused on
the needs of the organization and not on guiding and mentoring employees. As a
result, it is reasonable to conclude that participants’ perceptions of their
supervisors’ level of expertise and the amount of assistance their supervisor
provides them would decrease.
The Environment dimension’s influence on Person was between Safety
Concern and Stress. Holding all other variables constant, there was a negative
relationship between these two factors: As AMTs’ perceptions relative to their
organization’s concern for safety issues increased, their perceived level of stress
decreased. A plausible explanation for this finding is related to the workplace
attitudes. Although the current study did not assess participants’ workplace
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attitudes, it is reasonable to conclude that behaviors such as being alert, careful,
risk-aversive, and focused are representative of positive attitudes whereas behaviors
such as carelessness, complacency, and being distracted are representative of
negative attitudes. When applied to the context of the current study, this would
infer that if AMTs perceive their workplace to be safe because of the strong
concern their organization has for safety issues, including employee and client
safety, this could lead to a decrease in perceived workplace stress.
Summary of Reciprocal Relationships. As presented in this section, the
results of data analysis provided evidence that at least one factor of each dimension
affected at least one factor of the other two dimensions. Furthermore, consistent
with Bandura’s theory pertaining to reciprocal causation, these effects were
bidirectional. AMTs’ perception of their supervisor’s experience or concern for
safety (Environment) impacted their stress level (Person), which in turn impacted
the number of maintenance errors participants recalled making (Behavior). The
reciprocal also held. The reported number of recalled maintenance errors
(Behavior) impacted AMT’s stress level (Person) as well as their perception of
their supervisor’s experience or concern for safety issues (Environment).
Implications
This section contains a discussion of the implications of the current study
relative to theory, past research, and practice.
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Implications Relative to Theory
The current study was grounded in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model, which involves the dimensions of Person, Environment, and Behavior, and
posits that each dimension influences the other two to form bidirectional
relationships. The results of the current study provided evidence in support of
Bandura’s model. In the Person and Behavior dimensions, there was a significant
reciprocal relationship between Stress and Maintenance Errors. In the Person and
Environment dimensions, there was a significant relationship between Stress and
Safety Concern. In the Environment and Behavior dimensions, there were
significant reciprocal relationships between Maintenance Errors and Safety
Concern, and between Maintenance Errors and Feedback.
These findings give support to Bandura’s (1977) notion that both the
outside environment and a person’s internal mental processes can influence
behavior, and that these influences also can be observed in the opposite direction.
The findings also demonstrate that the interplay among these three dimensions is
present among AMTs at an MRO. For example, with respect to the Person and
Behavior dimensions, the positive relationship between AMTs’ perceived
workplace stress and the number of maintenance errors AMTs recalled making
implies that employees’ internal perceptions about the stress they believe they are
experiencing can have a direct impact on their behavior. Going in the opposite
direction, the positive relationship between the number of maintenance errors
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AMTs recalled making and their perceived workplace stress implies that AMTs
appear to have an internal locus of control because of the concern and personal
responsibility they have for safety. Thus, as the number of maintenance errors
AMTs recall making on the job increases, AMTs’ become more stressed that their
errors could result in an accident and feel responsible for it.
With respect to the Person and Environment dimension, the negative
relationship between AMTs’ perceived workplace stress and what they believe is
their organization’s concern for safety issues implies that the level of stress
employees’ believe they are under can influence how they view their workplace
environment. Going in the opposite direction, the negative relationship between
AMTs’ view of their workplace environment and perceived stress level implies that
management bears some responsibility for AMTs’ perceived stress level. For
example, if management were to actively engage all employees in its march to help
promote and produce a safe work environment, employees’ perceived stress levels
could be moderated.
With respect to the Environment and Behavior dimensions, the negative
relationship between the number of maintenance errors AMTs recalled making and
how they viewed the concern their organization has for safety issues implies that
AMTs appear to equate the errors they make to the workplace environment, which
they then attribute to management. Going in the opposite direction, the negative
relationship between AMTs’ view of their workplace environment and the number
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of maintenance errors they recall making implies that management bears some
responsibility for the maintenance errors AMTs make on the job. For example, if
AMTs believe that management does not consider safety issues or concerns to be
paramount in the workplace, then they might consider maintenance errors to be
inevitable because the workplace is “an accident waiting to happen.” This in turn
could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Lastly, the positive relationship between the number of maintenance errors
AMTs recalled making on the job and how they perceived the feedback they
received implies that AMTs’ behavior influences the amount and quality of
feedback: The more errors made, the more frequent and targeted the feedback. This
is analogous to a troubled youth in school: The more often a person acts out, the
more attention the person receives. Going in the opposite direction, the positive
relationship between the amount and quality of feedback AMTs received and the
number of maintenance errors they recalled making implies that supervisors play a
critical role with respect to the number of maintenance errors AMTs make on the
job. It appears that the more frequent and targeted feedback AMTs receive from
their supervisor with respect to their work performance directly influences the
number of maintenance errors regardless if the feedback is positive or negative.
Implications Relative to Prior Research
The current study consulted various empirical safety climate/culture models
that were reported in the literature and developed across multiple industries,
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including construction, mining, and aviation. Following is a summary of how the
results of the current study compared to those reported in these other industries.
General Contracting Industry. Focusing on the safety culture of a U.S.
based regional general contractor, Jin and Chen (2013) examined the effectiveness
of the company’s newly implemented safety management system (SMS) through
the perspective of Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. Unlike the current
study, though, Jin and Chen assessed an organization’s safety culture (not climate)
and used a different grounding of Bandura’s model. For example: (a) the Person
dimension focused on safety climate, which was defined as “the shared employee
perceptions and attitudes about safety” (p. 61) and was measured quantitatively
using a safety climate questionnaire similar in nature to Fogarty’s (2004) MES; (b)
the Behavior dimension focused on the actual safety-related behaviors such as
safe/unsafe acts of employees as recorded by management and was examined
qualitatively via document analysis; and (c) the Environment dimension focused on
all aspects of the organization’s SMS and was examined qualitatively via audits
and inspections.
Although Jin and Chen’s (2013) application of Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model was different than that of the current study, the findings of the
current study’s Environment dimension, which was related to the latent construct of
Safety Climate, can be compared to Jin and Chen’s Person dimension. Similar to
Jin and Chen, who reported that the majority of workers felt they were being held
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accountable for their safety and that of their co-workers, AMTs in the current study
also perceived that management held safety as a high concern and that their
supervisors held AMTs accountable for their safety-related actions. This notion of
safety concern also was related to the Behavior dimension. The current study’s
findings also were consistent with those of Jin and Chen’s relative to the issue of
employees’ perceptions of feedback. In both studies, feedback was related to the
Behavior dimension. The general consistency of these findings implies that two
aspects of safety climate—employees’ perceptions of their organization’s concern
for safety, including who is accountable for safety-related actions, and employees’
perceptions of the feedback they receive relative to workplace safety—have both a
significant and practical influence on behavior.
Chinese Mining Industry. Cui et al. (2013) examined how Bandura’s
(1977) reciprocal causation model fit the safety management and culture of the
Chinese mining industry. They did this through the use of Geller’s (2001) total
safety culture triad where the Person dimension was hypothesized to mediate the
relationship between Environment and Behavior. As in the current study, safety
climate was conceptualized through the workers’ perceptions of safety committee
status, management commitment to safety, leadership role ambiguity,
organizational environment, and safety training, representing the Environment
dimension. This model also was consistent with Fogarty’s (2005) Safety Climate
model.
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Using a questionnaire, Cui et al. asked employees to assess their
“perception of their work environment and management attributes, their attitudes
toward occupational safety, and their safety related behaviors” (p. 40). Cui et al.
reported (a) there was a significant positive relationship between hazardous
environment and management’s commitment to safety, (b) a significant positive
relationship between management’s commitment to safety and employees’ beliefs
toward safety, and (c) a positive but not significant relationship between hazardous
environment and employees’ beliefs toward safety. Furthermore, Cui et al. also
indicated that management’s commitment to safety fully mediated the effect of
hazardous environment on employee’s beliefs toward safety, and employee’s
beliefs toward safety fully mediated the effect of management’s commitment to
safety on employee safety-specific behavior and employee safety involvement.
The results of the current study essentially mirrored those reported by Cui et
al. (2013). For example, the current study found that AMTs’ behaviors were
affected by their perceptions of management’s commitment to safety. As noted
above, this also was consistent with Jin and Chen (2013). The current study also
found that the Person dimension mediated the relationship between the
Environment and Behavior dimensions, and there was a bidirectional relationship
between employees’ perceptions of management’s commitment to safety (“Safety
Concern”) and behavior. The general consistency of these findings provides
additional credibility to the relationship between employees’ perceptions of their
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organization’s concern for safety and their behavior, and implies that organizations
should not overlook the importance of how their employees perceive their
organization’s views of workplace safety. This suggests that regardless of how
acclaimed an organization’s safety climate is, if employees believe that
management does not care about workplace safety, it could have a negative
influence on their behavior.
Fogarty (2004, 2005). Fogarty identified factors that contributed to
maintenance errors in aircraft maintenance, and developed a corresponding safety
climate model that was empirically grounded. Fogarty’s (2004) initial model was
based on data he collected from an Australian Army helicopter MRO. Fogarty
(2005) then refined his initial model using a different sample from the targeted
MRO. He also reduced his Maintenance Environment Survey (MES) from 112
items to 48 items. Fogarty’s (2005) refined model confirmed that the latent
construct Safety Climate—which was measured by the factors Recognition, Safety
Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training—acted primarily on psychological
health, which in turn influenced maintenance errors. In other words, participants’
psychological health—labeled Psychological Strain in the model and measured by
the factors Stress and Distress—not only had a direct effect on their maintenance
errors, but also mediated the relationship between participants’ perceptions of their
workplace safety and maintenance errors.
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As discussed earlier, the findings of the current study were consistent with
Fogarty (2005). The current study confirmed the dual role of psychological health
with respect to maintenance errors: It had a direct, significant relationship with
maintenance errors, and it mediated the relationship between safety climate and
maintenance errors. The only difference between the results of the two studies is
that unlike Fogarty (2005), who reported all five Safety Climate factors having
significant paths, the current study only showed three significant factors: Safety
Concern, Supervision, and Feedback. Plausible explanations for this difference
include the smaller sample size (N = 86) of the current study and the differences
between the cultures of an Australian military aviation maintenance organization
and a U.S. based civilian aviation maintenance organization. Nevertheless, these
results demonstrate the strong influence AMTs’ mental health has on their
behavior, both directly and indirectly. When considered relative to Fogarty, the
findings of the current study imply that the observed relationships hold for both
civilian and military MROs as well as those focused on fixed-wing and rotary wing
aircraft. The results also imply that although maintenance errors were defined as
what AMTs recalled making on the job (either self- or supervisor-detected), it is
reasonable to conclude that AMTs’ mental health also could influence the number
of maintenance errors they actually commit.
Uhuegho (2017). The current study also was a replication of Uhuegho who
endeavored to validate Fogarty’s (2005) model by applying it to a U.S.-based
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civilian MRO that repaired and maintained commercial jetliners. In addition to
differences between countries (U.S. vs. Australia), type of MRO (civilian vs.
military), and aircraft type (fixed-wing vs. rotary wing), Uhuegho’s targeted MRO
was a large-scale operation with a presence across the U.S. and participants were
not restricted to a single location.
Uhuegho (2017) reported that his empirical safety climate model did not
fully support Fogarty’s (2005) model. For example, in Uhuegho’s model, only two
of the five Safety Climate factors—Recognition and Supervision—remained, and
none of the paths was significant. Uhuegho did, however, confirm that
Psychological Strain mediated the effect of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors,
but this was in the absence of three of the five Safety Climate factors. Because the
current study’s model was consistent with Fogarty, a logical conclusion (a
tautology results) is that the current study’s model is not consistent with Uhuegho.
As noted earlier, a plausible explanation for these findings among the three models
is related to the number of MRO sites targeted: The current study and Fogarty
targeted a single site whereas Uhuegho targeted several sites scattered across the
country. This implies that the observed relationships reported in Fogarty and the
current study cannot be generalized to all of a parent MRO’s sites.
In addition to seeking to validate Fogarty’s (2005) model, Uhuegho also
grounded his study in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model with the
Environment dimension aligned to Safety Climate, the Person dimension aligned to
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Psychological Strain, and the Behavior dimension aligned to Maintenance Errors.
Uhuegho reported significant bi-directional relationships between Safety Concern
and Stress, Maintenance Errors and Stress, Maintenance Errors and Psychological
Distress, and Maintenance Errors and Safety Concern. The current study’s findings
applied to Bandura’s model were consistent with those of Uhuegho. With the
exception of the Maintenance Errors and Psychological Distress path, the current
study supported Uhuegho. These findings demonstrate the robustness of applying
Bandura’s reciprocal causation model to analyze the safety climate of an
organization. They also provide greater credibility to the implications cited
previously with respect to the influences employees’ mental health, perceptions of
workplace safety, and behaviors have on each other.
Other Related Studies. In addition to the past research cited in this section,
the reader also should note that Hodges and Gardner (2014), Huang et al. (2015),
Johnson (2007), and Wang et al. (2018) all reported a significant relationship
between Safety Climate—relative to employees’ perceptions of safety, their
perceptions of how the organization views safety, and their perceptions of their
supervisors—and Behavior. As a result, the implications relative to prior research
presented here with respect to this relationship also hold for these studies.
Implications for Aviation Practice
The results of the current study with respect to the empirical model (see
Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4) have several implications to practice within the aviation
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maintenance industry. One implication is related to the influence of the
Psychological Strain construct. As noted earlier, Psychological Strain not only had
a direct effect on Maintenance Errors, it also mediated the effect Safety Climate
had on Maintenance Errors. In the case of the former, the number of maintenance
errors AMTs recalled making varied directly with AMTs’ stress and psychological
distress levels. In the case of the latter, AMTs’ Safety Climate perception did not
impact Maintenance Errors directly but instead were influenced by AMTs’ stress
and psychological distress levels. In other words, it did not matter what the extent
was with respect to AMTs’ beliefs that their organization/supervisor (a) recognized
them for doing good work; (b) had a strong concern for safety issues; (c) had an
appropriate level of expertise and provided adequate assistance; (d) provided timely
and rich feedback; or (e) provided adequate training, encouraged further training, or
offered on-the-job training. Psychological Strain influenced the effect these
perceptions had on Maintenance Errors. Given the dual role (direct and indirect) of
Psychological Strain in this model, the observed relationships imply that MRO
organizations/supervisors should not discount the psychological health of AMTs.
A second implication to practice is with respect to the negative relationship
between Safety Concern and Stress as well as between Supervision and Stress.
These two relationships imply that MRO organizations/supervisors could have a
direct influence on AMTs’ stress levels and therefore should place a high priority
on workplace safety and ensure supervisors are respected for their knowledge,
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skills, and willingness to assist. Based on the study’s findings, these two actions
could attenuate AMTs’ perceived workplace stress and result in a decrease in
maintenance errors.
A third implication relative to practice is with respect to Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model and involves the relationships among Stress, Safety
Concern, and Maintenance Errors. For example, AMTs’ perceived importance of
management’s concern for safety-related issues in the workplace influences the
number of reported maintenance errors, but also when they commit errors, their
stress level rises and their perception of management’s concern for workplace
safety decreases. A similar exposition can be presented when starting with a
different factor. For example, AMTs’ stress levels influence the number of reported
maintenance errors, which then influence AMTs’ perceptions of management’s
concern for workplace errors, and ultimately these perceptions impact stress levels.
As noted earlier, these relationships imply the possibility of a vicious cycle and
management and supervisors should be aware of the impact of these relationships
with respect to maintenance errors.
A fourth implication of the current study’s findings relative to aviation
maintenance practice also is related to Bandura’s (1977) model and involves the
bidirectional relationship between Feedback and Maintenance Errors. This
relationship is a bit problematic because the current study did not examine the
impact of positive and negative feedback on performance, but instead assessed
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AMTs’ perceptions of how often they received feedback as well as the quality of
feedback they received from their supervisors. Based on the findings, this
relationship was direct, which means that as AMTs’ perceptions of feedback
increased (i.e., became stronger) the number of maintenance errors they recalled
also increased, and vice versa. These findings imply that with respect to
maintenance errors, feedback could be a double-edged sword. For example, is it the
frequency and quality of the feedback or is it how AMTs are interpreting the
frequency and quality of feedback. In other words, it is possible that management is
simply being transparent and making sure AMTs are cognizant of their
performance as a means of improvement, but it also is possible that AMTs feel as if
they are being singled out, which could increase workplace anxiety. As a result,
supervisors should be sensitive to the feedback they provide as well the relationship
between feedback and maintenance errors.
Generalizability, Limitations, and Delimitations
Generalizability
The concept of generalizability refers to the extent to which the findings of
a study can be applied to either the target population (known as population
generalizability), or to a different population or under different circumstances,
events, or conditions (known as ecological generalizability). As noted earlier in this
chapter as well as in Chapter 3, the target population of the current study was all
AMTs employed at a U.S.-based general aviation OEM MRO, the accessible
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population was AMTs at the OEM’s MRO central Florida facility, and the sample
consisted of a volunteer group of AMTs selected from the accessible population.
With respect to population generalizability, because a nonrandom sampling
strategy was used, and because the central Florida MRO facility was selected by
convenience, the likelihood that the sample was representative of the parent
population is low. The dearth of demographical data available from either the target
population or from a general national perspective of all AMTs in the U.S. also
makes it challenging to assess the generalizability of the current study’s findings to
the parent population. Nevertheless, given the nature of the accessible population,
the current study’s findings can be reasonably generalized to U.S. based civilian
MROs that perform scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on general aviation
piston and turbine-powered aircraft, engines, and components. Furthermore,
although the target population is reflective of a diverse group of AMTs relative to
biological sex, age, race/ethnicity, education level, and type of technician (licensed
vs. unlicensed), sample demographics suggest that the study’s findings should be
restricted to AMTs who are Caucasian, male, and licensed technicians.
With respect to ecological generalizability, the results of the current study
can be generalized to AMTs employed at similar general aviation OEM fixed-wing
aircraft MROs in other locations across the country, or other small general aviation
MRO facilities in the U.S. Although not necessarily recommended, an argument
could be made in favor of generalizing the current study’s findings to AMTs at
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military MRO facilities because the current study validated Fogarty’s (2005)
empirical safety model. However, this probably would not be prudent because the
differences in environment, assignments, and responsibilities are not necessarily the
same as those encountered in the general aviation maintenance environment.
Similarly, it also would not be reasonable to generalize the study’s findings to
commercial fixed-wing aircraft MROs given that the current study’s empirical
safety climate model was not consistent with that of Uhuegho’s (2017). To further
assist the reader in determining the external validity of the current study’s findings,
Tables 3.1–3.4 in Chapter 3 contain information about the sample demographics
and detailed information about how the study was implemented.
Study Limitations and Delimitations
Chapter 1 described the limitations and delimitations of the current study.
They are replicated here for the reader’s convenience in advance of the discussion
on recommendations for future research relative to the study’s limitations and
delimitations.
Limitations. Limitations of a study are those conditions, events, or
circumstances over which a researcher has no control but can limit the
generalizability of the study’s results. Listed here are the limitations of the current
study. Some of these were identified a priori by evaluation of similar studies and
methodologies, while others were identified during the data gathering process.
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1. Sample Demographics. This study was conducted at a single general
aviation OEM’s MRO in central Florida and consisted of a specific demographic
mix of employees. Therefore, subsequent studies involving a different demographic
mix of participants might get different results.
2. Honesty of Participants’ Responses. Participants' responses to the items
on the AMSCS regarding their perceptions and experiences relative to their
organization’s safety climate were self-reported. Although confidentiality and
anonymity of participants’ responses were maintained, it is still possible that their
responses could have been influenced by a sense of connection between their
responses and some type of retaliation from management and hence their responses
might not have been truthful or honest. Therefore, the veracity of participants’
responses could have affected the results of the study, and the results of similar
studies that enact strategies to address this issue might be different.
3. Time Constraints. Because the current study was cross-sectional in
nature, the data represent participants’ attitudes toward and perceptions of safety at
a specific point in time. Therefore, subsequent studies conducted during a different
time period—even with the same respondents—might get different results.
4. Timing of the Study. The current study was conducted during an
unprecedented era. The world was experiencing a viral pandemic that affected
hundreds of millions of people with tens of millions of deaths globally, and the
United States was experiencing an economic downturn. It is unclear what impact
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these events had on participants’ perceptions of workplace safety. Therefore,
subsequent studies conducted in the absence of these events or under different
circumstances—even with the same participants—might get different results.
Delimitations. Delimitations are researcher-defined conditions, events, or
circumstances that further define the boundaries of a study. Imposing these
additional restrictions make a study feasible to implement, but they also have the
potential to further limit the generalizability of the findings. Listed here are the
delimitations of the current study. Some of these were identified a priori by
evaluation of similar studies and methodologies, while others were identified
during the research period.
1. Study Approach. The current study was a replication study that sought to
validate the respective empirical path models of Fogarty (2005) and Uhuegho
(2017). As was the case for these two previous studies, the current study used a
structural equation modeling (SEM) approach with exactly the same latent
constructs and corresponding measured variables. As a result, similar studies that
seek to validate different path models or use different latent constructs and/or
corresponding measured variables might get different results.
2. Theoretical Grounding. With respect to Research Question 3, the current
study was grounded in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model in which
Safety Climate was assigned to the Environment dimension, Psychological Strain
was assigned to the Person dimension, and Maintenance Errors was assigned to the
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Behavior dimension. As a result, similar studies that use a different theoretical
grounding or use different assignments to these three dimensions might get
different results.
3. MRO Facility. The current study’s targeted maintenance, repair, and
overhaul facility performed scheduled and unscheduled light-to-heavy maintenance
on general aviation single and multiengine turbine aircraft as well as general
aviation single and twin reciprocating engine aircraft manufactured. Therefore,
similar studies involving MROs that perform different types of service might not
get the same results.
4. Facility Location. The current study was implemented at a general
aviation OEM’s MRO in central Florida. Thus, similar studies conducted outside
this geographic region or at a different facility may get different results.
5. Participant Selection. The participants in the current study were limited
to only AMTs as defined in the definitions section of Chapter 1. Thus, similar
studies that use all employees working at an MRO, including support staff, line
service, customer service representatives, and general management, might get
different results.
6. Data Collection Instrument. The current study used Uhuegho’s (2017)
Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), which included Fogarty’s
(2005) Maintenance Environment Survey (MES) and Goldberg and Williams’
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(1988) General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). Therefore, similar studies that use
different data collection instruments might get different results.
7. Data Collection Approach. The data collection instrument was
administered as a digital questionnaire for participants to complete online during a
training event by the management team. As a result, similar studies that do not
administer the questionnaire as part of a training event, or use a different data
collection approach such as a mailed survey that is completed by hand or a
telephone survey might get different results.
8. Data Collection Period. The current study was conducted over a 2-week
period ending February 26, 2021. Therefore, similar studies that are conducted for a
longer or shorter time period or during a different time of the year might get
different results.
9. Sample Size. The current study was conducted at a single facility with a
limited population, which had an effect on the sample size. Therefore, a study
conducted in a facility with a larger population or across multiple facilities where a
larger sample could be selected might get different results.
10. Type of Data. The current study collected only quantitative data.
Therefore, similar studies that use qualitative methodologies such as case studies,
phenomenology, or grounded theory, all of which result in contextual data, or
studies that use a mixed-methods approach that results in both numerical and
contextual data, might get different results.
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11. Data Analysis Strategy. The current study used structural equation
modeling (SEM), multiple regression, and MANOVA to test the study’s
hypotheses and answer the corresponding research questions. Thus, similar studies
that use different statistical procedures might get different results.
Recommendations for Future Research and Practice
This section contains a discussion of various recommendations arising from
the current study’s findings and is divided into four sections. The first two sections
focus on recommendations for future research relative to the current study’s
limitations and delimitations, and the last two sections focus on recommendations
for future research and practice relative to the current study’s implications.
Recommendations for Future Research Relative to Study Limitations
Following is a list of recommendations for future research relative to the
study’s limitations, which were provided earlier as a convenience to the reader.
1.

The participants in the current study volunteered to participate and hence I had
no control over the sample demographics. As a result, it is recommended that
future research focus on a specific demographic, such as licensed technicians
only, female AMTs only, or Hispanic AMTs only to determine the extent to
which demographics impact the safety climate model.

2.

The veracity of participants’ responses could not be confirmed in the current
study. Therefore, it is recommended that future research conduct follow-up, inperson interviews with participants to verify their responses. It is also
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recommended that the researcher not be a member of the facility’s
management because it is possible that participants might have been
intimidated knowing that their manager was going to have access to their
responses. Although anonymity was maintained, it is possible that participants
believed that their manager would be able to identify them by their
demographic data.
3.

Because the current study was cross-sectional in nature, the findings are
relevant to the specific time period the study was implemented. As a result, a
recommendation for future research is to implement the study from a
longitudinal perspective (e.g., once a year or once every 6 months) using a
different sample from the same population so that a trend analysis could be
conducted.

4.

The timing of the study may have affected the results due to the ongoing
pandemic and economic downturn. Participant’s perceptions of job security
and workplace safety may have been influenced by these factors. Therefore, a
recommendation for future research is to replicate the current study during a
more stable period for the industry by targeting a time and location when
normal operations prevail without the threat of lay-offs or mass illnesses.

Recommendations for Future Research Relative to Study Delimitations
Following is a list of recommendations for future research relative to the
study’s delimitations, which were provided earlier as a convenience to the reader.
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1.

The current study sought to validate Fogarty’s (2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017)
respective empirical path models of safety climate and used an SEM approach
with the same latent constructs and factors. One recommendation for future
research is to replicate this approach with respect to different work groups
within an MRO. A second recommendation is to validate this model from a
safety culture perspective similar to Jin and Chen (2013). A third
recommendation is to employ the same approach but use different latent
constructs and/or measured variables.

2.

The current study’s Research Question 3 was grounded in Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model. A recommendation for future research is to ground
subsequent studies in different theoretical models such as Leveson’s (2017)
System-Theorestic Accident Models and Processes (STAMP) model or
Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior model.

3.

The current study targeted an MRO that performs scheduled and unscheduled
light-to-heavy maintenance on general aviation single and multiengine turbine
aircraft as well as general aviation single and twin reciprocating engine aircraft
manufactured. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to replicate
the current study at MROs that perform different types of maintenance such as
those that focus on rotary-wing aircraft or military installations.

4.

The current study was implemented at a U.S. civilian based general aviation
OEM MRO facility in central Florida. Therefore, it is recommended that future
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research be replicated at other facilities in the general aviation OEM MRO
network or similar facilities owned and operated by other general aviation
OEMs.
5.

The current study was comprised of AMTs at the targeted general aviation
OEM MRO. Because MROs also employ managers, supervisors, and customer
support personnel, a recommendation for future research is to replicate the
current study but include all levels of employees at the facility to (a) get a more
inclusive picture of safety climate and (b) see if these other individuals’
perceptions of management’s commitment to safety is consistent with AMTs’.

6.

The current study used Uhuegho’s (2017) Aviation Maintenance Safety
Climate Survey, which included Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance Environment
Survey (MES) and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ). Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to
use different data collection instruments. These include Baker’s (1998)
Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) instead of the MES, and
either the Positive Mental Health (PMH) instrument or the Primary Care
Evaluation of Mental Disorders Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ) instead of
the GHQ.

7.

The current study implemented the AMSCS as a digital questionnaire on an
online platform. Therefore, it is recommended that future research use a
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different data collection approach, including a mailed or telephone survey, or
personal interviews.
8.

The current study was conducted over a 2-week period ending February 26,
2021. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to implement this
study using a different time period. Suggestions include administering the
questionnaire to AMTs on a single day, making the questionnaire accessible
for more than 2 weeks (e.g., 4 or 6 weeks), or allowing participants to
complete the questionnaire on their own time.

9.

The targeted MRO was limited with respect to the number of AMTs employed,
and as a result the sample size acquired was not sufficiently large for an SEM
analysis (Kline, 2016; Wang & Wang, 2012). Therefore, a recommendation for
future research is to target an MRO that employs a larger number of AMTs or
over multiple facilities to acquire a larger sample size.

10. The current study employed a correlational design and collected quantitative
data. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to replicate the
current study using qualitative methodologies such as case studies,
phenomenology, and grounded theory, or studies that use a mixed-methods
approach that results in both numerical and contextual data. Qualitative data
can be collected through personal interviews, incident report reviews, and
safety management system reviews.
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11. The current study implemented structural equation modeling to test Fogarty’s
(2005) and Uhuegho’s (2017) respective empirical models, and multiple
regression and MANOVA to test Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model.
Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to employ different data
analysis strategies to see if similar results are obtained. For example, and
echoing what Uhuegho suggested, a mediation analysis could be used to
confirm the mediating role of Psychological Strain with respect to the
relationship between Safety Climate and Maintenance Errors, and an SEM
analysis could be used to analyze Bandura’s reciprocal causation model.
Recommendations for Future Research Relative to Implications
Following is a list of recommendations for future research based on the
implications relative to theory—which was grounded in Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model—and the implications relative to prior research.
1.

Given the significant reciprocal relationship between AMTs’ perceived level of
workplace stress and maintenance errors: A recommendation for future
research is to assess the extent to which AMTs’ locus of control, which was
not examined in the current study, influences this relationship.

2.

Given the significant reciprocal relationship between AMTs’ perceived level of
workplace stress and how they view the level of concern their organization has
for workplace safety: A recommendation for future research is to assess
management’s view of its efforts in promoting its concern for workplace safety
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to determine if there is a disconnect between the two groups’ respective
perceptions as part of an effort to mitigate AMTs’ stress.
3.

Given that the significant relationship between AMTs’ perceptions of the
amount and quality of feedback they receive from their organization/supervisor
and the number of maintenance errors they recalled making on the job was
consistent with what was reported in Jin and Chen (2013) with respect to
Bandura’s (1977) model:: A recommendation for future research is to assess
the organization’s/supervisor’s policy for administering feedback to AMTs,
and to examine the impact this policy is having on AMTs’ performance with
respect to the number of maintenance errors they make.

4.

Given that the significant relationship found in the current study between
employees’ perceptions of their organization’s concern for safety and their
behavior was consistent with what was reported in Jin and Chen (2013) and
Cui et al. (2013) with respect to Bandura’s (1977) model: A recommendation
for future research is to assess management’s view of its efforts in promoting
its concern for workplace safety to determine if there is a disconnect between
management’s and employees’ respective perceptions as part of an effort to
mitigate the number of maintenance errors AMTs’ make.

5.

Given that Bandura’s (1977) Person dimension—which corresponded to
“Psychological Strain” in the empirical path models of Fogarty (2005),
Uhuegho (2017), and the current study— significantly mediated the
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relationship between Environment (“Safety Climate”) and Behavior
(“Maintenance Errors”) in Cui et al. (2013), Fogarty, Uhuegho, and the current
study: A recommendation for future research is to determine if additional
affective domain Person factors such as attitudes toward the workplace, locus
of control, and self-efficacy also mediate the relationship between
Environment and Behavior similar to the psychological stress and distress.
6.

Given that the current study’s empirical path model was consistent with
Fogarty’s (2005) model: A recommendation for future research is to validate
this path model within other domains of the aviation industry when examining
safety climate. Suggestions include pilots, air traffic controllers, and airport
executives.

7.

Given the significant path between Psychological Strain and Maintenance
Errors in Fogarty’s (2005) and the current study’s respective empirical path
models: A recommendation for future research is to replicate Fogarty and the
current study, but instead of defining Maintenance Errors as the number of
errors AMTs recalled making on the job (either self- or supervisor-detected), to
collect the actual number of maintenance errors AMTs actually committed to
gain a better understanding of the relationship between AMTs’ mental health
and workplace errors.

8.

Given that the current study’s empirical path model yielded a significant
amount of unexplained variance related to the variables associated with Safety
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Climate, Psychological Strain, and Maintenance Errors—which suggests that
other factors are affecting these constructs: A recommendation for future
research is to (a) identify what these other variables might be using either
quantitative or qualitative methodologies, (b) augment Fogarty’s (2005) MES
to include these variables, and (c) replicate the current study to examine the
extent of these variables’ influence within the path model.
9.

Given that the current study’s empirical path model was consistent with that of
Fogarty (2005), which targeted a single MRO, but not with Uhueghu (2017),
which targeted an MRO with 200 facilities across the U.S.: A recommendation
for future research is to confine studies of the safety climate of an MRO to a
single facility but to also replicate the current study across multiple subgroups
of this single MRO (e.g., AMTs, managers/supervisors, support staff, line
service, and customer service representatives) to determine if there are any
differences in safety climate among these subgroups.

10. Given that the research design of the current study—as was the case with
Fogarty (2005) and Uhuegho (2017)—was strictly quantitative that focused
exclusively on safety climate through the administration of a questionnaire: A
recommendation for future research is to examine the safety culture of an
MRO similar to Jin and Chen (2013). This would involve (a) administering
questionnaires to all levels of employees to assess their perceptions and
attitudes about safety; (b) conducting a document analysis of the organization’s
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incident and accident reports to acquire specific information about actual
safety-related behaviors; and (c) interviewing all levels of employees, and
auditing and inspecting the organization’s safety management system.
Recommendations for Practice Relative to Study Implications
Following is a list of recommendations for practice based on the
implications for aviation practice presented earlier as well as some of the
implications relative to theory and prior research.
1.

Given that the current study’s findings confirmed that Psychological Strain
mediated the relationship between Safety Climate and Maintenance Errors,
which indicates that AMTs’ perceptions of workplace safety are being
subsumed by their psychological health: A recommendation for practice is that
management should not discount the psychological health of AMTs, but
instead coordinate with human resources to: (a) encourage employees to
engage in activities that can improve their mental health (e.g., group sponsored
lunch-time walks), (b) provide paid mental health leave, (c) provide on- or offsite counseling services, (d) allow for flexible work hours and/or remote
working when feasible, and (e) recognize employees for their contribution to
the organization such as sponsoring an “employee of the month” program.

2.

Given that the current study’s findings confirmed a negative relationship
between Safety Concern and Stress as well as between Supervision and Stress,
which suggests that MRO organizations/supervisors could have a direct
193

influence on AMTs’ stress: A recommendation for practice is for management
to (a) make an overt and concerted effort to make workplace safety a high
priority and (b) ensure supervisors are respected for their knowledge, skills,
and willingness to assist. With respect to the former, suggestions include
addressing safety-related issues promptly and giving safety a high priority in
meetings and budgets. With respect to the latter, a suggestion is to place
supervisors into environments where they are respected for their expertise and
technical knowledge.
3.

Given that the current study’s findings confirmed reciprocal relationships
among Safety Climate, Psychological Strain, and Maintenance Errors, which
implies that errors influence stress and perceived safety concerns influence
stress when errors occur: A recommendation for practice is that management
and supervisors recognize that AMTs appear to take errors personally, which
then affects their psychological health. Therefore, management is encouraged
to consider and promote policies that would mitigate this relationship. One
suggestion is that instead of responding to errors with a punitive response,
management/supervisors could respond by providing positive reinforcement,
counseling, and/or assistance when appropriate.

4.

Given that the current study confirmed a positive bidirectional relationship
between Feedback and Maintenance Errors, which suggests that feedback
could be a double-edged sword because it is unclear if this relationship is due
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to the feedback itself or how AMTs are interpreting the feedback: A
recommendation for practice is that management and supervisors be sensitive
to the frequency and type of feedback they provide AMTs, and recognize that
their feedback—both positive and negative—could inadvertently lead to an
increase in maintenance errors. For example, with respect to the former, it is
possible that positive feedback (e.g., a reward/recognition program) could be
contributing to an increase in maintenance errors because it could be building
overconfidence and complacency in AMTs. Similarly, management and
supervisors also should recognize it is possible that negative feedback (e.g.,
micromanaging an employee or reassigning an employee to a lesser function)
could make AMTs feel they are being singled out, which also could lead to an
increase in maintenance errors.
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Appendix A
Instrument

The Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS)
(Reprinted with Permission from Uhuegho, 2017)

Introduction
Hello.
You are invited to participate in a research study that endeavors to understand safety climate within
aviation maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) organizations. As part of this study, I am
requesting that you complete this questionnaire, which consists of two sections followed by a set of
demographic questions. It will take about 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Before clicking
“Continue” to begin, it is important for you to understand the following:
1. Your responses will be treated as strictly confidential and will be accessible only
by the research team.
2. Your responses will remain completely anonymous.
3. No reference will be made in oral or written reports that could connect you in any
way to this study.
4. Your participation is completely voluntary and you are not required to participate
in the study.
5. If you begin completing the questionnaire and opt not to continue, you may
simply close your browser’s window to close your session. This action will
eliminate you as a participant.
6. By clicking on the link below, you are indicating that you are at least 18 years old
and have agreed to voluntarily participate in the study.
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Section A: Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
Please rate the given statements using the following scale:
1 =Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither disagree nor agree, 4 =Agree, 5 =Strongly Agree
Statement
A1-R

Response
In this job the rewards and encouragement usually outweigh the
threats and the criticism.

1

2

3

4

5

A2-R

In this job people are rewarded according to performance.

1

2

3

4

5

A3-R*

There is not enough reward and recognition for doing good work.

1

2

3

4

5

A4-R

In our promotion system, the best people generally rise to the top.

1

2

3

4

5

A5-R

I am satisfied with the recognition I get for doing good work.

1

2

3

4

5

A6-SC

Personnel are well trained in the consequences of unsafe acts.

1

2

3

4

5

A7-SC

This workplace regards safety as a major factor in achieving its
goals.

1

2

3

4

5

Lack of proper equipment sometimes forces us to cut corners in
our work.

1

2

3

4

5

There is not always time to follow safe procedures.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

My immediate supervisor has had many years experience in
aviation maintenance.

1

2

3

4

5

A12-S

My supervisor really understands the maintenance task.

1

2

3

4

5

A13-S

I trust my supervisor.

1

2

3

4

5

A14-S

My supervisor sets clear goals and objectives for the team.

1

2

3

4

5

A15-S

My supervisor actively encourages team members to lift their level
of performance.

1

2

3

4

5

A16-S

When I make an error, my supervisor will support me.

1

2

3

4

5

A17-S

My immediate supervisor checks my work very carefully.

1

2

3

4

5

A18-F

The quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequently.

1

2

3

4

5

A19-F*

It is difficult for me to find out how well I am doing my job.

1

2

3

4

5

A20-F

My supervisor keeps me regularly informed of my progress.

1

2

3

4

5

A21-F

My work group receives detailed feedback regarding overall
performance.

1

2

3

4

5

My training and experience have prepared me well for duties in my
current job.

1

2

3

4

5

I have been encouraged to improve myself through continued
training.

1

2

3

4

5

I have found many opportunities to use my training in my current
job.

1

2

3

4

5

A8-SC*
A9-SC*

A10-SC* In high workload conditions, I am prepared to take a few shortcuts
to get jobs done on time.
A11-S

A22-T
A23-T
A24-T
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A25-T

I am not expected to perform tasks for which I have not been
trained.

1

2

3

4

5

A26-T

Maintenance personnel receive a lot of "hands-on" training.

1

2

3

4

5

A27-ST

I need to spend more time with my family and friends.

1

2

3

4

5

A28-ST

The demands of my work interfere with my home and family life.

1

2

3

4

5

A29-ST

I find it difficult to leave work concerns at work.

1

2

3

4

5

A30-ST

I have sometimes felt unwell because of work pressures.

1

2

3

4

5

A31-ST

My job here does not allow me enough time to relax.

1

2

3

4

5

A32-ST

I often feel irritated by things that happen at work.

1

2

3

4

5

A33-ST

Other workgroups don't appreciate the problems they cause by
amending their work schedules.

1

2

3

4

5

A34-ST

A heavy workload makes me feel tense.

1

2

3

4

5

A35-ST

I get anxious when I work to strict deadlines.

1

2

3

4

5

A36-E

When performing a maintenance task, I sometimes miss a step in a
test sequence.

1

2

3

4

5

A37-E

In a maintenance task, I sometimes do things I don't intend to do.

1

2

3

4

5

A38-E

Occasionally I plan an action that subsequently proves to be
incorrect.

1

2

3

4

5

There are times I have deliberately acted contrary to written
procedures.

1

2

3

4

5

When I return to a task sequence after an interruption, I sometimes
don't start at the right place.

1

2

3

4

5

A41-E

Occasionally, I forget to remove a tool at the completion of a task.

1

2

3

4

5

A42-E

I have been known to make a slip-up when I haven't been
concentrating.

1

2

3

4

5

A43-E

Under pressure, it's easy to forget steps in a task sequence.

1

2

3

4

5

A44-E

I only depart from approved procedures with my supervisor's
approval.

1

2

3

4

5

A45-E

I make errors in my job from time to time.

1

2

3

4

5

A46-E

There have been times when tiredness has affected my attention to
detail.

1

2

3

4

5

A47-E

I am pretty hard on myself when I make an error.

1

2

3

4

5

A48-E

I have made errors that have been detected by my supervisor.

1

2

3

4

5

A39-E
A40-E
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Section B: “Person” Factors (GHQ)
Please rate the given statements using the following scale:
0 = Not at all, 1 = No more than usual, 2 = Rather more than usual, 3 = Much more than usual
Item

Have you recently …

B1*

… been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing?

0 1 2 3

Response

B2*

… felt capable of making decisions about things?

0 1 2 3

B3*

… been able to face up to your problems?

0 1 2 3

B4

… lost much sleep over worry?

0 1 2 3

B5

… felt constantly under strain?

0 1 2 3

B6

… felt you could not overcome your difficulties?

0 1 2 3

B7

… been feeling unhappy and depressed?

0 1 2 3

B8

… been losing confidence in yourself?

0 1 2 3

B9

... been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?

0 1 2 3

B10*

… felt that you are playing a useful part in things?

0 1 2 3

B11*

… been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities?

0 1 2 3

B12*

… been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?

0 1 2 3
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Section C: Background Information
Please provide the following information:
Item

Demographic / Background Information

C1

Age _________

C2

Gender:

C3

Marital status:  Single

C4

Race/Ethnicity:

C5

Ratings:

C6

Total years of experience as an aviation maintenance personnel __________

C7

Highest education:

C8

 Male

 Female
 Married

 Divorced

 Separated  Widowed

 Caucasian
 African American
 Hispanic
 Asian American
 Other (please specify) ___________

 Airframe
 Powerplant
 Inspection authorization
 Other (please specify) ______________________________

 High School Diploma
 2-year/Associate’s Degree
 4-year/Undergraduate Degree
 Graduate Degree
 Other (please specify) ________________
How many voluntary reports have you submitted to FAA’s ASRS that was related to a
maintenance error in the past 2 years? ______
Please provide a brief description of the report.

C9

How many voluntary reports have you submitted to that related to a maintenance
hazard in the past 2 years? ______
Please provide a brief description of the report.

C10

Please describe any circumstances in which you were involved in a maintenance error.
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Appendix B
Raw Data

Table B.1
Raw Data
Row
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Y
42
45
52
28
41
36
39
36
44
32
35
33
35
31
37
46
33
30
31
35
41
33
39
37
50
33
46
40
33
25
38
39
30
65
26
42
40
26
34
44
38
18
44
31
35

X1
15
16
11
9
15
15
10
14
9
8
21
11
9
10
17
18
15
15
17
19
9
13
15
13
17
9
15
13
19
11
15
15
11
21
19
11
6
12
15
12
12
8
11
14
10

X2
14
18
14
21
22
24
22
16
10
16
21
18
10
15
16
17
23
20
17
21
17
19
16
15
16
16
21
19
21
25
13
15
17
13
18
19
18
13
18
24
25
22
18
19
15

X3
23
28
33
29
35
18
21
27
26
25
31
33
28
24
13
27
31
19
23
28
13
16
30
20
26
13
23
32
33
29
25
21
14
35
33
26
29
15
17
25
30
24
20
20
24

X4
15
15
15
12
19
13
14
11
6
11
15
6
7
8
10
14
13
10
7
14
4
12
15
11
14
9
16
12
17
12
11
12
10
16
16
12
6
8
10
9
16
8
13
16
10

X5
21
18
19
15
23
22
14
15
13
15
20
7
19
20
20
18
21
15
9
21
18
18
21
17
15
17
20
19
19
23
19
15
17
25
23
18
10
7
22
17
22
19
22
16
18

X6
30
36
33
34
25
23
32
11
34
21
12
26
23
25
30
25
22
29
28
30
25
28
33
36
24
24
29
20
21
26
33
27
24
45
14
25
21
29
27
26
33
21
25
27
24

X7
3
18
18
17
5
15
15
13
9
11
5
11
11
13
8
11.49
12
6
9
12
14
11.49
21
1
8
12
11
16
20
14
20
18
9
18
6
6
12
11
20
11
14
11
17
12
9

X8
47
60
46
56
47
48
56
62
51
33
23
47
50
41
41
44.5
40
39
44.5
51
35
44.5
43
48
38
57
51
47
45
56
42
20
44
33
42
37
40
44
48
33
44.5
50
27
40
33

X9
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

X10
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
NM
M
M
M
NM
M
M
NM
NM
M
M
NM
M
NM
M
NM
NM
M
M
M
M
NM
NM
M

X11
27
28
19
38
28
15
31
37
28
13
1
5
31
20
20
11
17
28
15
31
29
27
16
18
1
24
4
24
7
9
10
25
10
13

X12
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
O
C
C
O
O
O
C
C
O
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
O
O
O
C
C
O
O
C
C
O
C
C

X13
AF,PP,IA
A
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
A
APP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
PNT
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA,PL
AF,PP
A
AF,PP
AF,PP
A
AF,PP,A
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
Avionics
PNT
AF,PP,A
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
AF,PP
AF,PP
-

X14
Grad
2-Yr
TS
TS
2-Yr
Grad
2-Yr
TS
HS
2-Yr
4-Yr
Grad
4-Yr
HS
HS
HS
TS
TS
HS
2-Yr
TS
Grad
Grad
HS
4-Yr
4-Yr
HS
2-Yr
2-Yr
Grad
2-Yr
HS
HS
2-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
TS
TS
HS
2-Yr

Note. Y = Maintenance Errors, X1 = Recognition, X2 = Safety Concern, X3 = Supervision, X4 = Feedback, X5 =
Training, X6 = Stress, X7 = Psychological Distress, X8 = Age, X9 = Sex (M = Male, F = Female), X10 = Marital Status
(M = Married, NM = Not Married), X11 = Total Years of Experience, X12 = Race/Ethnicity (C = Caucasian, O =
Other). X13 = Ratings (AF = Airframe, PP = Powerplant, IA = Inspection authorization, A = Avionics, PNT =
Painter, APP = Apprentice, PL = Pilot, CS = Customer Service), X14 = Highest Level of Education (HS = High
School Diploma, TS = Technical School, 2-yr = 2-year college degree, 4-yr = 4-year college degree, Grad =
Graduate Degree).
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Table B.1
Raw Data (Continued)
Row
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Y
37
41
39
48
31
31
28
35
34
22
42
39
37
42
16
34
38
23
38
36
34
36
30
37
40
34
41
36
36
25
35
36
37
42
34
30
39
21
24
43
21
33
36
16
34

X1
11
12
17
14
9
9
8
10
12
22
11
15
13
17
5
14
9
21
12
10
12
9
12
15
15
10
16
14
16
12
11
5
9
16
8
16
13
8
17
16
20
17
16
16
15

X2
13
12
17
21
14
11
18
13
24
24
17
21
16
25
23
20
14
23
16
16
20
20
19
20
11
13
19
17
20
17
21
19
23
13
15
22
20
21
25
16
23
19
20
23
16

X3
20
14
23
14
23
19
20
15
30
30
20
30
24
31
11
22
25
35
21
20
25
19
29
21
23
17
19
25
27
25
26
19
27
23
7
34
19
19
35
21
32
21
27
12
26

X4
9
9
12
16
15
11
8
8
14
20
14
13
13
15
5
17
19
14
10
12
13
11
13
16
12
10
11
12
8
12
11
4
15
14
4
14
15
10
12
8
13
15
14
9
12

X5
11
12
18
14
21
14
13
11
21
19
15
20
16
20
19
19
15
25
15
18
12
14
14
18
16
16
18
19
18
15
16
15
17
18
10
15
18
23
24
18
22
18
19
24
19

X6
23
28
23
34
30
23
20
28
18
17
25
27
40
15
34
26
26
20
31
21
26
27
25
37
19
40
29
32
20
31
33
37
30
33
33
20
28
21
14
24
20
22
22
9
32

X7
9
2
14
7
3
18
8
7
7
8
9
7
26
29
11.49
4
14
12
9
4
11.49
12
13
14
18
11
16
20
5
16
23
15
15
9
11
4
5
5
9
7
6
10
4
5
7

X8
55
51
53
44
47
55
45
43
52
40
38
58
50
23
44.5
62
44.5
23
28
44.5
44.5
43
44
29
42
44.5
60
51
36
60
46
38
56
30
43
36
62
63
23
57
52
45
49
33
55

X9
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M

X10
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
NM
M
M
NM
M
M
M
NM
M
NM
M
M
M
M
M
M
NM
NM
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
NM
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
M
M

X11
30
22
10
27
30
10
18
7
10
7
24
0.5
47
4
10
8
23
22
5
40
40
13
38
25
6
35
10
18
8
48
31
3
40
26
5
7
30

X12
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
O
C
O
C
C
C
O
C
C
C
O
O
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
O
C
C
C
C
O
C
C
O
O
C

X13
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
AF
AF,PP,IA
AF,PP,PL
AF,PP
AF,PP
CS
AF
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
AF,PP,IA
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP,IA
AF,PP
AF,PP
AF,PP
CS
AF,PP
CS
AF,PP
AF,PP

X14
HS
2-Yr
HS
4-Yr
Grad
2-Yr
2-Yr
4-Yr
HS
4-Yr
Grad
Grad
HS
4-Yr
HS
2-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
TS
2-Yr
HS
HS
2-Yr
2-Yr
TS
2-Yr
4-Yr
4-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
2-Yr
HS
2-Yr
2-Yr
TS
HS
HS
HS
HS
HS

Note. Y = Maintenance Errors, X1 = Recognition, X2 = Safety Concern, X3 = Supervision, X4 = Feedback, X5 =
Training, X6 = Stress, X7 = Psychological Distress, X8 = Age, X9 = Sex (M = Male, F = Female), X10 = Marital Status
(M = Married, NM = Not Married), X11 = Total Years of Experience, X12 = Race/Ethnicity (C = Caucasian, O =
Other). X13 = Ratings (AF = Airframe, PP = Powerplant, IA = Inspection authorization, A = Avionics, PNT =
Painter, APP = Apprentice, PL = Pilot, CS = Customer Service), X14 = Highest Level of Education (HS = High
School Diploma, TS = Technical School, 2-yr = 2-year college degree, 4-yr = 4-year college degree, Grad =
Graduate Degree).
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